Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence

Chapter 08

Responsible service of gambling

Responsible service of gambling

Introduction

  1. The financial position of Victoria in 1991 was grim. The State’s public sector debt had risen to $28 billion, from about $23 billion in 1988. Unemployment was around 10 per cent. The budget deficit for the year was expected to exceed $1 billion.1
  2. For some time, the government had been subject to pressure to legalise casinos in the state. Given the circumstances, it is not surprising that the government finally agreed. The reasons were compelling. Significant economic benefits were expected. There would be a growth in employment. Tourism to the state would increase. Associated businesses would benefit. And, importantly, government revenue would rise.
  3. In the second reading of the Casino Control Bill, the responsible Minister explained that ‘[Melbourne] is a world-class city and the time has come when it should have a world-class casino’.2
  4. The Minister acknowledged that there were significant risks associated with establishing a casino. The risks the Minister identified were the potential for criminal activity and the influence of organised crime. In his 1983 Report, Mr Connor, QC warned that criminal organisations would find casinos ideal for the purposes of money laundering.3
  5. The Minister said that the Casino Control Bill was ‘designed to provide strict control over all aspects of the operation of casinos’ so as to exclude criminal activity and influence.4
  6. Nothing was said by the Minister introducing the Casino Control Bill about the potential harmful effects of gambling at a casino.5
  7. The opposition supported the establishment of a casino. The Member for Monash, a former barrister, said that the opposition:

    decided that, after very careful investigation of the economic, social and regulatory factors involved, there should be a casino in this State and that it should be what is described as a world-class casino.6

  8. The Member for Monash went on to say:

    On balance the economic benefits of casinos outweigh the risk on the regulatory side, the risk that is undoubtedly the greatest being that of organised crime taking an interest in casinos and intruding into them. The opposition came to the view that the level of surveillance and regulation is such that it will reduce the risk to a very low level.

  9. The only mention of the harmful effects of gambling during the parliamentary debate of the Casino Control Bill was in the context of loansharking and extortion. It was pointed out that there was a real potential for extortion where people have a gambling problem. They would be concentrated in one area and would potentially fall prey to those who lend money.8
  10. The stated purposes of the Casino Control Bill, which remain in the Casino Control Act to this day,9 reflected the government’s priorities and concerns. They were to:

    [e]stablish a system for the licensing, supervision and control of casinos with the aims of:

    1. ensuring that the management and operation of casinos remains free from criminal influence or exploitation; and
    2. ensuring that gaming in casinos is conducted honestly; and
    3. promoting tourism, employment, and economic development generally in the State.10
  11. Following the passage of the Bill in June 1991, the government took immediate steps to establish a casino, commencing the process to issue the casino licence in late 1991.11 The casino was anticipated to be a $1 billion development that could earn $100 million per year in gambling revenue for the State.12

The benefits of gambling

  1. Gambling in Australia has become a large and expanding industry. It incorporates a diverse range of activities, from charitable gambling to internet gaming. New products are being developed. The trend to increased spending on recreation and leisure and the expansion of commercial forms of gambling allows gambling to be promoted as a legitimate form of entertainment.13
  2. The gambling industry makes a significant contribution to the Victorian economy in terms of employment, investment tourism and tax revenue.14 Over 15,000 people are employed at clubs and hotels that have EGMs, at the Melbourne Casino and at standalone TAB agencies.15
  3. In dollar terms, between 2001 and 2019 more than $4 billion was spent on all forms of gambling in Victoria each year.16
  4. Gambling taxes have become a stable source of State revenue, with between $1.63 billion and $2 billion received annually by the State in the 2009 to 2020 financial years.17 In the 2020 financial year, gambling taxes were the State’s fifth-highest source of revenue.18 This revenue helps fund some of the essential services that the government provides, including health services, community projects and community education initiatives.
  5. Crown’s contribution to the economy must be acknowledged. Crown is a major employer (over 20,000 people are employed across the Crown Resorts businesses, including over 11,500 who work in Melbourne)19 and makes a substantial contribution to Victorian, Western Australian and Commonwealth revenues. It provides training and educational opportunities and, through its philanthropic arm, the Crown Foundation, contributes to cultural and charitable causes.20
  6. More specifically, Crown paid over $650 million in taxes in Australia in 2019. Since 2014 it has paid at least $812.4 million in corporate income tax to the Commonwealth as well as contributing over $3 billion to Victoria’s revenue. Through its procurement activities, Crown also supports many other Australian businesses.21
  7. In a submission to a 2015 Productivity Commission research paper into tourism, Crown Resorts contended that, with the exception of airlines, it was Australia’s largest generator of tourism revenue and that a third of its revenue came from international visitors. Crown Resorts also asserted that, in circumstances where Australia’s market share of tourism from China in particular was declining, it stood to ‘capture growing international demand for luxury travel, as [Crown’s integrated resorts] cater to the desire of the Asian middle class’.22
  8. Crown Melbourne was the fifth most visited attraction in Melbourne in 2019, with 2.2 million overnight visitors. Of this number, 1.6 million were domestic overnight visitors and 610,800 were international overnight visitors.23
  9. In the 2020 financial year, the Melbourne Casino and other gambling services contributed $149 million in ‘direct tourism gross value added’ to the State. While this industry sector does not make the highest direct tourism gross value added contribution, the amount is still significant.24
  10. More broadly, many people who gamble (including at the Melbourne Casino) do so because they enjoy it. Some studies have tentatively linked certain forms of gambling with an improved sense of wellbeing.25 The recreational and functional benefits of the Melbourne Casino extend beyond gambling to other forms of entertainment, and to accommodation and function spaces.

The harm caused by gambling

A brief overview

  1. The Productivity Commission conducted the first independent national review of the social and economic impacts of the gambling industries across Australia.26
  2. Its report was published in 1999.27 It was a novel and influential effort to evaluate the costs and benefits of gambling. The Productivity Commission’s work has been augmented by reports from the VRGF,28 the work of other organisations in Victoria29 and interstate,30 and a growing body of international reports and scholarship.31
  3. The Productivity Commission identified problem gambling as a significant social cost resulting from the rapid growth and commercialisation of the gambling industry. It noted the industry’s ability:

    simultaneously to provide entertainment that is harmless to many people, while being a source of great distress—and even of financial and personal ruin—to a significant minority. The imbalances between the consequences for each group can be very marked, a feature not found in other entertainment industries.32

  4. A common research tool to assess the risk and prevalence of problem gambling is the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). The PGSI is a tool based on research on the common signs and consequences of problematic gambling,33 and is a standardised measure of at-risk behaviour used by the VRGF.
  5. The PGSI is used by respondents to self-assess their gambling behaviour over the past 12 months. They answer nine questions by selecting a score for each: never (0), rarely (1), sometimes (1), often (2) or always (3). The scores are added up and respondents are placed in one of the following categories:
    • non-problem gambler (the person’s gambling has no negative consequences)
    • low-risk gambler (the person experiences a low level of problems with their gambling with few or no identified negative consequences—for example, they may very occasionally spend over their limit or feel guilty about gambling)
    • a moderate-risk gambler (the person experiences a moderate level of problems leading to some negative consequences—for example, they may sometimes spend more than they can afford, lose track of time or feel guilty about gambling)
    • a problem gambler (the person gambles with negative consequences and a possible loss of control—for example, they may often spend more than their limit, gamble to win money back and feel stressed about their gambling).34
  6. This and similar indices, such as the Short Gambling Harm Screen, have been used to measure the level of problem gambling in the population.
The number of problem gamblers
  1. In 2009, the Productivity Commission conducted a further inquiry into Australia’s gambling industries. The report, published in 2010, estimated that there were between 80,000 and 160,000 adults suffering severe problems from their gambling and between 250,000 and 350,000 adults at moderate risk, experiencing low levels of harm, and who could progress to problem gambling.35 In its 2017 report, ‘The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria’ (2017 VRGF Report), the VRGF estimated that out of a total Victorian population of around 4 million people, there were approximately 35,000 problem gamblers, 122,600 moderate-risk gamblers and 391,000 low-risk gamblers.36 In a later report, published in March 2020 (2020 VRGF Report), the VRGF estimated that there were approximately 36,000 problem gamblers, 118,000 moderate-risk gamblers and 329,000 low-risk gamblers in Victoria.37
  2. In 2018, the VRGF conducted an online questionnaire, rather than using the usual telephone-based survey method, and found markedly higher rates of problem gambling. It estimated that averaged over all age groups, the prevalence of problem gambling was 11 per cent and that the prevalence in the 25–34 year age group was 23 per cent.38 The authors observed that individuals may be more willing to acknowledge their gambling problems in an anonymous online questionnaire than in a telephone interview. They also noted that participants were chosen to be more representative of the general Victorian population than in other studies.39
  3. Evidence given to the Commission was that the prevalence of problem gambling in the Victorian adult population in the 2019 financial year was 0.7 per cent.40
The money lost to gambling
  1. Research showed that in the 2019 financial year, approximately 70 per cent of Victorian adults had participated in some form of gambling in the previous 12 months.41 The principal forms of legal gambling in Victoria are EGMs, casino table games, betting, lotteries, raffles and bingo.42
  2. Annual gambling losses are substantial. The amount lost per adult in Victoria in the 2018 financial year was estimated to be $1,163.43 Broken down by gambling product, the losses on EGMs are the greatest. Some $2.7 billion was lost on EGMs in Victoria in the 2018 financial year. This may be compared with sports betting losses in Victoria, which were around $371.7 million in the same period.44
  3. It is instructive to consider gambling losses by reference to problem gamblers and moderate-risk gamblers.
  4. The 2010 Productivity Commission Report estimated that problem gamblers likely accounted for around 40 per cent (possibly as much as 60 per cent or, in the most conservative case, as low as a (still significant) 22 per cent) of EGM losses, and moderate-risk gamblers accounted for a further 19 per cent (possibly as much as 27 per cent or, in the most conservative case, 7 per cent). Problem gamblers accounted for $2.6 billion of EGM losses.45
  5. More recently, the 2017 VRGF Report estimated that problem and moderate-risk gamblers in Victoria accounted for 59.4 per cent of EGM spending in the 2015 financial year (moderate-risk gamblers accounting for 23 per cent and problem gamblers accounting for 35.8 per cent), and that only 18.7 per cent of EGM spending came from non-problem gamblers.46 It also found that problem gamblers accounted for 58.7 per cent of table games spending at the Melbourne Casino, moderate-risk gamblers accounted for 19.1 per cent and low-risk gamblers accounted for 15.3 per cent. A mere 6.9 per cent of the casino’s table games spending came from non-problem gamblers.47
  6. The total amount spent on gambling at the Melbourne Casino is significant. Between the 2008 and 2018 financial years, this amount rose from approximately $1.1 billion to approximately $1.8 billion.48
The response of government and industry
  1. In 2006, the State Government acknowledged that over 55,000 adult Victorians had become addicted to gambling. The vast majority were addicted to gambling on EGMs.49
  2. As more evidence of the harmful effects of problem gambling emerged and the cost of those effects mounted, both the government and the industry took action to minimise the harm. Initiatives included:
    • prohibiting minors from accessing gambling
    • conducting community awareness campaigns
    • requiring the provision of information about gaming rules, odds and rates of returns
    • establishing self-exclusion programs
    • putting warning messages on gambling terminals
    • placing restrictions on advertising
    • establishing gambling assistance hotlines.50

Non-gamblers affected by gambling

  1. The number of people with gambling problems is much smaller than the number of people who may be affected by those problems.51
  2. Work carried out by the VRGF in 2016 confirmed that the harm done by gambling extends well beyond the gambler. The types of harm experienced by ‘affected others’—people in the familial and social networks of gamblers who are experiencing harms—include:
    • relationship disruption, conflict or breakdown
    • poorer health
    • emotional and psychological distress
    • financial harm
    • reduced performance at work or in study
    • cultural problems (for example, personal conflicts about gambling when it is against cultural beliefs, reduced ability to participate in cultural practices or meet community expectations, and reduced connection to the cultural community)
    • criminal activity
    • life course and intergenerational harms.52
  3. The 2017 VRGF Report stated that in the 2015 financial year:
    • Gambling-related harm imposed both direct and indirect costs on the gambler.
    • The costs imposed by gambling-related harm extended to affected others in the form of divorce or separation; experiences of violence; emotional distress; and, in extreme cases, the impact of suicide attempts or fatality by suicide.
    • Costs extended to third parties and the community in the form of productivity loss and work impacts; the cost of crime to businesses and the Victorian justice system; and costs to the health and human service sector, the mental health sector and homelessness services.
    • Every problem gambler affected approximately six others through their gambling, while gamblers at moderate risk affected three others, and low-risk gamblers affected one other.53
  4. The 2017 VRGF Report estimated that affected others could constitute over 22 per cent of the Victorian population; however, it noted that a substantial percentage of this population would be experiencing minor harms, not enough to give rise to a high degree of emotional stress and the costs associated with that.54

Costing the harms

  1. The cost to Victorians of the harms caused by gambling far exceeds the amounts lost by those gambling. The Victorian Auditor-General has assessed this cost to be around $7 billion a year, through damage to relationships, health and wellbeing, monetary losses and other social costs.55
  2. A brief survey of some of the types of harms that contribute to those costs follows.
Financial costs
  1. The financial costs of gambling harms are substantial, and can stem from bankruptcy, unpaid debts and excessive spending on gambling (which may result in financial strain, debt or less money available for essential items). The VRGF 2017 Report estimated that in the 2015 financial year alone, 2,693 bankruptcies may have been the result of gambling in Victoria. It estimated the annual cost of gambling-related bankruptcy in Victoria to be $70.1 million.56 That figure did not take into account the indirect costs that may arise from bankruptcy, such as costs to relationships (for example, emotional distress and divorce), and the use of government services such as housing assistance or financial support.57
Costs to health and wellbeing
  1. The physical and psychological impacts of gambling can be very grave. Problem gambling is associated with substantially lower levels of life satisfaction. The 2020 VRGF Report used the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index to measure Victorian adult respondents’ overall life satisfaction, as well as their satisfaction with how safe they felt; their standard of living; their personal relationships; their health; their future security; what they were currently achieving in life; and their feeling of being part of a community. Problem gamblers had notably lower scores than other respondents in every domain.58
  2. The 2017 VRGF Report indicated that in the 2015 financial year, over 40 per cent of problem gamblers reported increased depression due to gambling within the previous 12 months. Some 7.5 per cent of problem gamblers reported that their gambling had contributed to or caused a suicide attempt or ideation. Even adjusting this rate to accommodate the possibility that gambling was not the sole contributing factor, this amounted to 2,112 suicide attempts or ideation among problem gamblers alone within the previous 12 months. The total number of suicide attempts or ideation for low-risk, moderate-risk and problem gamblers was estimated to be 8,802.59
  3. The 2017 VRGF Report estimated (again, applying a reduction to account for those who may have committed suicide in any event) that there were 587 suicides in Victoria caused by gambling problems in the 2015 financial year.60
Costs to relationships and family
  1. Problem gambling has been shown to have disruptive and destructive consequences for relationships and families.
  2. The 2017 VRGF Report records that almost 20 per cent of problem gamblers in Victoria reported that their gambling contributed to or caused their divorce or separation. Applying a 20 per cent reduction to account for instances of divorce or separation that may have occurred in any event, it was estimated that gambling problems contributed to or caused 14,693 divorces or separations among low-risk, moderate-risk and problem gamblers.61
  3. Gambling has also been empirically associated with family violence. The relationship between gambling and family violence is complex.62 Gambling can result in stress, anger or financial crisis, which in some cases may increase the likelihood of family violence. In other cases, problematic gambling may be an effect of family violence. Some research indicates that there is a nearly threefold increase in the probability of violence in families where there is problem or moderate-risk gambling.63
Productivity and work costs
  1. Problem gambling can interfere with a person’s ability to function as a productive, gainfully occupied member of the community. The 2017 VRGF Report considered, for example, the cost of gambling-related job losses, absenteeism and lost productivity in the 2015 financial year. Datasets indicated that reduced productivity at work due to gambling problems cost businesses over $323 million that year.64 More than 16,000 people were estimated to be absent from work because of gambling problems, costing over $46 million.65 Further, over 11 per cent of problem gamblers, and almost 5,000 people with varying levels of gambling problems were estimated to have lost their job as a result of gambling problems (again adjusted to account for those who may have lost their job in any event).66
Costs to government
  1. Gambling imposes substantial costs on various branches of government. There are costs to the justice system as a result of gamblers who commit offences connected with gambling problems. In the 2015 financial year, some 18,513 people with varying levels of gambling problems were estimated to have committed a crime due to gambling.67
  2. Wider costs to government include the cost of establishing and maintaining the public structures that regulate, research and treat gambling-related problems; and the cost of people with gambling problems accessing health and human services, mental health services and homelessness services.68

Concluding remarks

  1. Concentrating attention on the financial costs of harms caused by gambling problems ignores the larger picture. Many of the most profound impacts of gambling problems defy quantification. The true impact of a life lost to suicide on the person’s family and friends is incalculable. The same is true of the personal cost to a life of irrecoverable years spent overwhelmed by addiction, uncertainty and hopelessness, or of a childhood marred by violence or homelessness.

The number of problem gamblers at the Melbourne Casino

  1. The Melbourne Casino is a huge, attractive and busy venue. In the five financial years from 2016 to 2020, Crown spent some $2.46 billion on marketing, rewards and other benefits and enticements to attract customers.69 These measures have been very successful. In each of the years 2016 to 2019, the Melbourne Casino had between 22.4 and 23.4 million visits. Numbers declined in 2020 because of the closures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.70
  2. The number of visits includes players who visit the Melbourne Casino on more than one occasion in a day. This means that estimating the number of individuals who attend each day is difficult. The likely number is somewhere between 12,000 and 14,000 players per day.71
  3. The Melbourne Casino attracts many gamblers who have problems with their gambling. Data from the 2020 VRGF Report shows that in 2018−19:
    • Twenty-five per cent of people who had gambled at the Melbourne Casino in the previous 12 months experienced some harm from gambling.
    • Just over a third of Victorians experiencing problem gambling, and nearly a third of all Victorians at moderate risk of experiencing problem gambling, had gambled at the Melbourne Casino in the previous 12 months.
    • Compared to the broader population of Victorians who gamble on table games, EGMs, bingo and Keno, those gambling at the Melbourne Casino are more likely to report having experienced at least one form of gambling harm.
    • Sixty-one per cent of people gambling on EGMs at the Melbourne Casino experiencing ‘problem gambling’ had used unrestricted EGMs in the previous 12 months.72
  4. Using data from the 2020 VRGF Report, Ms Rosa Billi, Branch Head for Research and Evaluation at the VRGF, concluded that the prevalence of problem gamblers at the Melbourne Casino may be three times higher than among all Victorian adults who gamble.73
  5. Crown says there are three issues of concern with Ms Billi’s analysis: (a) it is not statistically significant; (b) the sample size is too small to draw an accurate conclusion; and (c) since her conclusions were drawn from the 2020 VRGF Report’s findings but not published within it, they have not been peer-reviewed.74
  6. Those concerns can be put aside. First, the issues were not raised with Ms Billi, so she could not rebut or answer any criticism. To rely on them now is unfair.
  7. Second, Ms Billi’s analysis has some support in the research. A 2015 paper titled ‘Responsible Gambling and Casinos’, commissioned by Gambling Research Australia, reached the following conclusion:

    In general, regular casino gamblers were found (i.e. by prevalence studies) to be more likely compared to other gamblers to be problem gamblers with 10 per cent of casino gamblers in the general population likely to be moderate risk to problem gamblers (New South Wales); casino gamblers were over three times more likely to be problem gamblers and moderate risk gamblers than other gamblers (South Australia).

