Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence

Chapter 03

The Bergin Inquiry: corporate failures and the Packer influence

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The Bergin Inquiry: corporate failures and the Packer influence

Introduction

  1. This chapter examines the inquiry under section 143 of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) that was undertaken by the Hon. Patricia Bergin, AO, SC (Bergin Inquiry). The Report of the Bergin Inquiry was provided to the Independent Liquor and Gaming Authority (NSW) (ILGA) on 1 February 2021.1 The findings of the Bergin Inquiry constitute a critical context for the work of this Commission.
  2. By way of background, Crown Resorts has three operating subsidiaries: Crown Melbo urne, which operates the Melbourne Casino, Burswood Nominees Ltd as trustee for the Burswood Property Trust (Crown Perth), which operates the Crown casino in Perth, and Crown Sydney Gaming Pty Ltd (Crown Sydney), which holds a restricted gaming licence to operate the Crown casino at Barangaroo.2
  3. The Bergin Inquiry was established to determine whether:
    • Crown Sydney was a suitable person to continue to hold a restricted gaming licence; and
    • Crown Resorts was a suitable person to be a close associate of Crown Sydney.3
  4. A key focus of the Bergin Inquiry was whether Crown Resorts or its subsidiaries had engaged in money laundering, breached gambling laws in China and made arrangements with junket operators who had links to organised crime.4
  5. The Bergin Inquiry also examined the sale by CPH to Melco Resorts & Entertainment Limited (Melco) of a 19.99 per cent stake of its shareholding (then 46.1 per cent) in Crown Resorts.5
  6. The Bergin Inquiry concluded that:
    • Crown Sydney is not a suitable person to continue to give effect to its restricted gaming licence
    • Crown Resorts is not a suitable person to be a close associate of Crown Sydney.6
  7. The principal findings upon which these conclusions were based were that:
    • between 2014 and 2019, Crown enabled or facilitated money laundering through the bank accounts of its subsidiaries Southbank Investments Pty Limited (Southbank) and Riverbank Investments Pty Limited (Riverbank), and that this situation went unchecked and unchanged despite warnings from its bankers7
    • between 2014 and 2016, Crown disregarded the welfare of its China-based staff—putting them at risk of detention by pursuing an aggressive sales policy and failing to escalate risks through the appropriate corporate risk management structure8
    • between 2012 and 2020, Crown entered into and/or continued commercial relationships with junket operators who had links to triads and other organised crime groups, and maintained those relationships after becoming aware of persistent public allegations of such links in national and international media reports and in its own due diligence reports.9
  8. Shortly after this Commission was established, Crown Melbourne was requested to inform the Commission whether it accepted that, based on the evidence and material that was before the Bergin Inquiry, it was open for the Commission to: (a) make the principal findings set out above; and (b) conclude that Crown Resorts is not a suitable person to be a close associate of Crown Sydney.10
  9. This Commission received a response by letter on behalf of both Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne.11 The letter defined those companies together as ‘Crown’ and recorded Crown’s acknowledgement that:
    • Between 2013 and 2017 in the case of the Riverbank accounts, and between 2013 and 2019 in the case of the Southbank accounts, third parties engaged in apparent money laundering through those accounts. Crown inadvertently facilitated or enabled this activity despite concerns being raised by its bankers.
    • Between 2015 and 2016, the pursuit of an aggressive VIP sales policy and a failure to escalate risks through the appropriate corporate risk management structure put Crown’s China-based staff at risk of detention.
    • Between 2012 and 2020, having relied on its due diligence, Crown entered into and/or continued commercial relationships with some junket operators after becoming aware of a number of allegations in national and international media reports of links between those operators and triads or other organised crime groups.
  10. Neither Crown Resorts nor Crown Melbourne has sought to resile from those concessions, although they were given the opportunity to do so.12 Further, Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne accept that, based on the evidence and material before the Bergin Inquiry, it was open to conclude that Crown Resorts was not a suitable person to be a close associate of Crown Sydney.13
  11. Following the commencement of the Bergin Inquiry, Crown began to implement ‘a substantial reform program’.14 The program is continuing and intends to deal, among other things, with the deficiencies in governance that came to light during the Bergin Inquiry.
  12. A key issue for this Commission is to consider the effectiveness of this reform program. To undertake that task requires a proper understanding of the facts and circumstances that led the Bergin Inquiry to make its findings and reach its conclusions.
  13. This chapter will summarise the Bergin Report. In the Bergin Report Crown Resorts Limited is referred to as ‘Crown’but in some instances, the term ‘Crown’ is used in a generic sense to refer to the broader Crown business or group.15 For fidelity to the Bergin Report, this chapter reflects the language used in that Report.