  8. Finally, even if the issues raised by Crown were valid, it is open to conclude that, as a matter of common sense, problem gamblers are more likely to be found in the casino when compared to all Victorian adults who gamble.
  9. So much appeared obvious to Parliament when considering the establishment of a casino in Victoria. During the debate on the Casino Control Bill, the Member for Monash said:

    Finally, it was pointed out to those who consulted on the issue that the potential for extortion is enormous where those who have a gambling problem … can be seen as concentrated in one area, and will perhaps be prey to those who lend money (emphasis added).76

  10. The evidence and submissions received by this Commission indicate that problem gamblers are drawn to the casino for many reasons, including because it is open 24 hours a day and has more EGMs than any other venue.77

The features of EGMs

  1. It is important to understand why such a large proportion of problem gamblers are attracted to EGMs, and why most money gambled by problem gamblers is spent on EGMs.
  2. Ms Billi said research that had examined the structural characteristics of EGMs has identified a range of factors associated with gambling harm. These factors include:
    • the rapid speed of play relative to other forms of gambling
    • the lack of natural breaks from gambling
    • the highly variable and unpredictable outcomes, together with product characteristics such as ‘near misses’ (where losses are presented as ‘almost wins’) and ‘losses disguised as wins’ (where a person loses more than they stake, yet the outcome is accompanied by the celebratory machine sounds and graphics that occur when a person wins),78

    which may lead to persistent gambling in the face of losses, particularly among those experiencing problem gambling.79

  3. Ms Billi said research shows that:
    • people who experience problems with gambling are more likely to gamble out of a desire to escape or alter mood, and products that offer rapid, continuous gambling appear to be a more effective means of achieving these goals
    • faster, more continuous gambling activities are more conducive to potentially harmful patterns of gambling behaviour, such as increasing stake size in an attempt to recoup losses
    • the absence of a natural break from gambling prevents a person from reflecting on the gambling outcome
    • increased EGM play speed may be associated with higher spending, greater underestimates of the amount spent, placing of higher bets and impaired recall of outcomes.80
  4. Other research confirms Ms Billi’s evidence. For example, there is evidence that EGMs can induce a dissociative ‘flow state’ where a gambler’s awareness of self, the passage of time and surroundings is diminished.81 For problem gamblers in particular, that ‘flow state’ may itself be addictive,82 especially for those suffering from depression, who find superficial relief in a dissociative state.83
  5. Research suggests that losses disguised as wins produce a response in the brain similar to that produced by wins, encouraging gamblers to continue gambling, and that they can enhance the ‘flow state’.84 Similarly, losses presented as ‘near misses’ may stimulate an even greater urge to continue playing than an actual win, and can result in players gambling for longer than intended.85
  6. In addition to having these general characteristics, the EGMs at the Melbourne Casino have particular characteristics that others in Victoria do not. The restrictions imposed on the EGMs at the Melbourne Casino are less stringent in many instances than those imposed on EGMs at other gaming venues in Victoria. The following table sets out the operational differences.
    EGM features
    Clubs and hotels
    Crown (restricted mode)
    Crown (unrestricted mode)

    Spin rate

    Cannot be shorter than 2.14 seconds

    Cannot be shorter than 2.14 seconds

    No restriction

    Bank note acceptor

    Cannot accept bank notes greater than $50

    Cannot accept bank notes greater than $50

    No restriction

    Load-up limit

    Limit of $1,000

    Limit of $9,949

    No restriction

    Pay-out limit

    Winnings higher than $2,000 must be paid by cheque

    Winnings higher than $2,000 must be paid by cheque

    No restriction

    AutoPlay

    Prohibited

    Prohibited

    Allowed

    Maximum bet per spin

    $5

    $10

    No restriction

    Source: Submission 60 VRGF, 31 May 2021, 20.

  7. As can be seen from this table, EGMs at the Melbourne Casino can operate in both restricted and unrestricted mode. Of the 2,628 EGMs permitted to be operated at Crown Melbourne,86 1,000 are permitted to operate in ‘unrestricted’ mode when certain requirements are satisfied (including that a player has a pre-set time and loss limit on their YourPlay account, and has not exceeded either limit).87 Crown Melbourne is the only venue in the state that has EGMs permitted to operate in unrestricted mode.88
  8. Mr Mark Mackay, Executive General Manager of Gaming Machines, acknowledged that because there are no maximum bet limits on unrestricted EGMs and there are higher bet limits on restricted EGMs at the casino than at other EGM venues, the risk of harm from gambling at the Melbourne Casino is greater than the risk of harm from gambling on any other EGMs in Victoria.89

The Gambling Code

  1. It is a condition of Crown Melbourne’s casino licence that it must implement a Gambling Code.90 Repeated breaches of its Gambling Code is a ground upon which the regulator may take disciplinary action against Crown Melbourne.91
  2. The requirement to implement a Gambling Code came about in the following way.
  3. In October 2006, the Victorian Government issued its report ‘Taking Action on Problem Gambling’.92 The Report set out the steps the government intended to take in response to problem gambling. The steps included establishing a code of conduct for the Victorian gambling industry to be implemented in 2007.93
  4. The requirement that there be a Gambling Code was implemented by the Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Vic). This legislation introduced a number of measures designed to deal with the prevention, early intervention and treatment of gambling-related harm.94 In relation to casinos, the measures included limiting the availability of ATMs in the casino, making it an offence to provide gaming machines outdoors and making it an offence to allow an intoxicated person to gamble.95
  5. It also required a range of gambling licence holders, including Crown Melbourne, to implement a Gambling Code. For Crown Melbourne, this new obligation was imposed under section 69 of the Casino Control Act.96
  6. Section 69 now provides:

It is a condition of a casino licence that the casino operator implement a Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct that complies with—

...

[the relevant Ministerial direction]97

  1. The latest Ministerial direction that applies to Crown Melbourne was made on 17 September 2018.98 The required contents of a Gambling Code are set out in part 2 of the direction. Most are concerned with the provision of information to customers. Others require positive action by the casino operator.99
  2. Under the heading ‘Interaction with customers’, the Ministerial direction provides:

    A code must require the relevant person to interact with customers to foster responsible gambling, and must identify how this will occur.

    In particular, a code must specify a process for interacting with those customers who:

    1. have requested information about, or assistance with, a gambling problem or self-exclusion; and
    2. are displaying indicators of distress that may be related to problem gambling.100
  3. An important question that arises is whether Crown Melbourne is implementing its Gambling Code. The answer to that question requires an investigation into:
    • Crown Melbourne’s obligations under its Gambling Code
    • what action it takes to comply with those obligations
    • whether that action is adequate to secure compliance.
  4. Before answering those questions, it is necessary to consider the terms of its Gambling Code.

A brief history of the Gambling Code

    1. Crown Melbourne has adopted different versions of its Gambling Code.
    2. The first version, adopted in 2009, required the following interaction with customers:

      A customer displaying signs of distress or unacceptable behaviour will be approached by a staff member who will offer assistance and referrals to specialist support as required. These signs are known by our staff and may include, but are not limited to, a person:

      • either gambling every day or finding it difficult to stop gambling;
      • gambling for extended periods without a break;
      • avoiding contact while gambling;
      • communicating very little with anyone else;
      • barely reacting to events going on around them;
      • displaying aggressive, antisocial or emotional behaviour while gambling; and
      • making requests to borrow money from staff or other customers or continuing to gamble with the proceeds of large wins.

      The assistance offered by staff may take the form of:

      • interaction with the customer and encouraging them to take a break from gambling;
      • offering the customer non-alcoholic refreshments such as a cup of tea or coffee in a quieter and more private area such as our break-out lounge areas or the [Responsible Gaming Support Centre].101
    3. The Gambling Code also required that all contacts with a customer by the Responsible Gaming Liaison Officers (RGLOs) and senior management would be recorded in an incident register, along with the action taken.102
    4. The circumstances in which there would be interaction with a customer were altered in the third version of the Gambling Code, which was adopted in 2012. The relevant part then read:

      A customer displaying signs of distress or unacceptable behaviour will be approached by a staff member who will offer assistance and referrals to specialist support as required.

      Observable Signs are seen or reported behaviours or patterns of behaviours which are potential indicators that a person may be experiencing problems with their gambling behaviours. These are seen or reported in context and usually more than one is displayed to indicate potential problems with gambling. Observable signs are included in Crown’s Responsible Service of Gaming training …103

    5. The ‘Observable Signs’ changed, to the following:
      • Self disclosure of a problem with gambling or problems related to gambling
      • Request to self-exclude
      • Distorted and irrational attitudes about gambling
      • Barely reacting to surrounding events
      • Intolerance to losing, displayed as bad temper or distress
      • Significant variation in mood during a gambling session
      • Children left unattended whilst parent/guardian gambles
      • Regular complaints to staff about losing or blaming the venue/staff for their losses
      • Requests to borrow money for gambling
      • Showing a pattern of gambling for long periods without a break
      • Progressive reduction of self-care e.g. appearing unkempt or fatigued
      • Requests for assistance from family and/or friends concerned about an individual’s gambling behaviour104
    6. The Gambling Code noted:

      These [Observable Signs] are adapted from ‘Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues’, Delfabbro et al, 2007 and ‘Current Issues related to identifying the problem gambler in the gambling venue’ various authors, Australian Gambling Council, 2002.105

    7. The fourth version of the Gambling Code, adopted in July 2016, made further changes to the section on intervention with customers. Three are material:

      The following change was made (marked up against third version added):

      As part of delivering exceptional customer service, our staff are encouraged to engage with our customers. A customer displaying observable signs of distress or unacceptable behaviours that may be related to potential problem gaming behaviours or unacceptable behaviour will be approached by a staff member who will offer assistance and referrals to specialist support as required.106

      The list of Observable Signs of problem gambling became:

      • Self-disclosure of a problem with gaming or request to self-exclude
      • Requests for assistance from family and/or friends concerned about an individual’s gaming behaviour
      • Children left unattended whilst parent/guardian gambles
      • Gets angry while gaming or shows signs of distress during or after gaming
      • Often gambles for long periods without a break
      • Witnessed or heard that a customer was trying to borrow money for gaming
      • Significant decline in personal grooming or appearance
      • Observed conflict over gaming between family members or friends
      • Unrealistic remarks about gaming
      • Complains to staff about losing or blames the casino or gaming product for losing
      • Secretive or embarrassed about being at the casino or stays on to gamble when friends leave the venue
      • Gambles without reacting to what is going on around him/her and avoids contact or conversation with others
      • Frequent visits to the ATM107

      In similar terms to earlier versions of the Code, the fourth version provided:

      Persons displaying [Observable Signs] will be referred to RGLOs or senior management who have undergone advanced responsible gaming training.108

    8. The fourth version stated that, in addition to the sources mentioned in the third version, the Observable Signs in this version were also adapted from the 2014 ‘Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators’ (2014 Study), by Anna Thomas, Paul Delfabbro and Andrew R Armstrong.109
    9. The fifth version, adopted in October 2016, made no relevant changes.110 The sixth version, adopted in 2019, made only one relevant change. Instead of persons displaying Observable Signs being referred to ‘RGLOs or senior management’111 they were now to be referred to ‘[Responsible Gaming Advisors] or management for referral to the [Responsible Gaming Advisors]’.112 During the Commission hearings, in May 2021, a seventh version of the Gambling Code was adopted. It contained no relevant changes.113
    10. In summary, the most recent Gambling Code requires Crown Melbourne staff to act if a customer displays an Observable Sign that may be related to potential problem gambling behaviours or unacceptable behaviour. One action is for the staff member to approach the customer and offer assistance. The other is for the customer to be referred to a Responsible Gaming Advisor (RGA) or to management for referral to an RGA.

    A key Observable Sign under the Gambling Code

    1. As has been explained, there were originally separate Observable Signs, being ‘either gambling every day or finding it difficult to stop gambling’ and ‘gambling for extended periods without a break’.114 The two were subsequently combined into: ‘showing a pattern of gambling for long periods without a break’.115 That Observable Sign then became ‘often gambles for long periods without a break’.116 This Observable Sign was the subject of considerable attention during the Commission hearings.
    2. The proper understanding of Observable Signs can be gathered from the research cited in the Gambling Code, namely the 2014 Study,117 the 2007 study, ‘Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues’ (2007 Study)118 and the 2002 study, ‘Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue’ (2002 Study).119 While the focus of the research was on EGMs, the 2007 Study involved participants who gambled on other games and the 2002 Study referred to casinos generally.120
    Long periods without a break
    1. The 2002 Study is not a research project, but ‘a compilation of submissions from a [panel] of Australian and international experts working in research or clinical practice’.121 As to length of playing sessions, the 2002 Study states:

      The panel had a wide range of session times indicative of problems. While most may not agree that the lower end of the range (1 hour) is indicative of anything serious, certainly five to six hours and beyond would raise concerns especially if linked to a number of sessions per week—although this latter feature was not a frequent response from the panel … This is also harder to quantify in absolutes, and people may lose very quickly if playing maximum stakes, many lines and experiencing a bad run. But clearly, a long session can be an indicator of trouble.122

    2. The 2007 Study involved a literature review and empirical research. The authors found that ‘there are certain behaviours that most, if not all, problem gamblers produce on at least some occasions’.123 One was that ‘[a] problem gambler typically gambles for long periods (often 3 hours or more) and often lose[s] track of what is going on around them’.124 The authors developed a list of indicators that would assist gaming venue staff to identify problem gambling. The list included ‘gambles for three hours or more without a break of 15 minutes or longer’ and ‘gambles for five or more hours without a break of 15 minutes or longer’.125
    3. The 2014 Study revised the indicators of a gambling problem identified in the 2007 Study. The authors noted the importance of long periods of continuous play; that is, play without a meaningful break:

      The results of the present study showed that the most common visible indicators of problem gambling which can be observed in venues relate to the duration and intensity of gambling or to ways of raising funds or chasing wins. Problem gamblers were likely to be intensely focused on their play, want to play for long periods of time without a proper break and play very rapidly or frenetically (emphasis added).126

    4. The revised list of indicators of a gambling problem in the 2014 Study included as a ‘probable’ indicator of a gambling problem, ‘often gambles for long periods (3+ hours) without a proper break’.127
    5. These studies make clear that the reference to ‘gambl[ing] for long periods’ in Crown Melbourne’s Gambling Code should be understood to mean gambling for at least three hours, with an outer limit of five to six hours, without a proper break.
    6. For its part, Crown Melbourne contends for a different approach. It says that the reference to a ‘long period without a break’ is a reference to the periods of permitted play set out in its internal Play Periods Policy.128
    7. There is no merit in this contention. The proper meaning of any aspect of a Gambling Code cannot be affected by a document not incorporated by reference into the Code.
    ‘Often’
    1. Since the fourth version of Crown’s Gambling Code, the relevant Observable Sign has required the customer to exhibit the behaviour of ‘often gambles for long periods without a break’ (emphasis added). The meaning of ‘often’ is unclear.
    2. The research contained in the 2002 Study suggests ‘often’ could mean a number of gambling sessions per week,129 gambling at least once a week,130 or gambling more than five hours a week.131
    3. The preferable view is that ‘often’ means two or more gambling sessions in a week. Gambling for a long period without a break for more than one session a week may not be an indicator of problem gambling. Gambling for five hours in a week is also unlikely, without more, to be a sign of problem gambling. It is reasonable to proceed on the basis that gambling for two or more sessions in a week could be a sign that there are problems.
    4. In the end, the correct construction, whatever it is, will not affect the outcome of the Commission’s analysis. This is because it is also reasonable to proceed on the basis that a significant number of players who gamble for extended periods are likely to do so more than once a week.

    Play Periods

    1. Crown Melbourne has an established policy that sets out the steps for Crown Melbourne staff to ‘administer and supervise those parts of the [Gambling] Code’ related to the Observable Sign ‘Often gambles for long periods without a break’ and to ‘breaks in play’.132
    2. This policy is the Play Periods Policy mentioned earlier.

    A brief summary of the Play Periods Policy

    1. Following a proposal in 2010,133 a ‘Play Periods Trial’ was implemented in May 2012.134 The trial provided that:
      • after 12 hours of play, the customer would be observed by a manager and/or RGLO and action or no action would be taken as required
      • after 16 hours of play, the customer would be spoken to by a manager or RGLO and action or no action would be taken as required
      • after 20 hours of play, the customer would be spoken to by an RGLO and action or no action would be taken as required
      • after 22 hours of play, the customer would be spoken to by an RGLO and action or no action would be taken as required
      • after 24 hours of play, the customer may be asked to leave depending on prior engagement/observation.135
    2. Version 1.1 of the Play Periods Policy was adopted in February 2018 and provided that:
      • after significant continuous gambling for less than 24 hours, the customer would be reminded to take substantial regular breaks
      • after 24 hours of continuous gambling, the customer would be asked to leave and be directed by an RGLO to take a 24-hour break
      • SYCO (being the loyalty program data collection system in place)136 reports would be generated every four hours, and RGLOs would check all ratings where there was gambling for 16 hours or greater.137
    3. Version 1.2, also adopted in February 2018, was in relevantly the same terms as Version 1.1.138
    4. Version 1.3, adopted in December 2018, made the following relevant changes:
      • After significant continuous gambling ‘without appropriate breaks’ for less than 24 hours, the customer would be reminded to take substantial regular breaks.
      • After 24 hours of continuous gambling ‘without appropriate breaks’, the customer would be asked to leave and would be directed by an RGLO to take a 24-hour break.
      • Gaming staff or an RGLO would interact with the customer at 12, 16 and 20 hours of gambling to encourage the customer to take a break from play.
      • If the customer also displayed ‘any observable signs’, the customer would be asked by staff to take a break.
      • RGLOs would check all ratings where there was gambling for 12 hours or greater.139
    5. Version 1.4, adopted in May 2019, was in relevantly the same terms as Version 1.3 (save that the title of ‘RGLO’ was changed to ‘RGA’).140
    6. No Version 1.5 was produced to the Commission.
    7. Version 1.6, adopted in December 2019, was in relevantly the same terms as Version 1.4 save for two key changes:
      • It expressly applied only to Crown loyalty program members as distinct from all customers.
      • It provided that gaming staff or an RGA would interact with or observe, as appropriate, the member (as distinct from interact with only) at 12, 16 and 20 hours of gambling to encourage the member to take a break from play.141
    8. Version 1.7, adopted in December 2020, also expressly applied only to Crown loyalty program members. It included the following relevant changes:
      • Members who continuously gambled ‘without appropriate breaks’ for significant periods of less than 18 hours would be reminded to take regular breaks.
      • Members who continuously gambled for 18 hours ‘without appropriate breaks’ would be asked to leave and be directed by an RGA or Gaming Manager to take a 24-hour break.
      • Gaming staff or an RGA would interact with or observe, as appropriate, the member at 12, 15 and 17 hours of gambling to encourage the member to take a break from play.142
    9. Accordingly, since Version 1.3 of the policy, the first time a staff member is required to check on a player, on the basis of their length of continuous play without appropriate breaks, has been at the 12-hour mark. No interaction has ever been required before this time under the various versions of the Play Periods Policy. This is also reflected in practice.143
    10. Moreover, Versions 1.6 and 1.7 of the Play Periods Policy do not mandate interaction, and permit observation of the customer at the 12-hour mark.144 Indeed, in practice, an RGA would only observe from afar and would not interact with the customer unless there was some other Observable Sign displayed at that time.145 The same process may occur at the 15 and 17-hour mark (under Version 1.7 of the Play Periods Policy).146
    What constitutes a break?
    1. There is little evidence of what length of time constitutes a ‘break’. This makes it difficult to determine when a patron has gambled for a particular time ‘without appropriate breaks’ (as specified in the Play Periods Policy since Version 1.3). According to an internal paper prepared by the VCGLR in June 2020, the position is as follows:

      RGAs are provided with … mobile phone alerts of members who have been on the gaming floor for more than 12 hours without a substantial break, based on their loyalty club use. This new technology seeks intervention at:

      • 12 hours of continuous play without breaks of more than 2 hours
      • 14 hours of continuous play without breaks of more than 3 hours
      • 20 hours of continuous play (irrespective of breaks), and
      • 24 hours of continuous play (irrespective of breaks).147
    2. The break times are not unreasonable. On the other hand, the length of the break time is largely irrelevant as a harm mitigation measure by Crown Melbourne for reasons that will be explained.

    A recent ‘enhancement’ to the Play Periods Policy

    1. In May 2021, and in direct response to this Commission’s exploration of the issue,148 the Crown Resorts board endorsed a plan to introduce Responsible Service of Gaming (RSG) ‘enhancements’.149 These enhancements will be discussed later. At present, it is only necessary to mention that one enhancement was an alteration to the Play Periods Policy. The alteration was that:

      Crown will introduce the following time limits on playing at Gaming machines, Table Games and Electronic Table Games:

      • Domestic Players—12 hours in a 24 hour period with observation/intervention at eight and 10 hours. Customers will not be able to play for more than 48 hours in a week.
      • International Premium Program Players—staying less than seven days—18 hours in a 24 hour period with interventions at hours 12, 14 and 16. Players staying for longer than 7 days would align with Domestic Player limits.150
    2. Crown has indicated that a new Play Periods Policy, reflecting the above changes in respect of domestic players, was approved on 24 May 2021.151
    3. While the change is a positive development, precisely how the new Play Periods Policy will operate is not clear.
    4. Further, the change was developed and approved in just six days, and in circumstances where the person responsible for the change, Mr Steven Blackburn (Group Chief Compliance and Financial Crime Officer of Crown Resorts),152 did not appear to have a full understanding of the issues involved. This is not intended to be a criticism of him.153
    5. One final matter should be noted. There is evidence that Crown Melbourne was ‘also looking at implementing a 3-hour check, between three and four-hour and implementing an additional check at that stage’.154 Crown has not indicated when a change along those lines would be implemented.155
    6. What follows focuses on Play Periods Policy Version 1.7 (unless the context indicates otherwise).

    Breaches of the Play Periods Policy

    1. The evidence reveals the following:
      • Crown Melbourne has consistently failed to comply with both the Gambling Code and the Play Periods Policy. Players have been allowed to gamble continuously for 12 hours or more without any observation or interaction.156 Some customers have been allowed to gamble continuously for well over 24 hours.157
      • Faithful compliance with the Play Periods Policy is inconsistent with the requirements of the Gambling Code (this observation applies equally to the May 2021 enhancement). The Gambling Code requires that a customer be approached and offered, or referred to, assistance when they display an Observable Sign. It provides that ‘often gambl[ing] for long periods without a break’ is an Observable Sign.158 The literature on which this Observable Sign is based shows that a ‘long period’ is between three hours and five to six hours.159 Yet, the various versions of the Play Periods Policy discussed above do not require an observation or interaction by Crown Melbourne staff until at least 12 hours of gambling (without a break of two or more hours).160 In practice, the position is worse. At the 12-hour mark, staff will only observe a customer, not interact with them, unless they are displaying some other Observable Sign.161
      • The alerts sent to RGAs in relation to play periods do not include information about how frequently customers gamble, making it very difficult for the RGAs to know whether a customer has been gambling ‘often’.162
      • The alerts are concerned with ‘carded’ customers only (that is, Crown loyalty program members).163 RGAs must rely on observation alone to determine whether an ‘uncarded’ customer has ‘often gambled for long periods of time without a break’. That is an almost impossible task. As one RGA agreed, her job would be ‘much, much easier … if people were playing carded’.164
    2. The evidence that establishes these propositions will now be addressed.

    Identifying patrons with gambling problems

    The measures implemented by Crown Melbourne
    1. Ms Sonja Bauer, then Group General Manager of Responsible Gaming at Crown Resorts, gave detailed evidence about how Crown Melbourne deals with customers with gambling problems. She explained that:
      • All Crown Melbourne employees are trained in RSG when they commence employment. Operational staff such as food and beverage and gaming staff undertake refresher training every two years thereafter.165 The training includes Observable Signs.166 Staff are trained to inform an RGA,167 or their manager (who will in turn inform an RGA), when they notice a customer displaying Observable Signs.168 Some staff also attend VIP/Operational management meetings where gaming managers are updated on RSG matters.169
      • Crown Melbourne established a Responsible Gaming Centre (RGC) in 2002. It comprises ‘a reception area, private counselling rooms and an office area, and is located close to, but away from the casino gaming floor’.170 It is staffed by RGAs, responsible gaming psychologists and a chaplaincy service.171 There are three responsible gaming psychologists and one part-time chaplain.172
      • RGAs are trained to implement and deliver Crown Melbourne’s responsible gaming programs and services ‘with the aim of minimising harm for customers and their families’.173 RGAs are required to spend a proportion of their time walking the gaming floor ‘to approach and respond to customers exhibiting problem gaming indicators, and [to attend] to referrals and enquiries from staff’.174
      • Crown Melbourne maintains an electronic database known as the Responsible Gaming Register (Register), used by responsible gaming staff ‘to log activities pertaining to the service of responsible gaming’. It generates daily reports and can produce reports on particular customers when required.175
      • The Play Periods Policy is applied to regulate the time customers spend engaged in gambling.176 The evidence indicates that customers may gamble at the Melbourne Casino using a Crown loyalty card (enabling them to gain points and associated benefits), or without a card. Crown Melbourne staff commonly refer to this as ‘carded play’ and ‘uncarded play’. Where a player is engaged in carded play on EGMs, it is possible to measure the time they have spent gambling within a given day. If a carded player spends 12 hours gambling without a break of two or more hours, an RGA will receive an alert on their mobile phone via a system called ‘Splunk’, which enables the RGA to identify the player’s location. The RGA can then check on the player. Further alerts are received at 15, 17, 18, 20 and 24 hours of play (without appropriate breaks).177
      • There is a ‘Crown Model’, which is a predictive data modelling tool that Crown Melbourne has devised. Using characteristics of carded players who have subsequently self-excluded, it attempts to predict problematic play. The model does not operate in real time. Rather, RGAs are provided with reports listing a tranche of 100 members whom the model identified as appropriate for interaction with the RSG Team. Efforts are then made to interact with that person.178 The evidence indicates that the reports are created approximately every six weeks, and the RSG Team has about four to five weeks to action each report, and to evaluate and report on the data obtained.179
      • Crown Melbourne maintains a Self-Exclusion Program where individuals who wish to self-exclude can visit the RGC and undertake in writing to do so, or can self-exclude via the online portal on Crown Melbourne’s website. Customers will self-exclude for a minimum of 12 months, during which Crown Melbourne’s policy requires certain steps to be taken to ensure those customers cannot gamble at the Melbourne Casino. A third party exclusion program also operates, permitting family members or others to apply to Crown Melbourne to review a person’s gambling behaviour. Third parties may also contact RGAs to report concern for others.180
      • There is a Time Out Program, which is an adjunct to the Self-Exclusion Program. Through this, customers can elect to ban themselves from the gaming floor for three or six months.181
    2. These tools are not effective. Crown Melbourne now understands that there are ‘serious deficiencies in some aspects of its Responsible Gambling services’.182
    Staffing levels and staff training
    1. The challenges of administering RSG at the Melbourne Casino are immense. The venue is enormous. In the years 2016 to 2019 there were between 22.4 and 23.4 million visits to the gaming floor each year,183 with an estimated 12,000 to 14,000 unique visitors each day.184
    2. The key RSG staff on the casino floor are the RGAs.185
    3. Until 2018, Crown Melbourne employed only seven RGAs. In 2018, the number was increased to 12 following concerns raised in the VCGLR’s Sixth Review.186
    4. Increasing the number of RGAs to 12 was intended to provide even coverage across the 24 hours of the day that the Melbourne Casino is open.187 But with only 12 RGAs, no more than three are at work at any one time.188 The Commission assumes that as has been announced, when a further four RGAs are hired,189 there will be no more than four RGAs at work at any one time.
    5. Whether the number of RGAs present at one time is three or four, it is inadequate.190 RGAs have numerous responsibilities. These include providing information or advice to staff, entering information into the Register, speaking with customers who are contemplating self-exclusion and managing customers who have attempted to enter the gaming floor despite having self-excluded.191
    6. The RGA position description specifies that only 30 per cent of an RGA’s role will be dedicated to ‘Customer Service and Operations’, which includes walking the gaming floor.192
    7. This means that most of the time, there are fewer than three RGAs present on the gaming floor. Sometimes no RGA is present on the gaming floor because they are attending to other duties.193
    8. Even when all three RGAs are on the gaming floor, each has to supervise approximately 870 EGMs and approximately 180 gaming tables (including poker and other table games).194
    9. Save for the RGAs, operational staff have little training in responsible gambling. All operational staff (including gaming, food and beverage and security personnel) receive a 45-minute training session as part of their induction,195 and online refresher training for an hour every two years.196 Staff working in EGM areas of the casino receive a further hour of advanced training,197 and some staff are required to undertake additional hospitality or management training.198 However, only 10 minutes of the induction training,199 and five minutes of the advanced training, are dedicated to Observable Signs.200
    10. Crown Melbourne expects the task of the RGAs to be supported by all staff working on the gaming floor. That expectation is not the reality. In the end, Ms Bauer accepted that, more often than not, food and beverage staff and dealers were there to do their primary jobs and were not, for example, keeping track of play periods.201
    11. In any event, there are practical difficulties with the approach that all Crown Melbourne staff are involved in RSG.202 The roles of operational staff—whether they are serving food and drinks at a busy bar or dealing hands at a blackjack table—do not permit them to provide meaningful support to the RGAs in relation to the dozens, if not hundreds, of customers in their immediate vicinity.
    12. Research has found that staff are not keen to intervene with customers displaying problem gambling behaviours.
    13. Research indicates that staff in gaming machine venues are generally reluctant to make an uninvited approach unless the customer is being aggressive, trying to borrow money or appears to be extremely upset. Approaches to offer assistance were very rare.203 This research suggests that staff will only intervene to prevent disruption to other patrons on the gaming floor rather than to assist the problem gambler.
    14. Crown submits that an operating model under which all staff are charged with at least some responsibility for looking out for Observable Signs is possible.204 That might be so in theory. But it would require extraordinary changes to workplace practices for such a model to operate effectively. Certainly, it will not be achieved in the short term.
    15. A number of Crown Melbourne staff who work on or near the gaming floor were randomly selected to give evidence about the assistance they give to RGAs. The staff included food and beverage staff, dealers and hosts. Each gave their evidence anonymously.
    16. There were compelling similarities in their evidence. For example, several of them:
      • were not even familiar with the term ‘Observable Signs’, let alone able to name specific Observable Signs205
      • could not accurately explain Crown’s Play Periods Policy206
      • did not know what RSG meant,207 or did not often encounter or deal with RSG issues in their work208
      • did not know where the RGC was located or had never been there209
      • could not name any of the 12 RGAs at Crown and/or could not recall speaking to them210
      • had never, or not more than once over their years of employment, referred anyone to the RGC or suggested to their manager that someone be referred.211
    The evidence from customers
    1. That Crown Melbourne staff face an impossible task attempting to identify and deal with customers who gamble continuously for extended periods is borne out by the evidence of what actually happens on the Melbourne Casino gaming floors.
    2. The Commission heard from several people who had gambled at the Melbourne Casino. Most gave evidence about their past or ongoing struggles with problem gambling. Their evidence provided a vivid and powerful picture of the sometimes devastating consequences of gambling.

    Case studies

    Elizabeth’s story

    Elizabeth is a trained secondary school teacher. She has tertiary qualifications. She also worked in real estate for a number of years.212

    Elizabeth owned a house in a beachside suburb. The house was sold and Elizabeth planned to use the proceeds ($120,000) to buy another house in Melbourne. But she was a problem gambler. She lost approximately $80,000 gambling.213 In the end, Elizabeth only had $5,000 left.214

    One evening, Elizabeth went to the Melbourne Casino in the ‘misguided hope that [she] might win all of what [she] had lost back’. She gambled for approximately 52 hours straight. Staff members would start their various shifts. She would recognise them. At one point, a staff member asked, ‘[A]re you still here?’ Elizabeth just nodded, smiled and said, ‘Yes I am. This is my time off.’215

    Elizabeth lost her $5,000. She said, ‘Never ever did one other person come and approach me … to say “Are you okay?”’216

    When she had lost all of her money, Elizabeth left the casino.

    Elizabeth’s gambling continued after this incident. Following one session of gambling during which she lost all of her money, she drove to the Westgate Bridge. She was absolutely desperate. She stopped her car and thought about ending her life.217

    What stopped her was the railing that she needed to scale, which was waist high. As she was attempting to clamber over, the bow of a ship appeared. The lights and noise of the ship frightened her, but they also brought her back to her senses.218

    Elizabeth returned to her car and drove to the Royal Melbourne Hospital, where she was admitted for a short time. She then underwent counselling.219

    Binbin’s story

    Binbin was raised in China. He came to Australia when he was 16 to study. He obtained a Bachelor’s degree in law and business and a Master’s degree in accounting.220

    He married, and bought several properties.221

    After losing his job, Binbin began to gamble, starting with online gambling. He also started gambling at the Melbourne Casino. Binbin's gambling habit became so bad, he excluded himself from online gambling.222

    While gambling at the Melbourne Casino, Binbin was invited to gamble in the Mahogany Room (the casino’s high roller room) by a host.223

    Over a two-month period between late 2019 and early 2020, Binbin went to the Melbourne Casino and gambled every day, often for over eight hours a day, and on two occasions for ‘maybe 15 hours a day’. On only one occasion was Binbin approached by a staff member about responsible gambling. By then, Binbin had already gambled every day for between one and one and a half months, and had lost around $50,000 to $60,000.224

    Binbin sold all of his properties to fund his gambling addiction, but was able to transfer some of the proceeds to his parents so that he could not spend the money. His marriage ended.225

    Stuart’s story

    Stuart is a relief primary school teacher.226

    He began gambling at the Melbourne Casino about 15 years ago. At the time, he was a heavy drinker and drug user.227

    Initially, Stuart went to the Melbourne Casino complex with friends, because he could get a drink any time of the day there.228

    Then Stuart began playing on the EGMs. Over time, he came to regularly gamble at the Melbourne Casino and other venues.229

    Over a 10-year period, Stuart would gamble at the Melbourne Casino about once a month.230 He was often under the influence of drugs or alcohol.231 He was never approached by Crown Melbourne staff for gambling for too long.232

    Stuart did not witness Crown Melbourne staff approach any person for gambling for too long.233 He did see staff approach persons if they misbehaved in some way; for example, if they started striking an EGM.234

    Carolyn’s story

    Carolyn worked as an administration officer in an electrical company.

    From time to time, Carolyn gambled at the Melbourne Casino with her employer.235 Initially, she was able to gamble within her means.236 But over a number of years, she developed a harmful addiction.237 Gambling eased her loneliness and she was drawn to the benefits offered to Crown loyalty program members.238

    Carolyn began to steal money from her employer to fund her gambling habit. She stole over $400,000 in a seven-year period.239

    Ultimately, Carolyn’s crime was discovered and she was convicted and sent to prison for stealing money from her employer.240 At the time she was 64 years old.241

    Carolyn gave up her inheritance and all her savings to repay the debt to her employer.242 She now lives a modest life with ‘nothing to show for all [her] years of hard work’, and is heartbroken and anguished.243

    During all her time gambling at the Melbourne Casino, even when she spent all day gambling, no one ever approached Carolyn to ask if she was okay or suggest she take a break.244 She said, ‘I would have thought that if they could see you’re sitting there for six, 12, even five hours or whatever, playing, and not taking a break … they would come up and say, “Look, you know, you haven’t taken a break. How about you come and have a coffee?” It doesn’t happen. It doesn’t happen. So long as you’re spending money, it won’t happen.’245

    Carolyn believes that if she had been approached while gambling, and spoken to, she ‘might not have spent that time in prison’.246

    1. The Commission also received submissions attesting to lengthy gambling sessions at the Melbourne Casino with no or insufficient staff intervention.247
    2. Then there are places at the Melbourne Casino where gamblers may be left unnoticed by staff.248
    3. Ultimately, Ms Bauer agreed that during the casino’s busiest times, problem gamblers could ‘get lost in a big crowd’, because staff are ‘busy doing other things’.249 Even during quiet periods, problem gamblers go unnoticed because staff levels are lower and the gaming floor is huge.250
    4. This is aggravated by the fact that RGAs only receive alerts in relation to customers who use carded play.251 For uncarded players, RGAs must rely on face-to-face observation of individual customers.252 On a busy and expansive gaming floor, recognising long periods of continuous play by uncarded players is a difficult, if not impossible, task.
    5. Ms Bauer accepted that uncarded players are ‘the least likely to be picked up for reminders’ about excessive play periods. Ms Bauer also accepted that if a customer prefers anonymity, they are unlikely to engage in carded play and may well be ‘the ones most likely to be trying to avoid’ being reminded to, for example, take a break.253
    Evidence from support workers
    1. The Commission heard evidence from several people who work with those experiencing gambling harms.
    2. In the last five years, ‘Gloria’, a gambling counsellor and social worker, has counselled around 200 clients.254 About 85 per cent of her current clients (or their family members) are gambling at the Melbourne Casino. Gloria also visits the casino from time to time as part of her work.255
    3. Gloria gave evidence that a client had gambled continuously at the casino for more than two days, sleeping on sofas, at the food court and in cars in the car park.256 Gloria said it was common for problem gamblers who visited gambling counsellors to spend more than 24 hours at a time at the Melbourne Casino.257 Gloria also said that staff would only intervene and encourage people to take a break or ask them to leave if they misbehaved (such as by arguing with other customers) or appeared dishevelled.258
    4. Gloria also gave evidence about the consequences of excessive gambling at the Melbourne Casino. One horrific incident must be mentioned:

      A: … One example is the most horrible one. It happened five years ago. And then the wife is like came to my office and reported family violence related to her husband who has the gambling behaviours. And when this man is lose money at Crown Casino he will come back home and whack his wife, then blaming her that she brings bad luck after they getting marriage because before getting marriage the man can win some money, after they get marry he keep losing the money. So he thinks that is all his wife’s fault.

      Q: And just so the Commissioner understands, how did the husband propose the money be repaid?

      A: He force his wife to provide sex work in their massage shop. He ask his wife to provide either hand job or blow job to the client to collect more money.259

    5. ‘Ronaldo’ has worked with 70 to 80 clients over the course of a career as a social worker, and currently has 15 active clients.260 Ronaldo estimated that around 75 per cent of clients gamble at the Melbourne Casino for up to 12 hours a day.261 Ronaldo mentioned that one client had gambled for four days, occasionally sleeping in front of EGMs, but that ‘none of the staff there have approached her ever’.262
    6. Ronaldo had also never heard of casino staff regularly approaching customers who had been gambling for long periods and asking them to take a break.263 During regular work-related visits to the Melbourne Casino, Ronaldo had seen people ‘crying on their phone and … staff walking by without approaching them’, and ‘a lot of people sleeping right in front of the pokie machines’.264
    7. ‘Prita’, a gambling counsellor,265 also gave evidence. The following exchange took place:

      A: So, my clients told me that they can spend hours, like 24 … more than 20 hours per day, or they can stay at Crown for several days without being check in, whether to see if they is okay. And they even report to me that if they keep playing, no one come in and check in with them regardless the longest hour that they’ve stayed at Crown. They always been approached if they were too tired and they fall asleep. That is why one of the staff will check in with them and ask them to leave the venue and take a nap or something like that.