The genesis of the Bergin Inquiry

  1. On 30 May 2019, CPH Crown Holdings Pty Ltd, a wholly owned CPH subsidiary, agreed to sell 19.99 per cent of its approximately 46.1 per cent shareholding in Crown to Melco (Share Sale Agreement).16 Melco owns casinos in Asia that operate in Macau and the Philippines.17
  2. The Share Sale Agreement between CPH Crown Holdings and Melco provided for the shares to be transferred in two equal tranches—the first on 6 June 2019 and the second by 30 September 2019.18
  3. On 6 June 2019, Melco advised ILGA that it intended to seek ‘approvals’ for representation on the Crown board and relevant subsidiary boards, and for six named individuals to become close associates of Crown Sydney. Melco also advised ILGA that it intended to apply to become a close associate of Crown Sydney.19
  4. As a result, ILGA began to inquire into the suitability of Melco and the six named persons becoming close associates of Crown Sydney.20
  5. In July and August 2019, various media outlets, including The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, published allegations of illegal and/or improper conduct by Crown and its alleged associates and business partners.21 The allegations included that Crown or its agents, affiliates or subsidiaries:
    • engaged in money laundering
    • breached gambling laws in China
    • partnered with junket operators who had links to drug traffickers, money launderers, human traffickers and organised crime groups.22
  6. The partial consummation of the sale to Melco and the media allegations caused ILGA to establish the Bergin Inquiry on 14 August 2019.23 Its purpose was to conduct a suitability review and undertake a regulatory framework and review.
  7. On 6 February 2020, CPH Crown Holdings and Melco agreed to release Melco of its obligations to purchase the second tranche of shares in Crown.24
  8. Three key issues considered by the Bergin Inquiry were:
    • ‘China arrests’: In October 2016, Chinese police detained 19 Crown employees, for promoting Crown’s Australian casinos.25 Sixteen were sentenced to imprisonment and fined.
    • Money laundering at Crown: This involved suspect transactions through the Riverbank and Southbank bank accounts, and the deposit of large sums of cash carried into the Melbourne Casino in shopping bags.
    • Junkets and organised crime: This involved Crown’s relationships with junket tour operators (JTOs) (who arranged for high rollers from mainland China to come to Crown casinos in Australia) with links to organised crime, including triad gangs notorious for laundering drug money, suspect debt collection techniques and links to sex trafficking.

China arrests

  1. Crown Melbourne had a business unit known as ‘VIP International’. That business unit reported to the Crown Melbourne board and was responsible for managing all overseas operations.26 It identified and developed relationships with international VIP gamblers with a view to having those gamblers visit Crown casinos in Australia. From as early as March 2007, Crown’s VIP marketing efforts were focused on offshore expansion.27
  2. The following people were involved in the management of VIP International:
    • From August 2013, Mr Barry Felstead was the CEO of Crown’s Australian Resorts and the most senior executive responsible for VIP International. Mr Felstead reported to Mr Rowen Craigie. Mr Craigie was then Managing Director and CEO of Crown.28
    • From 2011 until his arrest in October 2016, Mr Jason O’Connor was the ultimate decision maker in VIP International. His job title was Group Executive General Manger of VIP International Gaming.29
    • From February 2012, Mr Michael Chen, based in Hong Kong, was the most senior internationally based member of VIP International. He reported directly to Mr O’Connor and they spoke at least once a day.30
    • A number of senior vice presidents were responsible for different geographic regions or business lines within VIP International, including, until mid-2013, Mr Stefan Albouy.31
    • The VIP International leadership team comprising:32
      • Ms Jacinta Maguire, General Manager of Commercial
      • Mr Roland Theiler, Senior Vice President of International Business
      • Mr Ishan Kunaratnam (known as Mr Ratnam), a Crown executive with a longstanding relationship with the Packer family.33
  3. To facilitate its activities, VIP International established and maintained overseas sales teams and operations in various jurisdictions, including China.34 Those operations were intended to take advantage of the wealth of the middle class and the increasing propensity of Chinese citizens to travel.35
  4. By 2011, China had become Crown’s largest market for high-value international VIP players.36
  5. Initially, VIP International operated in mainland China by having sales staff travel to meet existing or prospective Chinese VIP customers from neighbouring regions such as Macau and Hong Kong.37
  6. Subsequently, although the Bergin Report does not record precisely when, Crown consolidated its presence in China. It did so by having staff who lived and worked in various regions of China conduct its sales and marketing activities.38 Members of senior management also regularly travelled to China to undertake roadshows on behalf of Crown.39
  7. From 2012 onwards, China-based staff were employed by Crown Singapore. The directors of that entity were Mr Craigie and Mr Felstead.40
  8. The role of the sales team in China was to maintain relationships with existing VIP gaming customers, to establish and consolidate relationships with high-value gamblers who had yet to visit Crown’s casinos, and to market those casinos to existing and potential customers.41 The team’s role also involved collecting gambling debts.42
  9. The presence of Crown in China led to the continued growth of VIP International turnover in Australia. VIP International achieved turnover of $26.9 billion and $31 billion in 2010 and 2011 respectively, with turnover increasing year on year between 2012 and 2014.43 As at September 2014, approximately 20 Crown staff lived and worked in mainland China.44
  10. On 13 and 14 October 2016, Chinese police conducted a series of coordinated raids on the homes of staff in mainland China. Nineteen Crown employees were arrested and questioned by the authorities. All were charged with assembling a crowd to engage in gambling in breach of Article 303 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 1997 (China).45
  11. Article 303 provides:

    Whoever, for the purpose of profit, gathers a crowd to gamble, or undertakes gambling as a business shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of three years or less, detention or surveillance and shall be subject to a fine.46

  12. On 26 June 2017, 16 of the 19 employees were fined and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between nine and ten months. The remaining three employees were exempted from criminal penalty.47

Media allegations and Crown’s response

  1. In July and August 2019, various media outlets published allegations concerning the operations of Crown in China and the arrests of its China-based staff. It was alleged that:
    • Crown knew that its China-based staff were breaching Chinese gambling laws
    • Crown exposed its staff to the risk of detention in China
    • Crown disregarded the welfare of its employees who were offered ‘huge bonuses’ to lure Chinese high rollers to its Australian casinos
    • even as it became likely that Chinese police were closing in, Crown directed its China-based staff to continue to promote gambling, but to do so ‘under the radar’
    • Crown’s operations in China cast doubt over its corporate governance practices.48
  2. On 31 July 2019, in response to the media allegations, the Crown board made an Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcement titled ‘A Message from the Crown Resorts board of Directors’.49 The announcement sought to defend Crown against the allegation that it knew that its staff breached Chinese gambling laws. In the announcement, the board stated that Crown:
    • did not know that the conduct of its staff in China constituted an offence in China
    • had itself not been charged with or convicted of any offence in China
    • understood that its staff were operating in a manner that did not breach Article 303
    • had obtained legal and government relations advice from reputable independent specialists.50