      Q: So the only times that your clients reported to you that they had been asked to leave is when they have fallen asleep?

      A: Yes.

      Q: No other client has been told they were asked to leave because they were gambling too long or exhibiting signs of distress?

      A: No, never.266

    8. One of Prita’s clients, a black tier member (of the Crown loyalty program), told Prita that she had gambled for more than 10 days without stopping, and staff did not check on her or ask whether she was okay.267
    9. Regrettably, the evidence revealed that the consequences of excessive gambling included loansharking,268 criminal activity,269 forced prostitution270 and even suicide.271 These are precisely the kinds of harms that were identified as potential consequences of gambling at the outset of this chapter.
    Evidence from a Responsible Gaming Advisor
    1. The Commission also heard evidence from an RGA.272 The RGA gave evidence anonymously. This is what was said:
      • Customers sometimes engaged in uncarded play to avoid detection.273
      • At times customers were permitted to gamble continuously for periods in excess of 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 and even 24 hours.274 Some were permitted to gamble for 24 hours or more without a significant break and without being spoken to or approached.275
      • RGAs do not receive alerts in relation to play periods for uncarded players; instead, RGAs must rely on their visual observations as they circulate around gaming areas. This is more difficult than monitoring carded players.276
      • Customers sometimes fell asleep at EGMs. In some instances they were woken up and asked to move along, but were not offered any assistance or referred to RSG services.277
      • RGAs would receive an alert when a carded player had gambled for 12 hours. Provided the player was not displaying other Observable Signs, they would not approach and speak to them.278
    2. It is worth expanding on the last point. The RGA gave the following evidence:

      Q: … if you get a [phone] alert at 12 hours, and you get to the customer in time and you observe the customer, let’s take that hypothetical example, and I know every case is different, but if you then observe the customer and they are not displaying any other observable signs, in the ordinary course, your approach is to just make that observation at 12 hours; is that right?

      A: Yes.

      Q: And not, at 12 hours, to go and approach and speak to the customer, in the ordinary course?

      A: In the ordinary course, yes.279

    The Mahogany Room
    1. The Mahogany Room is the high roller room at the Melbourne Casino.280 Access is restricted to platinum and black tier members of the Crown loyalty program. There are about 7,000 platinum members and about 750 to 800 black tier members.281 Together, they contribute 62 per cent of turnover from Crown loyalty program members.282 The goings-on at the Mahogany Room are of some importance.
    2. Mr Peter Lawrence, the General Manager, VIP Customer Service, accepted that customers in the Mahogany Room often gamble for more than 12, 14 or 16 hours.283
    3. The evidence given by Mahogany Room customers was consistent with Mr Lawrence’s observation, and indicated that there was no intervention by staff during these periods of gambling. One current black tier member gave the following evidence:

      Q: … Is the casino staff and the hosts, are they encouraged to get people in no matter what if they know someone has a problem or are they astute and they try to help people with that?

      A: They don’t try to help anybody in there ...

      Q: Have you ever seen, for example, someone gambling who looks tired or might have been there for a while and someone come along and tap them on the shoulder and say, ‘You’ve been here for a long time, why don’t we get a drink and have a break’?

      A: No.284

    4. A former black tier member said this:

      Q: And if you were to gamble—if you were to gamble for 10 hours in a row, or 11, 12, 13, have you gambled those periods?

      A: I have on many occasions …

      Q: Has anyone tapped you on the shoulder to have a break?

      A: Never. Never.

      A: I’ve never seen anyone tapped on the shoulder and asked the question, you’ve exceeded … I’ve seen people fall asleep.285

    The Responsible Gaming Register
    1. Another source of evidence is the data in the Register. The Register records interactions between RSG staff members and customers and other parties in relation to responsible gaming.286 Ms Bauer extracted information from the Register that she said provided ‘an overview of the behaviours that are recorded that may be indicative of problem gambling behaviours’.287 What the extract shows, for example, is that:
      • in 2016, there were a total of 1,470 interactions. Of these, 846 arose from customers voluntarily requesting assistance or seeking self-exclusion, a further 42 were identified by a third party (such as a concerned family member reporting a person’s problem gambling) and 582 were identified by Crown Melbourne staff.
      • in 2017, there were a total of 1,603 interactions: 957 voluntarily identified, 34 identified by third parties and 612 identified by Crown Melbourne staff
      • in 2018, there were a total of 2,125 interactions: 1,012 voluntarily identified, 67 identified by a third party and 1,046 identified by Crown Melbourne staff
      • in 2019, there were 3,366 interactions: 1,724 voluntarily identified, 198 identified by a third party and 1,444 identified by Crown Melbourne staff.288
    2. We return to these figures later in this chapter. As will be made clear, the figures demonstrate that there is little interaction by Crown Melbourne staff with customers who gamble for extended periods.
    3. The Register shows many instances where no interaction occurred in response to a phone alert to an RGA (in relation to play periods) for several hours after the alert was received.289 The Register also disclosed many instances where the action taken was not the interaction required by the applicable Play Periods Policy and the Gambling Code.290 Examples include failures to take any action at the 12-hour mark, 16-hour mark, 20-hour mark and even after 24 hours (as required by the relevant Play Periods Policy).291
    4. These are not isolated instances. They are part of a pattern of systemic failures that is evident from a close examination of the Register.
    5. An examination of an arbitrarily chosen day from the Register, 10 June 2019, highlights the point.
      Time
      Comments

      8.05 am

      PP16 [ie Play Period alert]

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [A] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      8.31 am

      PP20

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [A] advised [patron] playing for 20hrs with no significant break.

      9.27 am

      P24

      PRE

      Tables

      TG ACM [B] advised [patron] playing for over 24hrs with no significant break.

      10.50 am

      PP16

      VIP

      Machines

      GM VOSM [C] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      10.55 am

      PP16

      PRE

      Machines

      GM VOSM [C] advised [patron] playing for 18hrs with no significant breaks (staying in-house).

      12.33 pm

      PP20

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [A] advised [patron] playing for nearly 24hrs with no break longer than 4.5hrs.

      12.33 pm

      PP16

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [A] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no break longer than 3.5hrs.

      12.34 pm

      PP16

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [A] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      2.58 pm

      PP24

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [D] advised [patron] playing for over 24hrs with no significant breaks.

      3.15 pm

      PP20

      PRE

      Machines

      GM VOSM [E] advised [patron] playing for 21hrs with no break longer than 4.5hrs.

      4.58 pm

      PP24

      PRE

      Machines

      GM VOSM [F] advised [patron] playing for over 24hrs with no significant breaks.

      5.21 pm

      PP16

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [D] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      5.22 pm

      PP16

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [D] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      5.22 pm

      PP16

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [D] advised [patron] playing for 19hrs with no significant break.

      5.23 pm

      PP20

      VIP

      Tables

      Local Host manager [D] advised [patron] playing for 20hrs with no break longer than 4hrs.

      7.43 pm

      PP20

      VIP

      Tables

      ACM informed patron has played for 20hrs.

      7.47 pm

      PP20

      Tables

      DSM [G] informed patron is at 23hrs.

      9.19 pm

      PP24

      VIP

      Tables

      DSM [H] informed patron has played for 24hrs.

      Source: Exhibit RC0103 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gaming Daily Operations Report, 10 June 2019.

    6. Two facts stand out from the Register for 10 June 2019. First, the RGAs and staff who were involved failed to comply with the applicable Play Periods Policy (which required gaming staff or an RGA to interact with customers at the 12, 16 and 20-hour mark, and required an RGA to attend if a customer has been gambling for 24 hours or more without a substantial break) and potentially the Gambling Code (which required that patrons displaying Observable Signs be referred to RGAs or certain senior management).292 That is not a criticism—the task asked of them was impossible. Second, in some cases, the patron was only observed several hours after the RGA received notification that the patron had been gambling for an extended period. Both facts are consistent with the evidence that the Commission has heard from patrons and Crown staff alike (discussed above).
    7. The Commission also examined extracts of the Register for other days. In particular, it examined the Register for 5 March 2021 (another randomly chosen day, but after the Commission had been announced).293 It revealed a similar story.
    8. The information from the Register is compelling. It casts considerable doubt on the evidence given by Ms Bauer about the successful operation of Crown Melbourne’s responsible gambling policies.
    9. Ms Bauer understood the damning impact of the information from the Register. To deflect that impact and in response to questions from Crown Melbourne’s counsel,294 Ms Bauer said that the alerts received by the RGAs at the 12, 15 and 17-hour marks did not indicate continuous play at the Melbourne Casino but only the time a customer spent ‘on site’. She explained that the times represented nothing more than an initial ‘card-in’ (that is, a member’s first use of their card at the casino) and the latest card-in. Ms Bauer said that a 17-hour alert would be issued if a member had ‘play[ed] for five minutes, [went] to the football and c[a]me back 17 hours later and play[ed] again’.295
    10. That this evidence was inaccurate was apparent from information provided by Mr Nicolas Emery, Crown Melbourne’s Chief Marketing Officer.296 He explained that it was possible to determine how long a Crown loyalty program member was at the Melbourne Casino and how long the member was gambling. He said a member’s card ‘tracked … the amount of time someone is spending on a device or a table … We can see the patron hours for our rewards members and we can also see the total patron[’s] hours on the property’.297
    11. When Ms Bauer was recalled, she confirmed that carded players are ‘measured’ for their gaming activity.298 She gave the following evidence:

      Q: If a person comes in, I think [Crown Melbourne’s counsel] mentioned on the last occasion they might enter the car park and enter the premises in some way and swipe their card, the systems that Crown has can record wherever the card is used; correct?

      A: Yes.

      Q: And so in that way it can record when someone is physically on the site?

      A: Yes.

      Q: But it can also record, as we’ve already discussed, how long a player has played a particular machine within a certain period?

      A: Yes.299

    Concluding remarks

    1. Four points should be noted.
    2. First, for carded players, the picture that emerges is that, generally speaking, there is no interaction with a customer who gambles for any continuous period up to 12 hours unless that customer displays some other Observable Sign. At the 12-hour mark, a customer might be observed, but no interaction will occur unless the customer displays some other Observable Sign.
    3. Second, uncarded players are in an even worse position. The monitoring of uncarded players, which only involves observation, is minimal. While steps are being taken by Crown Melbourne to address this issue,300 the only effective solution is to require carded play on all EGMs.
    4. Third, even if the various versions of the Play Periods Policy provided an appropriate guideline for compliance with the Gambling Code (which they do not), the Policy has not been followed.
    5. Finally, Crown Melbourne has for many years consistently breached its Gambling Code and, therefore, a condition of its casino licence.

    Permitting and encouraging gambling harms

    1. To this point, consideration has only been given to the issue of gamblers who engage in ‘continuous play’. It is also necessary to consider how Crown Melbourne approaches its RSG obligations in other areas.
    2. In particular, it is necessary to examine:
      • pre-commitment on EGMs
      • the role of hosts
      • Crown Melbourne’s response to behaviours that elevate the risk of gambling harms, including multiple machine use and the use of ‘picks’
      • Crown Melbourne’s capacity to supervise its customers
      • Crown Melbourne’s approach to self-exclusion
      • Crown Melbourne’s marketing functions, including promotional events and activities, Crown’s loyalty program, and select benefits and enticements offered to its customers
      • the use of data and information for research and evaluation.

    Pre-commitment on EGMs

    1. Research to which reference has been made in this chapter shows that a large proportion of problem gamblers are attracted to EGMs.
    2. Research that complements the evidence heard by the Commission also shows that individuals frequently gamble more than intended during sessions of play. Even if such an individual has decided how much time and money they might spend gambling, they make impulsive choices that ignore those earlier decisions.301
    3. The Productivity Commission made a number of recommendations to deal with these problems, noting that its main concern in relation to the costs of gambling for Australians was the reduction in the social costs of gambling (in particular, problem gambling).302
    4. One recommendation was that there should be a pre-commitment system for EGMs.303 A pre-commitment system involves a gambler setting limits on their gambling, such as a loss limit and a time limit before they commence gambling.304 According to the Productivity Commission:

      Under ‘partial’ pre-commitment, people are not obliged to be in the system. When they are, they can choose to set or not to set limits, and if they breach such limits, they can continue to play. In contrast, under ‘full’ pre-commitment, people must be in the system, but voluntarily set limits. If they set limits, they are bound by them. Often the former is referred to as ‘voluntary’ pre-commitment and the latter as ‘mandatory’. However, these labels are confusing. Both systems are essentially ‘voluntary’ since the gambler can choose whether to set a limit in either.305

    5. To avoid any confusion, pre-commitment will be considered in this chapter by reference to the following categories:
      • partial (where participation is voluntary) or full (where all players must use the system, but are not required to set limits)
      • voluntary (which allows participants to choose whether to set limits) or mandatory (where participants must set limits)
      • binding (where a participant cannot continue gambling once a pre-set limit is reached) or non-binding (where a player can elect to continue gambling once reaching a pre-set limit).
    6. The issue of whether a player should be forced to set limits before they gamble is one of the most contentious issues in discussions about EGM reform. There are those who contend that forcing players to set limits is paternalistic and that individual choice would be violated if players are forced to set limits. Others say that personal responsibility should not be paramount. They argue that the addictive nature of EGMs erodes a person’s free choice about their gambling. That is, the problem gambler needs protection from the harms their gambling causes.
    7. These arguments will never be fully resolved. In large measure, they depend upon the different personal values and ethics of those who hold the respective viewpoints.
    8. Putting to one side debates about values and ethics, the fact is that, as the Productivity Commission pointed out, pre-commitment is an effective strategy to control expenditure in respect of time and money spent on gambling.306 Professor Alex Blaszczynski (who, as detailed below, has acted as a consultant for Crown) and colleagues have pointed out in their report on Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling (Harm Minimisation Summary Review) that:

      support for the strategy [of pre-commitment] is steeped in the findings of a number of studies that have explored typical methods which individuals meeting the criteria for a gambling disorder have applied in self-regulating their gambling behaviour.307

      Moreover, pre-commitment as a harm minimisation strategy has been adopted, or is to be adopted, in a number of jurisdictions (including as a trial).308

    9. The Productivity Commission concluded that while partial pre-commitment provided some benefits, such as assisting gamblers to set goals and become more aware of their gambling, a partial pre-commitment system would ‘give Ulysses a knife to cut his bonds when the Sirens call’.309
    10. Accordingly, the Productivity Commission suggested that a full pre-commitment system was necessary. It said:

      The Commission’s view is that precommitment is a strong, practicable and ultimately cost-effective option for harm minimisation. It overcomes some of the existing severe deficits in achieving self-control for problem gamblers and for genuine informed consent by many other consumers.

      While recognising that even a full precommitment system cannot be a ‘silver bullet’, it may ultimately take pressure off other regulations aimed at harm minimisation.310

    11. Professor Blaszczynski and colleagues are of the same view. In their Harm Minimisation Summary Review they wrote:

      Offering pre-commitment where the problem gambler is responsible for making the choice of setting limits may not be realistic; its use may need to be mandated to maximise the positive outcomes [pre-commitment provides].311

    12. The authors go on to make two important points:
      • To be optimally successful, the structure of any ideal EGM-based pre-commitment system needs to apply to all players and to eliminate the option for a player to (a) exchange cards with other players, or be provided with temporary cards by venue operators once pre-set thresholds are reached; and (b) switch play to a cash-based machine.312
      • Any pre-commitment strategy ought to consider setting a reasonable minimum daily amount (losses) as the default level for all individuals. This daily amount can be estimated by taking into account the median losses or the average amount lost by recreational gamblers. This is an arbitrary figure that could be adjusted over time subject to it representing an acceptable daily limit for the majority of problem gamblers.313
    13. The Victorian Parliament introduced a pre-commitment system for EGMs in 2014 (effective from 1 December 2015) by amendment to the Gambling Regulation Act. The system is a partial, voluntary, non-binding system. On the second reading of the Gambling Regulation Amendment (Pre-Commitment) Bill 2013 (Vic), the then Treasurer said that the pre-commitment system is voluntary, provides players with choice and is effective for harm minimisation.314
    14. The pre-commitment scheme, which is accessible on all EGMs in Victoria, is called ‘YourPlay’. Under the YourPlay scheme, individuals can activate a YourPlay player card and then pre-set time and loss limits.315 As the VCGLR explained in its Sixth Review:

      Under the YourPlay scheme, when a player has set a time or spending limit and the person reaches the YourPlay set limit, the gaming machine is disabled and a message is displayed on the machine notifying the player that the player has reached the limit. A message then asks the player to choose whether to stop game play on the gaming machine or to continue play. If a person chooses to keep playing, the game play will be re-enabled on the gaming machine and YourPlay will continue to track the play.316

    15. The scheme has not been successful. Relevantly, in 2019, Crown Resorts established a Responsible Gaming Advisory Panel (RGAP), comprised of Professor Blaszczynski, Professor Paul Delfabbro and Professor Lia Nower.317 In August 2020, the panel prepared a paper titled ‘Review of Crown Resort’s Responsible Gaming Programs and Services’ (RG Review).318 The RGAP pointed out:

      The uptake of voluntary pre-commitment is extremely low. Most trials show that only 1–5% of people voluntarily sign up for pre-commitment systems and very few use time-based limits. Even when people are actively encouraged to sign up, the rate of utilisation drops off significantly over time and can be close to 0% after around 6 months (citation omitted).319

    YourPlay at the Melbourne Casino
    1. At the Melbourne Casino, when a person reaches a limit under the YourPlay system and elects to continue playing, they are permitted to do so. There is no regulatory obligation on staff to take any action.320
    2. In the RG Review, the RGAP noted that a limitation of the YourPlay system was that players can continue gambling after reaching their self-imposed limit.321
    3. Though nothing is being done by Crown Melbourne in this regard, that position need not continue. The following evidence given by Mr Blackburn is important:

      Q: Do you agree that Crown should not permit a person to continue gambling if they reach a pre-determined YourPlay time or money limit?

      A: I do.

      Q: So Crown obviously can’t, at the moment the way things are, set limits for patrons. Do you agree customers should be encouraged by Crown to set realistic and affordable YourPlay limits consistent with what the Foundation’s recommendation is?

      A: I do.

      Q: Do you agree with me that if Crown wanted to have limits and make sure players, when they reached pre-determined limits, stop playing, it is big enough and it has the resources, if it has the will it could make these things happen?

      A: I do.322

    Hosts

    1. There are many different types of hosts at the Melbourne Casino.323 The Commission focused on the role of hosts in the Mahogany Room, given the large amounts gambled there.324
    2. A table game host in the Mahogany Room, called a Mahogany Executive Host (referred to in this chapter as a ‘host’), looks after a number of Crown loyalty program members.325 The host acts as a regular point of contact for those members. The host attends to members’ personal needs, such as making hotel and dining arrangements on their behalf. The host also provides members with incentives and enticements, such as tickets to sporting and musical events.326
    3. The principal function of the host is to encourage members to gamble at the Melbourne Casino.327 As one former host put it:

      … [A] gambler is a gambler, a punter is a punter. When they are onsite, a lot of the time they’re not just going to come in and park their car, jump on the bus and go to the football, they’re going to come back and play.328

    4. That host said even if a member was taking a break from gambling, they would often contact them and invite them to come to the casino for a catch up. The expectation was that the member might continue their gambling. The host said:

      I was always asked to contact them and make sure that they were okay and continue to offer them, hey, look, you may not want to gamble, but he might want to go to the football, so give him football tickets, or they might want to come in for a bit of dinner, sometime.329

    5. The host said that even if a member had been playing for 15 or 20 hours, they would not suggest they take a break from gambling unless advised to do so by an RGLO (as RGAs were then known).330 Nor did the host feel obliged to suggest self-exclusion if a member was or seemed to be in relatively serious financial trouble. They said: ‘It wasn’t—it wasn’t the nature in the office to do that sort of thing. I mean, if—yeah—no, not really. No’.331
    6. Indeed, the host indicated that they were instructed to subtly discourage clients from self-excluding:

      Q: And if someone said to you, ‘Oh, I’m going to self-exclude, not just have a break’, what would you say in response, in the usual course of conduct? How would you normally respond to that?

      A: We would sort of ask if they … I would ask if … if it was one of my clients, I would ask if they are okay, sort of advise that if they do go down the road of self-exclusion just because they’ve had one bad day on the table, it is going to take more than 12 months to get back in, and when you do get back in you have to go through the Government. It is a big process. So we sort of were asked to steer them away from that option and maybe say, ‘Hey, look, instead of self-excluding, maybe just take time off and go to the football next weekend and take time to cool down, go home. Cool your heels and let’s speak in a few days time.’ That’s the road we went down.332

    7. The host also said that, in effect, they would ‘sort of talk [their clients] out of’ self-excluding in this way.333 They indicated that the Management Team instructed them and other hosts to operate this way.334
    8. The Commission has examples of the kinds of communications that members received from hosts. Some of these were plainly directed towards emotionally manipulating customers into spending more money for the benefit of their hosts.335
    9. In summary, the job of the host is ‘to get people to come in and gamble no matter what’.336
    10. An example of the lengths to which hosts would go to encourage gambling is the case of Ahmed Hasna. Mr Hasna was a black tier card holder.337 He was also addicted to gambling.338 On one occasion, Mr Hasna went to the Melbourne Casino. He had a cheque for $100,000 with him as the payee.339 Mr Hasna asked to exchange the cheque for $100,000 worth of chips. Crown Melbourne agreed to provide the chips.340 Mr Hasna then went to the gaming floor and lost the $100,000.341
    11. Two days later, the cheque was dishonoured.342 Mr Hasna was called by his host.343 According to the host, he was directed to make the call by Mr Lawrence.344 Mr Hasna told the host that he was experiencing financial hardship and could not repay his debt.345 He said he was considering self-exclusion.346
    12. On Mr Lawrence’s instruction, the host informed Mr Hasna that he could continue gambling at the casino—and maintain all his black card privileges—on the condition that he repay his $100,000 debt out of any future winnings.347 Mr Hasna agreed.348 In due course the debt was repaid.349 He then continued gambling and lost a considerable sum of money.350
    13. Mr Lawrence was asked about these events:

      Q: You agree with me, don’t you, that the decision to let Mr Hasna come back to gamble was predatory and irresponsible?

      A: Irresponsible, yes.

      Q: You don’t accept that it is predatory?

      A: Yes, it … it is a strong word, but possibly yes.351

    14. Mr Lawrence said he did not know that Mr Hasna had informed the host that he was in financial difficulty and was contemplating self-exclusion.352 He accepted, however, that he likely knew that Mr Hasna had previously self-excluded and that self-exclusion suggested that the person had problems with gambling.353
    15. Asked more generally about the culture and practices at Crown Melbourne, particularly in relation to higher tier members, Mr Lawrence said that:
      • patrons are not asked about the amount of money they gamble and whether they can afford it354
      • hosts do not suggest self-exclusion, even where a person is in financial difficulty355
      • hosts and Mahogany Room staff rarely check in on the wellbeing of customers before 12 hours of continuous play356
      • patrons regularly gamble for more than 12, 14, 16, 18 and even 24 hours at a time.357
    16. Mr Lawrence acknowledged that Mr Hasna’s situation was not exceptional. He said that prior to March 2021, Crown Melbourne often permitted patrons who owed debts they could not repay to gamble to pay back their debts. He agreed that this practice was irresponsible.358 The following exchange then took place:

      Q: And you must agree with me, mustn’t you, that that is because what is driving you, your colleagues in the Mahogany Room, is money. When you are looking at things, you are motivated by money, above all else. That’s the reality of the situation, isn’t it, Mr Lawrence?

      A: I would accept that.

      Q: And the point of all this, the thrust of it, is that when left to balance the competing interests, profits or the welfare of customers in the Mahogany Room, you and your colleagues prioritise money. That is just the reality, isn’t it?

      A: Certainly revenue is an important part of what we need to achieve, but

      Q: Answer my question.

      A: … (overspeaking) … yes, I agree.359

    17. It goes without saying, but it must be said, that it is inconsistent with the practice of responsible gambling for a casino to encourage a patron to gamble in the hope that the patron can win enough to discharge their debt to the casino. Yet this is what happened with Mr Hasna. And, according to Mr Lawrence, it has happened in many other instances.360
    18. In summary, the evidence before the Commission has made it clear that, at least to a significant extent, hosts engage in the following conduct. They:
      • proactively contact clients and entice them to come to the casino to gamble361
      • arrange for customers to collect gifts like tickets from the casino, and invite patrons to dinners at the casino, in the hope that when the customer enters the complex they will gamble362
      • do not speak to clients about the amount of money they are gambling or whether they can afford it363
      • rarely ask customers to take a break from gambling364
      • continue to contact clients if they have not visited the casino for a period of time, or had decided to take a break from gambling (though according to Mr Lawrence, contact would be made after an appropriate break had been taken, to entice the customer back into the complex in the hope that they started gambling again)365
      • before March 2021, irresponsibly permitted customers to gamble even if they owed the casino money,366 with the practice only changing in response to this Commission367
      • do not suggest that customers should self-exclude, and perhaps even discourage self-exclusion.368

    The misuse of gambling products

    1. Mr Mackay was asked about the use of picks and similar devices to depress the ‘play’ buttons on EGMs, and about customers gambling on more than one EGM at a time.
    2. On the first issue, it is important to understand that restricted EGMs are designed to require a player to press ‘play’ for each game. To be clear, the use of picks allows players to depress the play button without having to manually interact with the machine.369
    3. Mr Mackay acknowledged that customers sometimes used picks and similar devices for this purpose.370 He agreed this was an issue that Crown Melbourne had known about for some time.371 He agreed that ‘if one were to prioritise the welfare of Victorians, [Crown Melbourne] wouldn’t have a practice that allowed people to have picks and other devices that depressed the play button’.372
    4. As it turned out, prior to February 2018, Crown Melbourne issued Crown-branded picks to allow patrons to simulate ‘autoplay’. When the use became public knowledge, staff were instructed to confiscate Crown-branded picks if they observed them being used. However, according to Mr Mackay, where players used picks or similar devices that did not carry a Crown brand, the players were discouraged from using them but were not stopped from playing in that way, and the use of these devices continues.373
    5. While Mr Mackay did not accept the proposition, it appears that preventing the use of only Crown-branded picks indicates that Crown Melbourne is concerned with the reputational damage rather than preventing the harms caused by the use of those devices.374
    6. Under the current gaming rules, in certain circumstances a customer can play on up to three EGMs at a time.375 That is something that must change.
    7. Mr Mackay agreed that if Crown Melbourne were to prioritise the welfare of Victorians, it would not allow play on multiple EGMs to occur.376 He also acknowledged that the use of multiple EGMs was a practice that Crown Melbourne had known about for at least a few years.377
    8. Mr Mackay said that in January or February 2021, ‘with the pending update of the casino rules’, a direction was issued requiring staff on the main gaming floor to request customers to stop playing multiple machines.378 The practice is still allowed in the premium Teak and Mahogany Rooms.379
    9. At the conclusion of his evidence, Mr Mackay accepted that Crown Melbourne could have done more over the years to foster RSG and minimise gambling harms.380 He could hardly have done otherwise.

    Supervision of at-risk customers

    1. Ms Bauer estimated that in 2016 there were 1,470 interactions recorded in the Register that may indicate problem gambling behaviours, in 2017 there were 1,603, in 2018 there were 2,125, and in 2019 there were 3,366. Many of those interactions likely relate to multiple attendances on the same person.381
    2. As was noted earlier, in the 2019 financial year problem gamblers were found to constitute approximately 0.7 per cent of the Victorian adult population.382 They were found to constitute approximately 1.1 per cent of the Victorian adult population who gambled.383 There is a wider cohort who are at risk of becoming problem gamblers (‘moderate' and ‘low-risk’ gamblers), and a still wider cohort who may suffer gambling harms despite not being problem, moderate or even low-risk gamblers.384
    3. It was also noted earlier that people gambling at the Melbourne Casino may be more likely to suffer gambling harms than they would at any other venue.385 In 2018–19, 25 per cent of people who gambled at the Melbourne Casino experienced some type of gambling-related harm. The prevalence of people who experience problem gambling at the Melbourne Casino may be three times higher when compared to all Victorian adults who gamble.386
    4. Assume that there are 12,000 to 14,000 unique visitors each day at the Melbourne Casino:387
      • If 1.1 per cent of this group are problem gamblers,388 then on an average day there may be 132 to 154 problem gamblers at the Melbourne Casino and a larger number who are moderate or low-risk gamblers.
      • If 3.3 per cent of this group are problem gamblers (that is, three times the prevalence compared to all Victorian adults who gamble), then on an average day there may be 396 to 462 problem gamblers at the Melbourne Casino and a larger number who are moderate or low-risk gamblers.
      • If 25 per cent of this group experience gambling harm,389 that would be an average of 3,000 to 3,500 people per day who experience such harm.
    5. Yet the Register shows that on an average day in 2016 there were only about four interactions relating to behaviours that may be indicative of problem gambling (some of which may have related to the same person).390 That increased to about nine interactions per day by 2019.391
    6. On any view, a large number of customers engaging in problem or risky gambling are escaping attention.392
    7. Ms Bauer’s written statement to the Commission also included the complete set of interactions relating to referrals to the RGC that were recorded in the Register (not just those Ms Bauer identified as possibly indicative of problem gambling behaviours) for the last five calendar years.393 The tables show, for example, that there were 4,372 such referrals in 2016, 4,816 in 2017, 12,206 in 2018 and 18,259 in 2019.394
    8. Included in these numbers are categories of interaction only tangentially related to problem gamblers or the minimisation of gambling harm. For example, an interaction may be the report of a missing person.395 Further, as is noted above, many of the interactions relate to multiple attendances on the same person.396

    Self-exclusion

    1. Crown Melbourne’s Self-Exclusion Program is available to customers wanting to voluntarily ban themselves from gaming areas.397 A request to self-exclude is viewed as a ‘very strong’ Observable Sign and staff who are approached by customers wishing to self-exclude are required by the Gambling Code to refer the customer ‘as soon as practicable’ to the RGC.398
    2. An RGA then conducts an interview with the customer to provide information about self-exclusion, its implications and the process for revoking a self-exclusion order.399 Customers can choose a self-exclusion period of one, two or three years.400 The exclusion remains in place until an application for revocation is made.401 A customer cannot apply for revocation prior to the end of their chosen period.402
    3. Upon self-exclusion, the customer loses all their Crown Rewards loyalty points.403 If they breach, or attempt to breach, a self-exclusion order, an RGA is called and manages the incident.404
    4. In July 2016, Crown Melbourne introduced an online self-exclusion process. This has received only a very minimal response.405
    5. Several submissions received by the Commission state that customers who have self-excluded continue to enter the casino with no staff intervention.406
    6. One reason is likely to be that there is an insufficient number of RGAs.407
    7. Another is the slow deployment of facial recognition technology, which is a valuable tool to detect the presence of self-excluded customers.408 Mr Craig Walsh, Executive Director, Security and Surveillance, gave this evidence:

      Q: Do you now regret not prioritising or at least making facial recognition technology occur sooner in the roll-out program than it did?

      A: My wishes would have been to roll out facial recognition in 2012/13.

      Q: You wanted to do it in 2012 and 2013?

      A: I did.

      Q: The business wouldn’t spend the money on it?

      A: That’s correct.409

    8. Despite that evidence, Crown Melbourne says that it is unfair to suggest there was a ‘delay’ in the rollout of the technology.410 It says that the only delay was in the creation of the technology.411
    9. Whatever the true position, two points are clear. First, only now is Crown Melbourne completing its transition to a full digital facial recognition system.412 Second, the time it has taken to roll out the technology is regrettable. Had the technology been in place earlier, fewer excluded persons would have gained access to the casino floor,413 and that may have resulted in less harm being caused.

    Crown’s marketing activities

    1. Crown Melbourne’s marketing activities are a key part of its operations. Mr Emery explained that the marketing activities can be classified into groups:
      • Promotional events, activities and associated customer communications led by Crown Melbourne’s Marketing Team. Crown Melbourne orchestrates more than 200 promotions in a given year, ranging from direct-to-member offers to promotions offered to higher tier or general Crown Melbourne members, to red carpet and bingo campaigns.414 There are also events such as sporting competitions, galas and prize draws.415
      • The operation of the Crown Rewards loyalty program. In addition to its basic membership, Crown Melbourne has silver, gold, platinum and black tiers.416 Membership in these tiers is determined by ‘status credits’ that are based on the amount of money and time a given player spends gambling.417
      • Benefits and enticements offered directly to customers by Crown Melbourne’s gaming business units. These take many forms, including prizes, rebates, credits, tournaments and complimentary items or benefits such as food, beverages, accommodation, transport, tickets and free parking.418
    2. Mr Emery said that some promotions and benefits are aimed at enticing members to increase their level of spending.419 For example, to be eligible for a cash prize, a person may need to spend a certain amount in a given period, and the promotion may be open to members for whom that amount would represent a significant increase in their spending.420 Equally, members may be incentivised to increase their spending by the promise of attaining a higher membership tier.421
    3. The following preliminary matters are of note with regard to marketing at Crown Melbourne.
    4. First, promotions are designed to draw people into the casino so they will gamble.422 If marketing entices customers to gamble more frequently, and to gamble larger amounts, that is a successful outcome.423 Crown evaluates the success of a promotion predominantly on whether it drives visitation and whether or not participants in the promotion spent money while at the casino.424 All of that is unsurprising—the higher the gambling turnover, the higher Crown’s profits would be.425
    5. Second, the consequences of marketing promotions can be devastating for Victorians. For example, a black tier member came to the casino to collect ‘free’ Phil Collins tickets, and lost $30,000 gambling.426 Nonetheless, Mr Emery accepted that was a ‘good outcome’ from a marketing perspective.427
    6. Third, before Crown Melbourne invites members to participate in promotions, it does not consider whether they can afford to participate in the promotion,428 nor does it consider any player data analytics relevant to RSG (other than ‘stop codes’—codes applied to individuals subject to self-exclusion, Time Out or Withdrawal of Licence).429 Crown Melbourne only considers loyalty status data to ensure that its high-value customers receive the high-value offers.430
    7. Fourth, Crown Melbourne has structured its loyalty program so it rewards higher-turnover customers, meaning problem gamblers are more likely to benefit from the program as compared to people who gamble in a safe manner.431
    8. On the other hand, Crown Melbourne allows customers to opt out of receiving marketing material.432 Further, Crown Melbourne does not send marketing material to those loyalty program members with stop codes on their accounts.433 Mr Emery accepted that the number of persons with RSG-related stop codes is small, meaning this measure is inadequate.434
    The Red Carpet Program
    1. Some promotions targeted potentially vulnerable or financially constrained people. Several witnesses gave evidence about Crown Melbourne’s recently discontinued Red Carpet Program (previously known as the Bus Program).435 This program, which had been in operation since the 1990s,436 was directed towards older people who were members of community organisations, including members of CALD communities.437
    2. Participants were bussed to the Melbourne Casino.438 The cost was subsidised by Crown Melbourne. Prior to April 2018, in order for their community organisation to qualify for the subsidy, participants were required to stay for between four and six hours.439 They were offered a free musical performance and a buffet lunch.440 They were given other benefits, such as a parking voucher for a future visit, meal vouchers and vouchers for discounts at select outlets within the Melbourne Casino Complex.441 In their time at the casino many participants gambled, particularly playing EGMs.
    3. Professor Linda Hancock, an experienced gambling researcher and former Chair of the Victorian Gambling Research Panel, filed a submission with the Commission dealing with the vulnerability of older adults to gambling disorders. Professor Hancock identified various factors that may contribute to that vulnerability, ranging from age-related cognitive conditions, fixed incomes and social isolation. Women over 60 years of age were identified as a particular at-risk group, as were CALD groups.442
    4. Professor Hancock referred to a 2010 survey of Red Carpet Program participants by North East Primary Care Partnership, a metropolitan health service. The survey found that over 42 per cent of participants spent more than they had planned gambling at the casino and almost a quarter planned to return to win back their losses.443
    5. The VCGLR discussed the Red Carpet Program with the Ethnic Community Council of Victoria in 2017. A note of the meeting records the attendees’ concerns that participants in the Red Carpet Program were overspending, many to the extent that they did not have enough money to purchase their medication.444
    6. In May 2021, Crown Melbourne decided that the Red Carpet Program would be discontinued because it was inconsistent with its RSG obligations.445 This is a welcome decision. It should have been made years earlier.
    Bingo at Crown Melbourne
    1. The Red Carpet Program is just one example of how Crown Melbourne’s marketing activities have the potential to cause harm to vulnerable people.
    2. Crown Melbourne conducted a Bingo Program until May 2021.446 Dr Sarah MacLean (an Associate Professor at La Trobe University) and colleagues conducted research into the program.447 According to their work, playing bingo was free, but players were required to become Crown loyalty program members.448 They were given vouchers for table games and EGMs and thereafter received Crown Melbourne promotional material by email.449 Three bingo sessions were held at two to three-hour intervals during the day. People spoken to by Dr MacLean and her colleagues attended more than one session. Each session lasted for around 30 minutes, allowing participants to remain at the casino between sessions.450
    3. Dr MacLean and her colleagues observed that after the bingo game, most of the participants went directly to the gaming floor.451 They formed the view that: ‘[t]he provision of Bingo at Crown Melbourne is designed to draw people into the venue with the expectation that a significant proportion of visitors will then use other forms of gambling including EGMs’.452
    4. Dr MacLean and her colleagues spoke to a number of participants. For some it was a ‘pleasant and affordable experience’.453 Others were exposed to significant gambling harms.454 One participant described a friend who was unable to resist gambling on EGMs after attending bingo sessions and suffered significant financial and psychological harms.455
    5. In May 2021, Crown Melbourne decided that the Bingo Program would be discontinued.456
    Other concerns raised by community organisations
    1. Ms Manorani Guy is the President of the Victorian Working Group on International Student Employability (VicWISE), which provides pastoral care and employment pathways to international students. Ms Guy gave evidence that international students may be unfamiliar with casinos, and so may be especially vulnerable to enticements such as ‘attractive giveaways, free parking, free meals, access to high roller rooms and being treated like a celebrity’.457
    2. Gambling counsellors working with certain CALD communities gave evidence indicating that members of such communities are susceptible to a range of gambling harms, including mental illness, relationship breakdowns and family violence, and face difficulties effectively self-excluding from Crown Melbourne.458

    Supporting research into gambling harm

    1. There is evidence indicating that Crown Melbourne has been reluctant to support research and evaluation of gambling harms or to supply data to those investigating those harms.459 The Commission heard from researchers who considered that Crown Melbourne was resistant to providing data for research purposes.460
    2. Mr Shane Lucas, the CEO of the VRGF, voiced those concerns, though he conceded that the VRGF had not, in recent times, sought any data from Crown Melbourne. Mr Lucas suggested that it not having done so reflected ‘an understanding in the research community’ that the response ‘might simply be negative’, or that Crown Melbourne would ‘seek to exercise a degree of control over the ultimate outcomes of the research that you did based on the data’.461
    3. Whatever may have been the position in the past, Crown Melbourne has indicated that it is now amenable to providing information and assistance to enable independent research to be undertaken into problem gambling and gambling harms.462

    Recent initiatives by Crown

    1. There are two recent RSG initiatives that should be noted.

    Crown’s Responsible Service of Gaming Advisory Panel

    1. As has been observed, in 2019 Crown Resorts established a RGAP, and in August 2020 the RGAP prepared a ‘Review of Crown Resort’s Responsible Gaming Programs and Services’.463 The review made 17 recommendations. In brief, they included:
      • changes to staff training programs and staff roles
      • the expansion of the RGC to facilitate confidential and sensitive interaction with customers requesting assistance
      • sharing and promoting information about self-exclusion and third party exclusion programs and the provision of additional support services to self-excluded persons
      • procedures for self-exclusion, revocation and reinstatement
      • evaluation of the facial recognition technology to enhance detection of possible breaches by self-excluded individuals
      • changes to the Crown Model.464
    2. Some of the recommendations have been implemented; others are in progress. Crown must be commended for the creation of the RGAP and its work.465

    RSG enhancements

    1. As has been briefly mentioned, in May 2021 Crown Resorts approved a series of RSG enhancements. These involved:
      • the employment of a new ‘Manager RG’, ‘RG Administration Officer’, four new ‘RGAs’ and a part time ‘RG Psychologist (Research)’ at Crown Melbourne
      • the recruitment of additional RGAs with priority given to those from CALD backgrounds, including language skills that are underrepresented in the staff profile but overrepresented in persons experiencing harm from gambling
      • increased remuneration for RSG staff
      • new play period time limits for domestic players (12 hours in a 24-hour period, with ‘observation/intervention’ at eight and 10 hours) and for international premium program players
      • support for a statewide exclusion register
      • the permanent cessation of the Red Carpet Program and of Bingo for Crown’s loyalty program members
      • subject to the direction of the Victorian Government, an intention to move to cashless gaming
      • controls to ensure that direct-to-member offers do not require customers to exceed historical behaviours (spend or visit frequency) in order to get their first benefit
      • replacing gaming vouchers received on sign up to Crown Rewards with a non-gaming/promotional voucher
      • undertaking research into whether any aspects of the Crown Rewards loyalty program are causing harm and what measures can be put in place to control that risk
      • considering RSG implications of all future employee incentives.466
    2. It is appropriate to make some comments regarding how these enhancements came about.
    3. First, and as already observed in this chapter, most of the enhancements were developed urgently,467 between 18 and 24 May 2021. The urgency was driven by the directors, who wanted to ensure that Crown Melbourne had something positive in its statement to the Commission.468
    4. Mr Blackburn explained the matter:

      A: So I met with three members of the Board [on] … the morning of 18 May, to present to them in advance to brief them on the papers I was bringing to the board … And the RG enhancement paper at that stage included only reference to capacity and remuneration …

      … one of the board members said … are there other things we can change to help uplift our program, and I said I would take that away and discuss it with Sonja [Bauer].

      Q: Understand. But you agree with me that somewhere along the line, part of these enhancements were about positioning Crown for the purposes of this Commission?

      A: That wasn’t my goal but I agree it may have been part of the broader goal.

      Q: Part of the broader goal of the directors and the way Ms Bauer has interpreted things?

      A: Yes. Absolutely.469

    5. Second, and again as earlier observed, the person who proposed the ‘enhancements’, Mr Blackburn, had no experience, training or expertise in RSG.470 To reiterate, that is not a criticism of Mr Blackburn. He only took up his position at Crown Resorts on 24 February 2021, two days after this Commission was announced.471 He was retained for his expertise in financial crime, not to assist in developing and monitoring RSG at the casino.472 He was given the role of head of RSG following the departure of the former Chief Legal Officer.473
    6. Third, the enhancements are actions that, at a minimum, Crown Melbourne should already have been undertaking. As Mr Blackburn put it, they are common sense changes. They are not a comprehensive set of reforms.474
    7. Finally, the VCGLR noted in the Sixth Review that changes in Crown Melbourne’s responsible gambling practice have largely been driven by regulatory and other external pressures.475 The development of the enhancements on the fly, in response to the Commission, demonstrates that the position identified by the VCGLR remains true.
    8. Notwithstanding those observations, the evidence of Mr Blackburn and others indicates the proposals are a well-intentioned effort to address deficiencies obvious in Crown Melbourne’s approach to RSG.476
    9. Turning to the enhancements, it is appropriate to make some observations about each of them.
    The marketing controls and sign-up benefits
    1. The ‘controls’ with respect to direct-to-member offers are informal assurances from Crown Melbourne’s Marketing Team that direct-to-member offers will henceforth be designed in a particular way.477
    2. Direct-to-member offers constitute only one of many forms that promotions may take. In addition to direct-to-member offers there are ‘cross-complex campaigns’, which are promotions open to members and sometimes non-members across the main floor and gaming rooms; promotions open to all members, specific tiers of members and specific cohorts of members, including promotions run from the main gaming floor and in members-only rooms; member jackpots; poker tournaments and so on.478 The proposed reform applies only to one form of offer.
    3. Further, within direct-to-member offers the proposed reform will apply only to ‘first benefits’. A direct-to-member offer may, however, be structured so that a customer is eligible for additional benefits beyond the ‘first benefit’. For example, it may be that if a customer comes to the casino in accordance with an offer made to them they receive a benefit (their ‘first benefit’), such as a voucher; and if they come again, they receive a further benefit.479
    4. Equally, the replacement of gaming vouchers on signing up with non-gaming or promotional vouchers may make very little difference if, in either case, a person is incentivised by the non-gaming or promotional vouchers to spend more time and money gambling at the casino.
    Researching the link between problem gambling and loyalty programs
    1. Crown Melbourne appears to envisage conducting or commissioning research to determine whether there is a causal relationship between Crown Melbourne’s loyalty program and problem gambling. Crown Melbourne has not, to date, taken any such steps.480
    2. The following matters are important.
    3. First, in a supplementary statement to the Commission, Ms Billi referred to research that demonstrated that loyalty programs can be effective in attracting gamblers and facilitating gambling.481 The research suggests that loyalty programs may harm vulnerable individuals by providing rewards to frequent gamblers, so as to link positive reinforcement to the amount of money gambled rather than the outcome of gambling sessions (for example, wins or losses). Broader research also indicated that the desire to engage in an activity, including gambling, increases with proximity to a reward.482
    4. Ms Billi noted research that had concluded that loyalty programs in the gambling industry ‘may be antithetical to harm minimization strategies’.483 Ms Billi acknowledged, however, that further research was required to determine whether there is a definitive causal link between loyalty programs and problem gambling.484 Nevertheless, she said that people with gambling problems are overrepresented among loyalty program members.485 There is evidence, for example, that loyalty program points and rewards are linked to an increased urge to gamble beyond pre-planned limits;486 and that incentives provided by gambling venues may increase the amount wagered by gamblers and particularly problem gamblers.487 The research also indicated that people with gambling problems perceived that promotions and rewards offered by venues increased their gambling and distorted their perception of their gambling.488
    5. Second, there are reasons why immediate action on this issue is warranted:
      • There is evidence that people who are vulnerable to, or experience, gambling harms are overrepresented in loyalty programs.489
      • It is inherently likely that a membership program that requires people to maintain or increase the amount of time and money they spend at a casino, and offers them enticements and incentives to do so, has the potential to cause harm.
    6. Third, while the research enhancement proposed by Crown is in principle a good initiative, one matter of concern should be mentioned. Crown was asked to respond to the following question: ‘What research (if any) has been undertaken by Crown Melbourne or Crown Resorts to ascertain the effect the loyalty program has on problem gambling?’. Mr Emery provided the response. He said:

      To the best of my knowledge the business has not undertaken any research into the effect the Crown Rewards program has on problem gambling. The responsible gaming team do however keep abreast of academic research into problem gambling and this also includes academic research on the above topic.490

    7. When asked about that answer, Mr Emery gave the following evidence:

      Q: If the casino was serious about undertaking research about the link between loyalty programs and problem gambling, it would have been mentioned in paragraph 85 of your statement?

      A: Yes, correct.491

    8. There is a risk that the need for further research could be used to justify continued inaction.
    Remuneration
    1. The proposal that employee incentives consider RSG implications is far from concrete. Merely considering the matter does not tether Crown Melbourne to a particular approach.
    2. There is a further concern. Presently, Crown Melbourne hosts receive a bonus that is based, at least in part, on customer visitation.492 It is safe to infer a relationship between turnover and visitation.
    3. It appears this will not change. In a paper dated 19 May 2021, prepared by the General Managers, Responsible Gaming of Crown Perth, Crown Sydney and Crown Melbourne, the following recommendation was made:
      1. Elimination of Gaming Host Turnover-based Commission/Bonus Rewards.
        In whatever form there may still exist bonus payment incentives among Crown management/staff to encourage from our customers, higher stakes and/or longer play periods, these must cease.493
    4. A proposal in that form was not put to the Crown Resorts board or approved as part of the responsible service of gaming enhancements.494
    Play periods
    1. The development of the play periods enhancements raises concerns about the RSG Team. The RSG Team told Mr Blackburn that a 12-hour play period was reasonable.495 There is, of course, no research or academic learning suggesting that a 12-hour play period is reasonable. The following exchange between Mr Blackburn and the Commission took place:

      Q: If the 12 hours is absurdly wrong, what does that tell you about your team who were pushing it? They say 12 hours is fine. Let’s say they are wrong … but what would it tell you about the team you have if 12 hours is absurd?

      A: That I need to revisit my team.

      Q: Yes. And what does that mean. When you use the word ‘revisit’, what do you mean by the word ‘revisit’?

      A: I need to understand the expertise they apply in reaching conclusions of that nature. I need to apply judgment to it.496

    Cashless gambling
    1. While the move to cashless gambling is to be encouraged—both as an AML measure (see Chapter 6) and because play periods can be more effectively monitored through carded play—it must be developed and seen through a gambling harm reduction lens. Concerns include the frictionless nature of transactions, where there is less likelihood of time for reflection; and it being potentially difficult for people to track their spending during gambling.497

    Observations on the recent initiatives

    1. Many of the concerns voiced in this chapter were previously raised with Crown Melbourne by the VCGLR. In its Sixth Review, the VCGLR noted that Crown Melbourne’s approach to responsible gaming was ‘essentially unchanged’ since its Fifth Review five years earlier.498 Its Report noted:
      • Crown Melbourne’s RGC had no ‘quantified key performance measures’, and outcomes for patrons who interact with the RGC were not systematically measured.499
      • Poor use was made of Crown Melbourne’s internally available data, in contrast to its use of data to measure the effectiveness of its responsible service of alcohol practices.500
      • RSG staffing levels were inadequate and there was inadequate engagement with people who may be experiencing gambling harms.501
      • Crown Melbourne’s RSG strategy relies almost exclusively on Observable Signs and people self-identifying as having gambling problems.502
      • Crown Melbourne’s reliance on the wider body of staff to discern Observable Signs was limited by the fact that those staff are busy with their core duties.503
      • The amount of time patrons were left unattended before staff intervention as mandated by the Play Periods Policy was not conducive to responsible lengths of play for local players.504
      • Crown Melbourne’s use of player data analytics to support interventions was still in a trial phase five years after being recommended as part of the Fifth Review and 10 years after first being raised with Crown Melbourne.505
      • ‘Where there has been change in responsible gambling practice, this has largely been driven by regulatory and other external pressure …’.506
    2. Notwithstanding the above, and in fairness to Crown Melbourne, the Sixth Review made several RSG recommendations, all of which the regulator concluded were satisfactorily implemented (save for those recommendations that have not yet fallen due).507
    3. It must also be acknowledged that Mr Blackburn genuinely intends to further reform Crown’s RSG program.508

    Conclusion

    1. The problems raised in this chapter are not easily repaired. They reflect a flawed organisational structure, a dysfunctional culture, failures of leadership and an unfavourable regulatory regime.
    2. There are four areas where, based on current learning, steps can be taken to reduce gambling harms.

    Carded play

    1. As has been shown, it is nearly impossible to monitor uncarded players at the Melbourne Casino. For that reason, it is appropriate that all customers should use a player card for all forms of gambling at the Melbourne Casino. A recommendation to that effect has been made in Chapter 6.
    2. To enable proper research into problem gambling, it is important that the player card also be used to collect data.

    Recommendation 9: Player card data

    It is recommended that a direction be given to Crown Melbourne pursuant to section 23(1) of the Casino Control Act that the player card collect, to the extent practicable, data relating to:

    • player buy-in (time, amount)
    • player buy-out (time, amount)
    • play periods (date, start time, end time)
    • player turnover
    • player losses and wins
    • gambling product
    • such further information as the regulator reasonably requires for anti-money laundering and Responsible Service of Gaming purposes.

    Pre-commitment and time limits

    1. An important step is to control gambling on EGMs, which is a form of gambling that causes more harm than others.
    2. Pre-commitment is an obvious area of reform. If a full, mandatory, binding, pre-commitment system is implemented, that will significantly reduce the incidence of problem gambling.
    3. The State has explained that there are practical difficulties that stand in the way of an immediate implementation of this system. Nonetheless, when these practical difficulties can be overcome such a system should be introduced.509

    Recommendation 10: Pre-commitment and time limits

    It is recommended that as soon as possible, the YourPlay system be a full, mandatory, binding, pre-commitment system for Australian residents gambling on EGMs at the Melbourne Casino.

    The pre-commitment system should operate in the following manner:

    • Each player must set a daily, weekly or monthly time limit and a daily, weekly or monthly loss limit.
    • If the pre-set time limit or the pre-set loss limit is reached, the player cannot continue to gamble on an EGM and the limit(s) cannot be altered, for 36 hours.
    • No player can gamble on an EGM for more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period.
    • If a player has gambled for 12 hours in any 24-hour period, the player must take a break for 24 hours.
    • A player cannot gamble continuously on an EGM for more than three hours.
    • A player must take a break of at least 15 minutes after three hours of continuous gambling.
    • A player cannot gamble on EGMs for more than 36 hours per week.
    • There should be a default pre-set loss limit that the player can modify.
    • The default pre-set loss limit should be set by regulation. It could be calculated by reference to the median income of a wage earner less the standard cost of living. Or it could be calculated by estimating the median losses of a recreational gambler. The pre-set loss limit should be reviewed at least annually.

    For the effective operation of a full, mandatory, binding YourPlay system, internal control systems are needed to ensure that a customer is unable to acquire more than one card. The systems need to be approved under section 122 of the Casino Control Act.

    Gambling Code

    1. Another area where reform is desirable is the content of the Gambling Code for casinos.
    2. The contents of a Gambling Code are set by a Ministerial Direction made under section 10.6.6 of the Gambling Regulation Act.
    3. Currently there are two Ministerial Directions in force, one for casinos and other gambling licensees (made on 17 September 2018) and the other for EGM venue operators (pubs and clubs) (made on 21 February 2020).510
    4. There are material differences between the two Ministerial Directions. The differences are set out in the following table.
    Subject
    Crown Melbourne
    Other venues

    Responsible gambling message

    Requires a code to include a responsible gambling message that identifies the casino operator’s commitment to responsible gambling (part 2, page 4).

    Does not specify the level of commitment to responsible gambling a casino operator should have.

    Requires a code to include the following responsible gambling message: ‘A venue operator has a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and minimise harm from the operation of gaming machines in the approved venue, including by monitoring the welfare of gaming machine players, discouraging intensive and prolonged gaming machine play and intervening when a person is displaying behaviour that is consistent with gambling harm’ (part 2, clause 1).

    Interaction with customers

    Provides a code must:

    • require the casino operator to interact with customers to foster responsible gambling, and identify how this will occur
    • in particular, specify a process for interacting with those customers who:
      • have requested information about, or assistance with, a gambling problem or self-exclusion; and
      • are displaying indicators of distress that may be related to problem gambling
    • require that interaction with customers occurs in a manner that respects the customer’s right to privacy (part 2, page 5).

    Does not prescribe how the relevant person must interact with customers to foster responsible gambling, or the process for interacting with customers showing signs of distress.

    Arguably, does not require a relevant person to specify a process for interacting with customers displaying indicators of problem gambling if they did not request assistance or information about problem gambling or self-exclusion.

    Requires a code to include provisions regarding:

    • interaction with customers— communication with gamblers (part 2, clause 2); and
    • interaction with customers— signs of distress (part 2, clause 3).

    These provisions set out detailed responsibilities of a venue operator; for example, providing that a venue operator:

    • must ensure that communications with customers do not induce a person to enter or remain in the gaming machine area (part 2, clause 2.1(a))
    • must not encourage or induce a person to engage in intensive or prolonged gaming machine play (part 2, clause 3.3)
    • is expected to ask a person to take a break away from the gaming machine area where an interaction has occurred and that interaction has determined that the person is angry while gaming or has requested assistance as a consequence of their gaming (part 2, clause 3.4).
    1. It is accepted that there are differences in the operating environment of a casino on the one hand and a local pub or club on the other. This may account for some of the differences in the treatment of casino operators and EGM venue operators. But it does not account for all. Some requirements, appropriately amended, should apply to the casino operator. There are distinct risks that arise from the nature and scale of the Melbourne Casino that should be reflected and addressed in its Gambling Code.

    Recommendation 11: Gambling Code

    It is recommended that a new Ministerial Direction be made under section 10.6.6 of the Gambling Regulation Act, in respect of a casino operator, which includes the following requirements:

    • a duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent and minimise harm from gambling, including by monitoring the welfare of players, discouraging intensive and prolonged play and intervening when a person is displaying behaviour that is consistent with gambling harm
    • a duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that players on the gambling floor are regularly observed to monitor behaviour that is consistent with gambling harm
    • a duty to ensure that there is a sufficient number of responsible gambling officers (however called) at the casino.

    It is recommended that the Ministerial Direction:

    • set maximum play period limits
    • prescribe how long a break in play should be
    • identify the period at which players should be interacted with, and the form of interaction, while gambling.

    Different rules will be needed for different gambling products. For EGMs, the periods of play should mirror those recommended for YourPlay. For other gambling products, the limits should not be less onerous than those approved by Crown Resorts in May 2021 for domestic customers.

    1. It is appropriate to remind Crown Melbourne that its Gambling Code should be written in plain and unambiguous language. Its current Gambling Code does not satisfy that description as is evident from the discussion about the meaning of some of the Observable Signs.

    Access to data

    1. The final point is access to data. It is generally accepted that data collected by Crown Melbourne and other gaming venues should be made available to researchers.511 This will enable serious research into the causes of problem gambling and gambling harms.

    Recommendation 12: Data collection

    It is recommended that to facilitate data collection for research purposes there should be established a Gambling Data Committee made up of three persons, one appointed by the regulator, one appointed by Crown Melbourne and one appointed by the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation.

    The committee should have the following functions:

    • to identify the data to be included in a repository
    • to ensure the data is up-to-date and comprehensive.

    The committee should be required to carry out the following tasks:

    • oversee the design and structure of the repository and its user interface
    • identify the data that is to be publicly available and data that will have restricted access
    • ensure processes and procedures are put in place for the efficient maintenance and updating of the repository
    • establish protocols to anonymise data to respect the privacy of gamblers
    • establish a register of recognised researchers
    • establish a simple process by which a request for data is to be made.

    Recommendation 13: Crown Melbourne data

    It is recommended that the committee have power to direct Crown Melbourne and the monitoring licensee for the YourPlay system to provide data that is reasonably required and in a particular format.

    Recommendation 14: Costs of data collection

    It is recommended that the cost of establishment and operation of the committee is paid for by the government, with staff and Secretariat support provided by the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation.

    Endnotes

    1 See Exhibit RC1627 Victoria, Budget Speech, 28 August 1990 (Tom Roper); Exhibit RC1626 Victoria, Budget Strategy and Review 1990–91, Chapter 1: Budget Overview, 5 [Table 1.1]; Exhibit RC1628 Victoria, Budget Strategy and Review 1991–92, Chapter 1: Budget Overview, 3 [Table 1.3]; ‘Victoria: Unemployment Rate: Persons (A84595606K)’ in the spreadsheet titled ‘Table 02. Labour force by state, territory, greater capital city and rest of state and sex’, ‘Labour Force, Australia, Detailed,’ Australian Bureau of Statistics (Web Page, 26 August 2021) < www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-for…External Link ;.

    2 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 April 1991, 1692 (James Kennan).

    3 Xavier Connor, Report of Board of Inquiry into Casinos in the State of Victoria (Report, April 1983) [14.17]–[14.18].

    4 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 April 1991, 1692 (James Kennan).

    5 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 April 1991, 1692–5 (James Kennan).

    6 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 June 1991, 2311 (JVC Guest).

    7 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 June 1991, 2311 (JVC Guest).

    8 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 June 1991, 2312 (JVC Guest).

    9 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 1(a).

    10 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 1(a)–(c), as enacted.

    11 VCGA, Third Triennial Review of the Casino Operator and Licence (Report, June 2003) 40.

    12 Exhibit RC1621 Article: Kennan Expects $100m Windfall from State Casino, 1 November 1991, 1.

    13 Australian Institute for Gambling Research, University of Western Sydney, Australian Gambling Comparative History and Analysis—Project Report for the Victorian Casino and Gaming Authority (Report, October 1999) 205.

    14 See Victorian Government, ‘Victorian Government Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in Australia’ (March 2009) 22; Australasian Gaming Council, ‘A Guide to Australasia’s Gambling Industries, Facts Figures and Statistics, Chapter Seven: The Contribution of Australia’s Gambling Industries 2017/18’ (February 2020) 12.

    15 Victorian Government, ‘Victorian Government Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Gambling in Australia’ (March 2009) 27.

    16 Queensland Government Statistician’s Office, Queensland Treasury, Australian Gambling Statistics, 1993–94 to 2018–19, 36th edition (Report, April 2021) 89, Table Vic 20.

    17 See the spreadsheet titled ‘Taxation Revenue—Annual’ in ‘State Taxation Revenue’, Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance (Web Page, 2021) < www.dtf.vic.gov.au/state-financial-data-sets/state-taxation-revenueExternal Link ;. This spreadsheet details the historical and forecast data published in budget papers (Budget and Budget Update) and the Annual Financial Report. It includes the taxation data series for gambling taxes.

    18 Exhibit RC0722 VAGO Reducing the Harm Caused by Gambling Report, March 2021, 11.

    19 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 15 [A.33].

    20 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 107–10 [6]–[29]; see also ‘Crown Resorts Foundation’, Crown Resorts (Web Page, 2021) http://www.crownresorts.com.au/Our-Contribution/Crown-Resorts-FoundationExternal Link

    21 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 107–8 [1]–[7]; Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 15 [A.33(d)], 320 [17].

    22 Crown Resorts, Submission to Productivity Commission, Australia International Tourism Industry Research Report (15 December 2014) 2, 4–6.

    23 State of Victoria, ‘Melbourne’s Top Attractions, Business Victoria’ (Fact Sheet, 2019) 1 < https://business.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1865160/Melbour…External Link ;. This fact sheet provides an overview of overnight visitors to Victoria who attended places or attractions in Melbourne. This includes both domestic and international overnight visitors and may include those who visit the place/attraction as part of a day trip (this does not include local visitors).

    24 See Table 6 in the spreadsheet titled ‘State Tourism Satellite Account 2019–20 data tables’ in ‘State Tourism Satellite Accounts, 2019–20’, Tourism Research Australia (Web Page, 2021) https://www.tra.gov.au/data-and-research/reports/state-tourism-satellit…External Link . ‘Direct tourism gross value added’ means the value of direct tourism output before taxes, less the value of the goods and services used to produce these tourism products: ‘Australian National Accounts: Tourism Satellite Account methodology’, Australian Bureau of Statistics (Web Page, 10 December 2020) < www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/australian-national-accounts-tourism-satel…External Link ;.

    25 See, eg, Exhibit RC1586 Article: An Economic and Social Review of Gambling in Great Britain, 2013, 13–14.

    26 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Gambling Industries (Inquiry Report No. 10, 26 November 1999), 5.

    27 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Gambling Industries (Inquiry Report No. 10, 26 November 1999).

    28 See, eg, Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017); Exhibit RC0127 VRGF Identifying Effective Policy Intervention to Prevent Gambling-Related Harm Report, June 2019.

    29 See, eg, Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Counting the Cost: Inquiry into the Costs of Problem Gambling (Final Report, 2012).

    30 See, eg, South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, Social Impacts of Gambling: A Comparative Study (Final Report, April 2009); Lenny Roth, ‘Gambling: An Update’ (Research Paper, Parliament of New South Wales, March 2020).

    31 See, eg, Exhibit RC1586 Article: An Economic and Social Review of Gambling in Great Britain, 2013, 1; Patrick Basham and Karen White, GamblingwithourFuture?TheCostsandBenefitsofLegalizedGambling (Report, The Fraser institute, 2002); Gerda Reith, Research on the Social Impacts of Gambling (Final Report, Scottish Executive Social Research, 2006); Exhibit RC1593 Article: The Social Costs of Gambling: An Economic Perspective, February 1999; Douglas Walker, ‘Quantification of the Social Costs and Benefits of Gambling’ (Conference Paper, Annual Alberta Conference on Gambling Research, 2006); Douglas Walker, et al, State of the Evidence Review: Societal and Economic Impact of Gambling (Research Report, Gambling Research Exchange Ontario, 2015); Earl Grinols, The Hidden Social Costs of Gambling (Research Report, Centre for Christian Ethics at Baylor University, 2011); Brian Easton, ‘The Benefits and Costs of Gambling: Some Policy Implications’ (Web Page, April 2010) < www.eastonbh.ac.nz/2010/04/the-benefits-and-costs-of-gambling-some-poli…External Link ;.

    32 Productivity Commission, Australia’s Gambling Industries (Final Report No. 10, 26 November 1999) 13–14.

    33 ‘Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI)’, VRGF (Web Page, 2021) < https://responsiblegambling.vic.gov.au/for-professionals/health-and-com…External Link ;. ;.

    34 ‘Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI)’, VRGF (Web Page, 2021) < https://responsiblegambling.vic.gov.au/for-professionals/health-and-com…External Link ;.

    35 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 47, 5.19.

    36 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 45.

    37 Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 23.

    38 Howe et al, Gambling and Problem Gambling in Victoria (Report, VRGF, July 2018) 48.

    39 Howe et al, Gambling and Problem Gambling in Victoria (Report, VRGF, July 2018) 48–9.

    40 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 4 [34]. The figure in [34] was corrected in evidence by Ms Billi: see Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1795.

    41 Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 1.

    42 Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic); Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic).

    43 ‘Expenditure on Gambling in Victoria and Australia’, VRGF (Web Page, 13 December 2019) < https://responsiblegambling.vic.gov.au/resources/gambling-victoria/expe…External Link ;.

    44 ‘Expenditure on Gambling in Victoria and Australia’, VRGF (Web Page, 13 December 2019) < https://responsiblegambling.vic.gov.au/resources/gambling-victoria/expe…External Link ;.

    45 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 16–17, 5.33.

    46 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 51.

    47 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 51.

    48 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 51; Queensland Government Statistician’s Office, Queensland Treasury, Australian Gambling Statistics 1992–93 to 2017–18, 35th edition (Report, December 2019) 89, Table Vic 20.

    49 Exhibit RC1584 Article: A Pokie-Holic State, 17 June 2008, 1.

    50 Submission 59 Australasian Gaming Council, 28.

    51 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 26.

    52 Browne et al, Assessing Gambling-Related Harm in Victoria: A Public Health Perspective (Research Report, VRGF, April 2016) 75–9.

    53 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 26. See also Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 107–10.

    54 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 65.

    55 Exhibit RC0722 VAGO, Reducing the Harm Caused by Gambling Report, March 2021, 3, 11.

    56 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 53–4.

    57 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 54.

    58 Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 74–6. The Australian Unity Wellbeing Index has been designed as a barometer of Australians’ satisfaction with their lives and life in Australia.

    59 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 57–8.

    60 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 73.

    61 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 59–61.

    62 Women’s Health in the North, Understanding the Link between Family Violence and Gambling: Information for Local Government (Fact Sheet, 2021) 2 (citations omitted).

    63 Nicki A Dowling et al, ‘Problem Gambling and Family Violence: Findings from a Population-Representative Study’ (2018) 7(3) Journal of Behavioural Addictions 806, 806–9.

    64 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 67–8.

    65 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 70–1.

    66 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 68–70.

    67 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 74–6.

    68 Browne et al, The Social Cost of Gambling to Victoria (Research Report, VRGF, November 2017) 76–83.

    69 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, [11]–[12].

    70 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, [32].

    71 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1529; Exhibit RC0143 Crown Melbourne Average Daily Unique Visitations report, 1 June 2021.

    72 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, [52]–[53]; Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y.

    73 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, [52.5].

    74 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 224–5 [F.185]–[F.203].

    75 Submission 08 South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, 202.

    76 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 June 1991, 2312 (JVC Guest).

    77 Submission 32 Australian Vietnamese Women’s Association Inc, 1; Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 1; Submission 75 School of Public Health & Preventative Medicine, Monash University, 11. See also ‘Evidence given by support workers’ in this chapter.

    78 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 7 [39] (citing Parke et al, Key Issues in Product Based Harm Minimisation: Examining Theory, Evidence and Policy Issues in Great Britain (Report, December 2016)).

    79 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 7 [39] (citing Parke et al, Key Issues in Product Based Harm Minimisation: Examining Theory, Evidence and Policy Issues in Great Britain (Report, December 2016)).

    80 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 7 [40] (citing Parke et al, Key Issues in Product Based Harm Minimisation: Examining Theory, Evidence and Policy Issues in Great Britain (Report, December 2016)); Schottler Consulting, Literature Review of the Impact of EGM Characteristics on Gambling Harm (Report, 2019).

    81 Exhibit RC1587 Article: Dark Flow, Depression and Multiline Slot Machine Play, 73, 76, 81, 83.

    82 Exhibit RC1587 Article: Dark Flow, Depression and Multiline Slot Machine Play, 76.

    83 Exhibit RC1587 Article: Dark Flow, Depression and Multiline Slot Machine Play, 73, 83.

    84 Exhibit RC1587 Article: Dark Flow, Depression and Multiline Slot Machine Play, 73–4.

    85 Exhibit RC1585 Article: Amplified Striatal Responses to Near-Miss Outcomes in Pathological Gamblers, 27 April 2016, 2614, 2620–1. See also Exhibit RC1589 Article: Gambling Near-Misses Enhance Motivation to Gamble and Recruit Win-Related Brain Circuitry, 2009.

    86 Casino Licence granted to Crown Melbourne (then Crown Casino Ltd) under Part 2 of the Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) dated 19 November 1993, cl 8(c).

    87 Victoria, Victoria Government Gazette, No S 510, 9 December 2019. A player must have a pre-set time and loss limit on their YourPlay account, and not have exceeded either limit, to use an EGM in unrestricted mode. Other conditions apply to the operation of EGMs in unrestricted mode; for example, they can only operate in specified areas.

    88 Victoria, Victoria Government Gazette, No S 510, 9 December 2019.

    89 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1685 [16]–[22].

    90 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 69.

    91 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 20(1).

    92 Department of Justice (Vic), Taking Action on Problem Gambling (Report, October 2006).

    93 Department of Justice (Vic), Taking Action on Problem Gambling (Report, October 2006) 4.

    94 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 November 2007, 3827 (Tony Robinson).

    95 Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures) Act 2007 (Vic) ss 56–9.

    96 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 69 inserted by Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures) 2007 (Vic) s 57. When originally introduced, the section provided as follows: ‘[I]t is a condition of a casino licence that the casino operator implement a Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct that has been approved by the Commission’.

    97 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 69, inserted by Gambling Legislation Amendment (Problem Gambling and Other Measures Act 2007 (Vic) s 57 and subsequently amended by Gambling Regulation Amendment (Gaming Machine Arrangements) Act 2017 (Vic) s 58.

    98 Exhibit RC0508 Ministerial Direction No S 430, 17 September 2018, 4–6, as amended by Exhibit RC0163 Ministerial Direction No S 85, 21 February 2020.

    99 Exhibit RC0508 Ministerial Direction No S 430, 17 September 2018, 4–6.

    100 Exhibit RC0508 Ministerial Direction No S 430, 17 September 2018, 5.

    101 Exhibit RC0712 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, 26 May 2009, 11–12.

    102 Exhibit RC0712 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, 26 May 2009, 12.

    103 Exhibit RC0714 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 3, November 2012, 11−12.

    104 Exhibit RC0714 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 3, November 2012, 12.

    105 Exhibit RC0714 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 3, November 2012, 12.

    106 Exhibit RC0713 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 4, July 2016, 11, amending Exhibit RC0714 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 3, November 2012, 11.

    107 Exhibit RC0713 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 4, July 2016, 12.

    108 Exhibit RC0713 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 4, July 2016, 12.

    109 Exhibit RC0713 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 4, July 2016, 12.

    110 Exhibit RC0715 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 5, October 2016.

    111 Exhibit RC0715 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 5, October 2016, 3, 12.

    112 Exhibit RC0110 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 6, July 2019, 16.

    113 Exhibit RC0694 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 7, May 2021.

    114 Exhibit RC0712 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, n.d., 11–12.

    115 Exhibit RC0714 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 3, November 2012, 12.

    116 Exhibit RC0713 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 4, July 2016, 12.

    117 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014.

    118 Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007.

    119 Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002.

    120 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014, 28–9; Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007; Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, [2.5].

    121 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014, 20; Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 2.

    122 Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 8 (section 1.2, ‘Length of playing sessions’).

    123 Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007, 201 [5.14.2].

    124 Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007, 201 [5.14.2].

    125 Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007, 285.

    126 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014, 88–9.

    127 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014, 69, 202–3.

    128 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 198 [F.77].

    129 Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 8 (section 1.2, under the heading ‘Length of playing sessions’).

    130 Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 9 (section 1.3, under the heading ‘Number of sessions per week’).

    131 Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 34.

    132 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1225.

    133 Exhibit RC1622 Gaming Departments and Responsible Gaming Department, Proposal regarding Play Periods Trial, 26 May 2010.

    134 Exhibit RC1623 Table regarding Responsible Gambling Initiatives, n.d., 14.

    135 Exhibit RC1622 Gaming Departments and Responsible Gaming Department, Proposal regarding Play Periods Trial, 26 May 2010.

    136 Exhibit RC0208 Letter from Barry Felstead to Catherine Myers, 30 December 2019, 6.

    137 Exhibit RC1624 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.1, February 2018, 1.

    138 Exhibit RC0207 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.2, February 2018, 1.

    139 Exhibit RC0117 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.3, December 2018, 1–2.

    140 Exhibit RC0699 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.4, May 2019.

    141 Exhibit RC0698 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.6, December 2019.

    142 Exhibit RC0116 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.7, December 2020, 1–2.

    143 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1228, 1269.

    144 Exhibit RC0698 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.6, December 2019, 1; Exhibit RC0116 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.7, December 2020, 1.

    145 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1062–3; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1269.

    146 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1235.

    147 Exhibit RC0209 VCGLR Sixth Casino Review recommendations 7, 8 and 9, 16 July 2020, 4–5 [31].

    148 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3041.

    149 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021.

    150 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021, 2.

    151 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 199 [F.85].

    152 Exhibit RC0309 Statement of Steven Blackburn, 21 April 2021, 1.

    153 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3033–54.

    154 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3038.

    155 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 199–200 [F.86].

    156 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1068–70; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1252–4.

    157 See, eg, Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 28; Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1067–8. See also the evidence from Crown records, employees and customers, and from community workers and the public, in the section, 'Identifying patrons with gambling problems'.

    158 See, eg, Exhibit RC0110 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 6, July 2019, 15–16; Exhibit RC0694 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 7, May 2021, 15–16.

    159 Exhibit RC0121 Gambling Research Australia Validation Study of In-Venue Problem Gambler Indicators Report, February 2014, 203; Exhibit RC0968 The University of Adelaide Identifying Problem Gamblers in Gambling Venues Report, 24 August 2007, 285; Exhibit RC0550 Report regarding Current Issues Related to Identifying the Problem Gambler in the Gambling Venue, August 2002, 8.

    160 Exhibit RC0207 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.2, February 2018; Exhibit RC0117 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.3, December 2018, 1; Exhibit RC0699 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.4, May 2019; Exhibit RC0698 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.6, December 2019; Exhibit RC0116 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.7, December 2020, 1–2.

    161 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1062–3.

    162 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1059–61.

    163 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1059.

    164 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1070.

    165 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [58].

    166 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [59].

    167 RGAs were formerly called ‘Responsible Gaming Liaison Officers’.

    168 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [59].

    169 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [60].

    170 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [62].

    171 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [62].

    172 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1153, 1167 [29]–[41].

    173 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 15 [63].

    174 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 16 [63].

    175 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 16 [67].

    176 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 16–17 [68]–[70].

    177 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1059–61; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 21 June 2021, 2188–9, 2191–2, 2201, 2204; Exhibit RC0208 Letter from Barry Felstead to Catherine Myers, 30 December 2019, 7–8. Alerts may be sent at different times under Crown’s new Play Periods Policy, which was approved on 24 May 2021 (Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 199 [F.85]).

    178 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 17 [71]–[76].

    179 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 26–7 [117(g)]; Exhibit RC0567 Email chain between Michelle Fielding and Rowan Harris, 26 June 2020, 2.

    180 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 17–18 [77]–[78], 28 [123]–[124], 49–50 [174]–[175], 50–1 [180]; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ee, 5 [4], 6–7 [6].

    181 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 18 [79].

    182 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 11 [A.23], 181 [F.14].

    183 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 7 [32].

    184 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1529; Exhibit RC0143 Crown Melbourne Average Daily Unique Visitations Report, 1 June 2021.

    185 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 23–5 [101]–[106].

    186 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 57 [198(b)].

    187 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1169.

    188 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 24 [108]–[109].

    189 Exhibit RC0642 Email from Steven Blackburn to Bronwyn Weir, 20 May 2021, Annexure a.

    190 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1175–6, 1181–4.

    191 Exhibit RC0111 Responsible Gaming Advisor Position Description, 3 June 2019; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1174–5, 1158–9.

    192 Exhibit RC0111 Responsible Gaming Advisor Position Description, 3 June 2019, 1; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1174. The RGA who gave evidence said that they spent approximately 70 per cent of their time walking the gaming floor during their 12-hour shift: see Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1052. They also gave evidence that it took 30 minutes to walk the floor (provided that was limited to walking and observing), which they did more than five, and less than 10 times in a shift: see Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1058. This equates to approximately 20 per cent to 40 per cent of their time spent only walking and observing.

    193 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1174–5.

    194 Casino Licence granted to Crown Melbourne (then Crown Casino Ltd) under Part 2 of the Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) dated 19 November 1993, cl 8(c); Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1204–6. If there were four RGAs on the floor, the ratio would be approximately one RGA to 650 EGMs and 135 gaming tables (including poker and other table games).

    195 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure s.

    196 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure p.

    197 Exhibit RC0113 Responsible Service of Gaming for Senior Managers (advanced) session plan, January 2020.

    198 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 33 [151], [154].

    199 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1186.

    200 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1187.

    201 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1179–80.

    202 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1178–9.

    203 Hing et al, Responsible Conduct of Gambling Study (Research Report, 2020) 16–19.

    204 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 208 [F.121], 209 [F.123].

    205 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 479; Transcript of Employee 2, 21 May 2021, 489; Transcript of Employee 3, 21 May 2021, 498.

    206 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 479; Transcript of Employee 2, 21 May 2021, 490; Transcript of Employee 3, 21 May 2021, 499; Transcript of Employee 4, 21 May 2021, 509.

    207 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 4, 21 May 2021, 503.

    208 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 476; Transcript of Employee 2, 21 May 2021, 486.

    209 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 479–80; Transcript of Employee 2, 21 May 2021, 490; Transcript of Employee 3, 21 May 2021, 499; Transcript of Employee 4, 21 May 2021, 510.

    210 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 480; Transcript of Employee 2, 21 May 2021, 490–1; Transcript of Employee 4, 21 May 2021, 510–11.

    211 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 1, 21 May 2021, 480; Transcript of Employee 3, 21 May 2021, 499–500; Transcript of Employee 4, 21 May 2021, 511.

    212 Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 3.

    213 In oral evidence, Ms Mitchell gave an estimate of $55,000, but subsequently contacted the Commission to correct the estimate.

    214 Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 1; Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 5.

    215 Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 1; Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 5, 7.

    216 Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 7.

    217 Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 2–3; Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 11.

    218 Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 3; Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 11.

    219 Submission 28 Elizabeth Mitchell, 3; Transcript of Elizabeth Mitchell, 4 May 2021, 11–12.

    220 Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 3–5.

    221 Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 3–5.

    222 Submission 23 Binbin Du, 1; Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 7, 11–12.

    223 Submission 23 Binbin Du, 1; Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 8–10.

    224 Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 15–16.

    225 Transcript of Binbin Du, 5 May 2021, 20.

    226 Transcript of Stuart McDonald, 4 May 2021, 17–18.

    227 Submission 22 Stuart McDonald.

    228 Submission 22 Stuart McDonald.

    229 Transcript of Stuart McDonald, 4 May 2021, 19, 22.

    230 Submission 22 Stuart McDonald.

    231 Submission 22 Stuart McDonald.

    232 Transcript of Stuart McDonald, 4 May 2021, 22.

    233 Transcript of Stuart McDonald, 4 May 2021, 22.

    234 Transcript of Stuart McDonald, 4 May 2021, 22.

    235 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 2; Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 21.

    236 Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 21.

    237 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 1; Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 22–3.

    238 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 2; Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 24–5.

    239 Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 22, 36–8.

    240 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 1; Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 23.

    241 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 1.

    242 Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 29; Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 1.

    243 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 1.

    244 Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford, 2; Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 25.

    245 Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 26.

    246 Transcript of Carolyn Crawford, 6 May 2021, 28.

    247 See, eg, Submission 38 Anonymous; Submission 39 Anna Bardsley, 2; Submission 43 Anonymous, 1; Submission 45 Anonymous, 3; Submission 84 Anonymous.

    248 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1143.

    249 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1144.

    250 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1145.

    251 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1059.

    252 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1070.

    253 See, eg, Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1264.

    254 ‘Gloria’ is the pseudonym given to the witness known as EZ: Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 390–1.

    255 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 391.

    256 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 392–3.

    257 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 393.

    258 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 393.

    259 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 396–7.

    260 ‘Ronaldo’ is the pseudonym given to the witness known as EX: Transcript of EX, 20 May 2021, 412–13.

    261 Transcript of EX, 20 May 2021, 413–14.

    262 Transcript of EX, 20 May 2021, 414–15.

    263 Transcript of EX, 20 May 2021, 414.

    264 Transcript of EX, 20 May 2021, 414.

    265 ‘Prita’ is the pseudonym given to the witness known as FZ: Transcript of FZ, 27 May 2021, 1086.

    266 Transcript of FZ, 27 May 2021, 1091.

    267 Transcript of FZ, 27 May 2021, 1093.

    268 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 394–6; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1299–1304; Transcript of Manorani Guy, 8 June 2021, 1851–3.

    269 Transcript of FZ, 27 May 2021, 1092; Submission 16 Carolyn Crawford.

    270 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 396–7.

    271 Exhibit RC0525 Coroners Prevention Unit Response to Data Request re: Deaths relating directly or indirectly to the Crown Casino Complex, 6 May 2021, 41; Exhibit RC0520 Table of Crown Melbourne related deaths, 29 October 2019, 1–3.

    272 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1048.

    273 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1067.

    274 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1067–8.

    275 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1068–70.

    276 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1066–7.

    277 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1072–3.

    278 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1062–3.

    279 Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1062–3.

    280 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1476.

    281 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1718.

    282 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 13 [83].

    283 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1768.

    284 Transcript of AZ, 3 May 2021, 59, 76.

    285 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 6, 33.

    286 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 9 [40].

    287 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 11 [48].

    288 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 11–14 [50]–[54].

    289 See, eg, Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1252–6.

    290 See, eg, Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1260–2; Exhibit RC0118 Observable Signs Report, n.d., 4–5; Exhibit RC0117 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.3, December 2018, 1; Exhibit RC0715 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 5, October 2016, 11–12.

    291 See, eg, Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 2 June 2021, 1254–61; Exhibit RC0118 Observable Signs Report, n.d., 4–5; Exhibit RC0117 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.3, December 2018, 1.

    292 Exhibit RC0699 Play Periods Policy, Version 1.4, May 2019, 1; Exhibit RC0715 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 5, October 2016, 11.

    293 Exhibit RC0599 NOS Report spreadsheet, 2021.

    294 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 21 June 2021, 2204.

    295 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1399, 1436–7, 1439–40.

    296 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1455.

    297 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1527.

    298 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 21 June 2021, 2165.

    299 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 21 June 2021, 2174–5.

    300 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 202 [F.95].

    301 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 32 [5.1].

    302 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 1.3.

    303 See Recommendation 10.4: Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 54, 10.44.

    304 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 10.20–1.

    305 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 10.19–20.

    306 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 33 [5.1].

    307 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 33 [5.1].

    308 See, eg, discussion in Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 10.18; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d, 32 [1.7].

    309 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 10.21–2.

    310 Exhibit RC0322 Table of Documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure w, 10.44.

    311 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 41 [5.1.5].

    312 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 36 [5.1.2.2].

    313 Blaszczynski et al, Operator-Based Approaches to Harm Minimisation in Gambling: Summary, Review and Future Directions (Report, 2014) 41 [5.1.5].

    314 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 31 October 2013, 3800 (Michael O’Brien).

    315 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 97.

    316 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 98.

    317 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d, 1, 11 [1.1].

    318 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d.

    319 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d, 33 [1.7].

    320 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 98–9.

    321 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d, 59.

    322 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3062, 3064.

    323 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1715–17.

    324 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1759–60.

    325 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1717; Transcript of Employee 6, 21 May 2021, 550.

    326 Transcript of Employee 6, 21 May 2021, 551, 563–4; Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 29–30.

    327 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 45.

    328 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 30.

    329 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 43.

    330 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 42.

    331 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 45.

    332 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 43–4.

    333 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 45.

    334 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 44.

    335 Confidential submission.

    336 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 45.

    337 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 6.

    338 See, eg, Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 3.

    339 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 35–6.

    340 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 35–6.

    341 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 36.

    342 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 37.

    343 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 37.

    344 Exhibit RC0179 Statutory Declaration, 10 April 2021, 1 [6].

    345 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 38.

    346 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 38.

    347 Exhibit RC0179 Statutory Declaration, 10 April 2021, 1 [8]; see also Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1781.

    348 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 38.

    349 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 38–9.

    350 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1781; Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 38–9.

    351 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1786.

    352 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1784.

    353 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1784–5.

    354 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1765–6, 1772.

    355 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1769–70.

    356 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1766–7.

    357 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1768.

    358 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1773.

    359 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1789–90.

    360 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1774.

    361 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1760.

    362 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1760–1.

    363 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1765–6.

    364 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 42–3; Transcript of Employee 6, 21 May 2021, 560–1.

    365 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 43; Transcript of Employee 6, 21 May 2021, 568; Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1769. Mr Lawrence gave no evidence as to what an appropriate break was, nor how an appropriate length was determined.

    366 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1773.

    367 Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1774–5.

    368 Transcript of BZ, 4 May 2021, 43–5; Transcript of Peter Lawrence, 8 June 2021, 1769–70.

    369 Exhibit RC0146 Statement of Mark Mackay, 5 May 2021, 8 [24(b)], 9 [26]; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1135–6; Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1686.

    370 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1686.

    371 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1687.

    372 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1692.

    373 Exhibit RC1625 Letter from Alex Fitzpatrick to Barry Felstead, 7 March 2019; Exhibit RC1492 Reclaiming Button Picks Policy, 7 March 2019; Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1687–8.

    374 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1688.

    375 Victoria, Victoria Government Gazette, No S 44, 24 April 1997, 381–2, Rule 21. Subsequent amendments to the Rules do not amend Rule 21.

    376 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1692.

    377 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1690–1.

    378 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1690.

    379 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1690.

    380 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1720.

    381 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 9 [40], 10 [46], 11–13 [48]–[54]; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1389–91.

    382 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 4 [34]. Note the figure in [34] was corrected to 0.7 per cent in evidence by Ms Billi: see Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1795.

    383 Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 23.

    384 Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1802–3.

    385 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021 9–10 [52]–[53]; Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y.

    386 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 9 [52.5], [52.7].

    387 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1529; Exhibit RC0143 Crown Melbourne Average Daily Unique Visitations report, 1 June 2021.

    388 Exhibit RC0322 Table of documents emailed to Steven Blackburn, n.d., Annexure y, 23.

    389 Exhibit RC0181 Statement of Rosa Billi, 10 May 2021, 9 [52.7].

    390 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 11 [50]; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1389–91.

    391 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 13 [54].

    392 Notably, this accords with the reports of a number of people who made public submissions to the Commission. See, eg, Submission 7 Robert Ingmire; Submission 14 Catherine Sommerville; Submission 18 Anonymous; Submission 19 Anonymous.

    393 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 36–40 [168]; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1394–5.

    394 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 36–40 [168].

    395 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure 4, 77.

    396 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1394–5.

    397 Exhibit RC0694 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 7, May 2021, 9.

    398 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1333; Exhibit RC0110 Crown Melbourne Responsible Gambling Code of Conduct, Version 6, July 2019, 14.

    399 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1341; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ee, 2.

    400 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ee, 3; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1341.

    401 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1341; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, Annexure ee, 3 [1.5].

    402 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1342–3; Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ee, 3 [1.5].

    403 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure ee, 3 [1.4], 4; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1343.

    404 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1166, 1174.

    405 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, 28 [121]; Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1343−4.

    406 Submission 22 Stuart McDonald; Submission 25 Peter Jankowski, 2; Submission 46 Anonymous, 1. See also Submission 69 Financial Counselling Victoria, 2.

    407 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 1 June 2021, 1172.

    408 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 115; Transcript of Craig Walsh, 25 June 2021, 2582, 2593–8.

    409 Transcript of Craig Walsh, 25 June 2021, 2604.

    410 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 168 [E.49].

    411 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 169 [E.50]–[E.52].

    412 Transcript of Craig Walsh, 25 June 2021, 2579.

    413 See, eg, Transcript of Employee 7, 27 May 2021, 1052.

    414 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 3 [17], 6 [19].

    415 See, eg, Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 3–7 [16]–[31].

    416 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 11 [66].

    417 Exhibit RC1250 Crown Rewards Rules, 1 August 2019, 6 [6], 9 [9].

    418 See, eg, Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 2 [11], 3–5 [18]–[19].

    419 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1457, 1461, 1473–5, 1482.

    420 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1482.

    421 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 11–12 [66]–[71].

    422 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1460.

    423 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1461.

    424 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1468.

    425 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1458.

    426 Transcript of Ahmed Hasna, 3 May 2021, 8–9. ‘[O]n that occasion I got called in to pick up Phil Collins tickets, because you go in and pick them up, I went in to pick them up and I dropped 30,000. So going in to pick up Phil Collins tickets cost me $30,000 for my friends that went to watch him … Nothing is for free, it’s all calculated, it’s pretty smart. They know how to play you and they play you quite well.’

    427 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1474–5.

    428 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1468.

    429 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1468–9; Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 8 [42], [44].

    430 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1468.

    431 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1505.

    432 Exhibit RC0146 Statement of Mark Mackay, 5 May 2021, 7 [21].

    433 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1468–9.

    434 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1470–3.

    435 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1377−80; Transcript of Shane Lucas, 4 June 2021, 1577; Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1693–708; Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1827–8.

    436 Transcript of Sonja Bauer, 3 June 2021, 1378.

    437 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1695, 1703–5.

    438 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1696.

    439 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1695–7. From April 2018, no minimum stay on property was imposed.

    440 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1704.

    441 Submission 79 Deakin University, 7–8.

    442 Submission 79 Deakin University, 2, 11–12.

    443 Submission 79 Deakin University, 9.

    444 Exhibit RC0168 File Note regarding VCGLR meeting with Ethnic Community Council of Victoria, 28 November 2017, 3, [10]. See also Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1704–5.

    445 Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1708–9; Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021.

    446 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021, 2.

    447 Submission 09 La Trobe University.

    448 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 2–3.

    449 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 2–3.

    450 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 2.

    451 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 3.

    452 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 7.

    453 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 3.

    454 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 7.

    455 Submission 09 La Trobe University, 3.

    456 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021, 2.

    457 Transcript of Manorani Guy, 8 June 2021, 1849–50.

    458 Transcript of EZ, 20 May 2021, 390, 394, 396–7; Transcript of FZ, 27 May 2021, 1087, 1092, 1096.

    459 See, eg, Submission 65 Federation University, 5; Submission 79 Deakin University, 14–15.

    460 See, eg, Submission 65 Federation University, 5; Submission 79 Deakin University, 14–15.

    461 Transcript of Shane Lucas, 4 June 2021, 1565–6.

    462 Supplementary responsive submission Crown—Casino gambling data, 13 August 2021, 2–4 [4]–[19]; Transcript of Shane Lucas, 4 June 2021, 1582; Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 191 [F.50].

    463 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d.

    464 Exhibit RC0109 Statement of Sonja Bauer, 5 May 2021, Annexure d, 8–10.

    465 See Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 339–41, Annexure F1.

    466 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021, 2; Exhibit RC0652 Email chain between Steven Blackburn and Helen Coonan et al, 20 May 2021, Annexure a; Exhibit RC0652 Email chain between Steven Blackburn and Helen Coonan et al, 20 May 2021, Annexure b.

    467 Exhibit RC0217 Email from Rowan Cameron to Sonja Bauer, 19 May 2021; Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3048–9.

    468 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3049–50. Before 18 May 2021, the RSG paper detailing the proposed RSG improvements being prepared by Mr Blackburn had only included references to capacity and remuneration: Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3041. See also Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1499, 1516; Transcript of Mark Mackay, 7 June 2021, 1708–9.

    469 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3041.

    470 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3019–20.

    471 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 2916.

    472 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3019–20.

    473 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3020, 3037.

    474 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3033.

    475 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 6.

    476 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 11 [A.23].

    477 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1497.

    478 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 5 [19].

    479 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1498.

    480 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1515–16. At the time of writing Crown Melbourne had not taken such steps.

    481 Exhibit RC0182 Supplementary statement of Rosa Billi, 2 June 2021, 2 [5.1].

    482 Exhibit RC0182 Supplementary statement of Rosa Billi, 2 June 2021, 2 [5.2]; Exhibit RC1592 Article: Loyalty Programmes in the Gambling Industry: Potentials for Harm and Possibilities for Harm-Minimization, 13 June 2018, 496.

    483 Exhibit RC0182 Supplementary statement of Rosa Billi, 2 June 2021, 2–3 [5.2]; Exhibit RC1592 Article: Loyalty Programmes in the Gambling Industry: Potentials for Harm and Possibilities for Harm-Minimization, 13 June 2018, 496.

    484 See, eg, Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1823. But see Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 213 [F.136], in which it is asserted that one study has concluded that ‘[l]oyalty programs … have very little to do with problem gambling’ and that ‘loyalty programs have no significant impact on problem gambling’.

    485 See, eg, Exhibit RC0182 Supplementary statement of Rosa Billi, 2 June 2021, 3–4 [5.6].

    486 Exhibit RC1592 Article: Loyalty Programmes in the Gambling Industry: Potentials for Harm and Possibilities for Harm-Minimization, 13 June 2018, 502; Exhibit RC0732 Article: Factors that Influence Gambler Adherence to Pre-Commitment Decisions, 23 August 2010, 5–6, 12.

    487 Exhibit RC1592 Article: Loyalty Programmes in the Gambling Industry: Potentials for Harm and Possibilities for Harm-Minimization, 13 June 2018, 501–2.

    488 Exhibit RC1592 Article: Loyalty Programmes in the Gambling Industry: Potentials for Harm and Possibilities for Harm-Minimization, 13 June 2018, 502. See also Exhibit RC0728 Gambling Research Australia Report Regarding the Role of Loyalty Programs in Gambling, January 2016, 202.

    489 Exhibit RC0182 Supplementary statement of Rosa Billi, 2 June 2021, 3–4 [5.6].

    490 Exhibit RC0133 Statement of Nicolas Emery, 5 May 2021, 13 [85].

    491 Transcript of Nicolas Emery, 4 June 2021, 1516.

    492 Transcript of Employee 5, 21 May 2021, 531.

    493 Exhibit RC0219 Crown Responsible Gaming Best Practice Recommendations, May 2021, 2 [5].

    494 Exhibit RC0122 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 26 May 2021, 2; Exhibit RC0652 Email chain between Steven Blackburn and Helen Coonan et al, 20 May 2021, Annexure a; Exhibit RC0652 Email chain between Steven Blackburn and Helen Coonan et al, 20 May 2021, Annexure b.

    495 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3407.

    496 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3048.

    497 Transcript of Shane Lucas, 4 June 2021, 1554; Responsive submission VRGF, 2 August 2021, 23–24 [10.3]–[10.6].

    498 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 6.

    499 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 6.

    500 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 88.

    501 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 90–2, 95.

    502 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 93–5.

    503 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 95.

    504 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 97.

    505 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 6.

    506 Exhibit RC0002 VCGLR Sixth Review of the Casino Operator and Licence, June 2018, 6.

    507 See Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, Annexure F2.

    508 Transcript of Steven Blackburn, 1 July 2021, 3050; Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 11 [A.23].

    509 Supplementary responsive submission State of Victoria on Mandatory Pre-Commitment, 12 August 2021.

    510 Exhibit RC0508 Ministerial Direction No S 430, 17 September 2018; Exhibit RC0163 Ministerial Direction No S 85, 21 February 2020.

    511 Supplementary responsive submission Crown—Casino gambling data, 13 August 2021, 2–4 [4]–[19]; See also Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 191 [F.50]; Responsive submission VRGF, 2 August 2021, 30–1 [12.4]; Supplementary responsive submission VRGF, 10 August 2021; Transcript of Rosa Billi, 8 June 2021, 1821.

    Reviewed 25 October 2021