The findings of the Bergin Inquiry

No business licence to operate an office in China
  1. Neither Crown nor any Crown subsidiary held any form of licence, authorisation or approval to operate or conduct business activities of any kind in mainland China.51
  2. At various times between 2011 and October 2015, Crown obtained legal advice relating to the legality of its business activities in China. Based on an interpretation of the legal advice, those involved in VIP International appeared to form the view that it was legal for Crown to employ staff in China to promote gambling without a business licence so long as Crown was not operating an office in China. That is, Crown considered that a business licence was only required if it sought to establish an office in China.52
  3. While the China-based staff were typically required to work from their residential homes when conducting their marketing activities, from at least 2012 an ‘unofficial’ office had been opened in Guangzhou, China.53 The following facts are relevant:
    • The office was a residential apartment, rented by Crown to support VIP International business activities and to process visa applications for its Chinese customers. The office carried no Crown signage.54
    • The office was used by staff to perform administrative functions related to processing visa applications for VIP players from Macau, Hong Kong and mainland China.55
    • By May 2012 at the latest, the existence of the office was known to the Crown Melbourne legal team and several executives. This followed an email from Crown executive Mr Albouy to Mr Chen, Mr O’Connor and others describing the office arrangements as ‘unsuitable’, ‘subject to random checks by authorities’ and ‘posing many risks’. The email also proposed that the Guangzhou team move into a new premises, with business registration, so as to ‘give the team a more safe and professional environment’ in which to work.56
    • Mr Albouy’s concerns and suggestion were ignored, with Crown continuing to lease the same premises until at least 2015.57
    • In 2015, the Guangzhou office moved to new premises and continued to operate until the China arrests in October 2016.58
    • Following the China arrests, the premises continued to be leased on a rolling basis under the names of the employees, as negotiated between Mr Chen and the property owner. The lease continued until August 2017.59
    • Prior to the China arrests, additional people who were aware of the existence of the Guangzhou office included Ms Jan Williamson, Senior Legal Counsel at Crown Melbourne, Ms Debra Tegoni, Executive General Manager, Legal and Regulatory Services, Mr Theiler and Mr Chris MacKay, a non-executive director of Crown.60
    • Mr O’Connor told the Bergin Inquiry that the existence of the office ‘wasn’t a secret’ in Crown Melbourne.61
    • Mr Craigie accepted that the unofficial office in Guangzhou was an attempt to disguise from the Chinese authorities the fact that Crown was conducting an office in Guangzhou.62
Advice regarding the legality of Crown’s activities and escalating risks in China
  1. Article 303 prohibits a person, for the purpose of profit, from ‘gather[ing] a crowd to gamble’ or from ‘undertak[ing] gambling as a business’. Article 1 of Interpretation No. 3 [2005] of the Supreme People’s Court Criminal Division, effective from 13 May 2015, sets out four scenarios that constitute ‘gather[ing] a crowd to gamble’. One of those scenarios is ‘organising 10 or more persons who are citizens of the People’s Republic of China to go abroad to gamble, from which kickbacks or referral fees are collected’.63
  2. Further guidance from the Supreme People’s Court Criminal Division provides:

    The number of persons organised is not calculated on an aggregate basis. It is necessary that 10 or more [Chinese] citizens are organised at one time to go abroad to gamble … The phrase ‘at one time’ can be translated as on a single occasion.64

  3. Mr Craigie, Mr Felstead and Mr O’Connor understood that whether or not the China-based staff were breaching Article 303 turned on two questions of interpretation:
    • First, whether staff in China were organising more than 10 Chinese citizens to travel to venues to gamble on one single occasion, or whether the number of 10 citizens could be accumulated over a number of occasions.
    • Second, whether staff were receiving a commission from Crown based on the amount of the Chinese citizens’ gambling turnover (which they understood to be legal) or whether staff were receiving a commission from the gamblers directly (which they understood to be illegal).65
  4. Mr Craigie accepted that it was ‘particularly unsafe to rely on some technical construction of Chinese law’.66 Mr O’Connor gave evidence that he referred to legal and other advice at the time, but that he assessed that advice ‘through the eyes of a Westerner and … didn’t fully appreciate that China’s legal system doesn’t operate the same way as the Western legal system does’.67
  5. Crown directors and management generally accepted the following propositions:
    • The Chinese legal system was different to the Australian legal system.
    • China was a country where the law may be enforced inconsistently.
    • There was a risk of arbitrary action by Chinese authorities.
    • In the period up to October 2016, China was a riskier place for Crown staff to be working than Australia.68
  6. Crown sought legal advice about its activities in China from international law firm WilmerHale on at least seven occasions between 2012 and 2015.
  7. In June 2012, following a change in the political landscape in China when the Chinese Government announced a crackdown on corruption, WilmerHale advised:
    • It was not illegal to sell offshore gaming within China.
    • There were laws prohibiting the marketing of gaming onshore for more than 10 people.
    • Because gaming was a ‘sensitive topic’, Crown should be ‘cautious and avoid openly marketing’.69
  8. On 19 February 2013, WilmerHale advised that a normal casino employee is unlikely to be deemed a ‘principal’ or found guilty under Chinese criminal law by merely marketing or participating in casino operations, provided that the employee is not directly making a profit from doing so.70
  9. Mr Albouy cautioned that reliance could not be placed on the advice when it came to protecting staff, stating that ‘the issue is not conviction … but the fact that authorities “may” apprehend our team for questioning’.71
  10. On 25 March 2013, Mr Chen wrote to Mr O’Connor and Mr Felstead noting that two China-based staff of Crown had been seen regularly with a customer who had been recently detained. Mr Chen stated they were at risk of being called in for questioning by Chinese authorities.72 Mr Chen followed up with an email the next day that included the following:

    Folks in the VIP industry have long been very sensitive to the actions of the Chinese government. There has been much misinformation in the field about the legalities of what we do and the rights people have if they were identified to be marketing casinos in China.

    … We received definitive advice that the activities that we undertake in China do NOT violate any criminal laws …

    We have provided all China staff with the attached protocol to follow in the event such a knock on the door arrives …

    This is one thing that it is important to understand when it comes to the China team. They are living in constant fear of getting tapped on the shoulder. In a country where due process is inconsistently applied, it is a risky place to be for all of our team …

    Most folks in the industry just think it is in [a] gray area and that they are at risk of arrest …73

  11. On 19 May 2013, following Mr Chen receiving notice that a Crown junket operator had been detained by authorities for questioning in Guangzhou, WilmerHale advised that the law remained ‘unchanged’.74
  12. Crown engaged Mintz Group, a global investigations and risk advisory firm, to provide advice in relation to its operations in China.75 On 12 July 2013, Mintz Group sent Mr Chen a copy of an article it had published regarding foreign companies doing business in China. That article stated:

    While the draw of China’s large and growing market might be worth the risk, foreign companies must enter with full anticipation of a lack of transparency, fairness, and accountability under the country’s laws.76

  13. On 1 October 2013, Mintz Group sent a further email attaching a new article it had published. This article suggested that a newly established investigatory agency in China was adopting an aggressive stance towards foreign companies that was not ‘business as usual’.77
  14. On 15 October 2013, Mr O’Connor suggested adding ‘foreign political policy risk’ to the Crown Melbourne Risk Register as a risk affecting Crown Melbourne’s international business. The Risk Register was amended to record Chinese political action as a significant risk to the performance of Crown Melbourne.78 No other action was taken by Crown Melbourne.
  15. In March 2014, Mr Veng Anh, then a Vice President of International Business Operations at Crown Melbourne, exchanged a series of texts with Mr O’Connor. In his texts, he reported ‘inside information’ from China. The inside information suggested that from April to May 2014, the Chinese Government would begin arresting people, including those having ‘anything to do with gambling or moving money out of the country’. Mr Anh advised Mr O’Connor that Crown should remove all of its staff from China for one month.79 It appears that no staff were relocated. Instead, the warning appeared to prompt Crown to suggest that staff collect outstanding debts as soon as possible because of the crackdown.80
  16. In mid-August 2014, a bank in China made an inquiry with a China-based member of Crown staff, ‘CY’. CY then expressed concerns to Mr Chen about doing business in China without any formal registration. That prompted Mr Chen to seek advice from WilmerHale, which advised Crown not to use particular descriptors in banking fields when paying salaries, allowances, bonuses or consulting fees to its employees in China. Following this advice, Mr Chen suggested to Mr O’Connor that all wire transfers to overseas staff should have generic references and no reference to ‘VIP’ or ‘gaming’. Mr O’Connor in turn instructed Crown accounts payable staff to ensure that no China ‘funding templates’ displayed the words ‘VIP funding’ and to instead use ‘services/consulting fees’ as a generic reference.81
  17. Also in August 2014, Mr Chen wrote to Mr Felstead about the VIP International business in China. He proposed two alternative approaches to the future conduct of that business. The first was ‘doubling-down’ and maintaining aggressive targets and promotional activities. The second approach was reducing projections, expectations and promotional intensity in China. Mr Chen stated that the first approach would expose Crown to ‘a lot more risk’. Mr Felstead suggested that Mr Michael Johnston, a member of the Crown board, be included in a discussion on the topic. Thereafter, VIP International adopted the first approach and continued with a strategy to increase sales and pursue targets aggressively throughout 2014, 2015 and 2016. Pressure to improve performance, driven by Mr Felstead, continued into early 2015.82
  18. On 19 September 2014, a China-based employee informed Mr Chen by email that he had been questioned by Chinese police the previous day about his regular contact with an individual identified as a casino patron in 2012, and about what his job involved. The employee recounted that he told the police that he was doing ‘Crown Hotel marketing in China’ and only assisted with hotel accommodation in China. The questioning of the employee was reported to various individuals the same day, including Mr O’Connor, Ms Williamson and Ms Tegoni.83
  19. In October 2014, a VIP International marketing workshop for the 2015 financial year noted that the sales teams in many countries, especially in China, were ‘operating under constant threat of being detained, questioned, and harassed with regards to their customers and their activities’.84
  20. On 6 February 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security announced that China was cracking down on foreign casinos seeking to attract and recruit Chinese citizens to travel abroad for gambling (Crackdown Announcement).85 The Crackdown Announcement was widely reported in international media. The next day, media reports included the claim that President Xi Jinping had ‘officially declared war on the global gaming industry’.86
  21. The Crackdown Announcement quickly came to the attention of senior executives within VIP International, including Mr O’Connor and Mr Felstead, and a number of Crown executives and directors, including Mr James Packer, Mr John Alexander, Mr Craigie and Mr Johnston.87
  22. On 9 February 2015, a market intelligence service, Asia Gaming Brief, published a report quoting Mr Hua Jingfeng, a deputy bureau chief at the Ministry of Public Security, as saying:

    A fair number of neighbouring countries have casinos, and they have set up offices in China to attract and drum up interest from Chinese citizens to go abroad and gamble. This will … be an area that we will crack down on.88

  23. That same day, WilmerHale provided advice in relation to whether the Crackdown Announcement affected the China-based staff and, if so, how.89 It advised that:

    Given the highlighted government efforts to crack down on rep offices with core business to facilitate Chinese individuals gambling abroad, the company’s rep offices/employees in China should focus its business on introducing the hotel/resort and facilities, rather than [engaging] in any activities which may be viewed as directly facilitating Chinese individuals gambling offshore.90

  24. Also on 9 February 2015, Mr Chen emailed staff at the ‘VIP International Offices’ email address reassuring them that they were not in violation of ‘any known laws’. The email indicated that application would be made for Hong Kong or Singapore work permits for all China-based staff who did not currently hold a foreign passport. Mr Chen told staff: ‘[t]his is purely a precautionary measure that will allow you to say that you work out of an overseas location and are on business travel in China’ (although the application for work permits did not ultimately occur).91
  25. The following day, on 10 February 2015, WilmerHale provided advice in relation to whether there had been any change to the law regarding Article 303. It advised that there had been no recent changes but that, given the current enforcement environment, ‘it would be prudent for staff not to be involved in the money-moving activities because it can be easily interpreted as an effort to facilitate overseas gambling’.92
  26. Following the Crackdown Announcement, VIP International executives not based in China decided to avoid travelling to mainland China for a while.93
  27. The Crackdown Announcement did not cause Crown to stop or alter its business operations in China.94 Crown did, however, attempt to make them less overt by not proceeding with or deferring an ‘official’ office in China.95 Crown also removed the Crown logo from private jets used to transport high rollers from China to Crown venues in Australia (with a view to making Crown’s targeting of Chinese citizens to visit its casinos more ‘under the radar’, as noted by Mr Ratnam).96
  28. In contrast, competitors of Crown ‘pulled their entire teams out of China’.97 Mr Chen asked WilmerHale if Crown should do the same. On 25 February 2015, WilmerHale advised that the picture was not entirely clear. WilmerHale was ‘not sure’ whether the removal of staff from China was necessary at that point, but suggested that perhaps Crown could have some key China-based employees ‘tentatively’ work outside China; for example, in Hong Kong.98
  29. On 13 March 2015, VIP International engaged Mintz Group to do a risk assessment of the prevailing situation.99
  30. On 16 March 2015, a ‘VIP Update’ document, which was circulated to Mr Alexander, Mr Johnston, Mr Robert Rankin, Mr Guy Jalland, Mr Craigie and Mr Kenneth Barton (the then CFO of Crown),100 reported the Crackdown Announcement as a financial threat and a possible reason for the lower-than-expected turnover across the Chinese New Year period. The VIP Update did not, however, report the increased risk to the safety of staff, or the decision of VIP International executives to defer their own travel as a consequence of the announcement.101
  31. On 23 March 2015, Mr Chen emailed Mr O’Connor providing directions as to what should happen to his pay cheque if he were detained in China.102
  32. On 25 March 2015, Mintz Group provided its risk assessment. It relevantly read:

    There is clearly enhanced attention underway from relevant [Chinese] authorities concerning foreign casino marketing activities in mainland China … The coming months likely will feature an increasing level of scrutiny by [the Ministry of Public Security], and possibly other authorities directed at foreign casino marketing and other personnel in the mainland …

    … Given this current state of affairs, it would still seem prudent to proceed with planned marketing efforts, but keep them low-key, ideally with small groups at a time, and little to no publicity …

    … it is likely that relevant Chinese authorities will pursue this crackdown with greater than average vigour.103

  33. In mid-June 2015, Chinese authorities arrested and detained employees of certain South Korean casino operators. In late June 2015, Crown received advice from Mintz Group that the South Korean employees were detained because they were assisting with the transfer of funds out of China, in contravention of Chinese currency laws.104 That advice was circulated to Mr O’Connor, Mr Felstead and Mr Ratnam, and forwarded by Mr Felstead to Ms Tegoni, Mr Michael Neilson, Mr Craigie, Mr Johnston and Mr Barton.105
  34. On 22 June 2015, WilmerHale provided advice following the arrest of the South Korean casino employees. It advised that the potential charges included luring Chinese citizens to gamble in Korean casinos and violating Chinese foreign currency policies. WilmerHale also advised that those employees were not based in China but had travelled there to conduct marketing activities, and that their arrests should be read in the context of the government’s continued crackdown on corruption in recent years.106
  35. On 9 July 2015, Chinese police questioned two members of the VIP International team in relation to their involvement in gambling activities.107 Both were referred to the police by tipsters.108 One of the staff members, ‘Mr BX’, did not give a truthful response to police about what his employment involved, saying that he worked for Crown Resorts and helped to organise leisure trips for customers.109 The response of the second staff member was not recorded. Mr O’Connor and Ms Williamson appreciated that Mr BX had not been truthful in the answers he gave. Mr O’Connor acknowledged his awareness that Mr BX was in fact involved in organising gambling tours to Crown’s casinos in Melbourne and Perth.110
  36. Chinese police asked Mr BX to provide a letter confirming the nature of his employment by Crown.111 This triggered a flurry of internal activity within Crown. There was discussion regarding which Crown entity should send the letter and what should be said, if anything, about the activities of Crown.112 Parties to the discussion included Mr Chen, Ms Williamson, Ms Tegoni, Mr Neilson and Mr Felstead.113 Mr Johnston was made aware that Mr BX had been questioned by Chinese police in July 2015.114
  37. Ultimately, Crown Singapore sent a letter confirming Mr BX’s employment by that entity. It noted that Crown Singapore was a subsidiary of Crown Melbourne, which was, in turn, part of the Crown Resorts group. Finally, the letter noted that Crown Resorts was listed on the ASX and was one of the ‘leading hotel, resort and entertaining companies in Australia’.115 It did not mention that Crown through its subsidiaries operated two casinos in Australia.
  38. On 13 October 2015, Chinese national television broadcast a program called Topics in Focus (CCTV Program). The CCTV Program addressed the subject of foreign casinos and their networks inside China, with a particular focus on foreign casinos marketing to Chinese citizens. The CCTV Program included a discussion of the legal prohibitions on promoting gambling, and summarised the hard-line approach taken by the Chinese Government in relation to foreign casinos.116 Many of the China-based staff were shaken by the CCTV Program and sought advice on the current state of affairs regarding their activities in China.
  39. On 15 October 2015, Mr Chen advised China-based staff to limit meetings with guests to small numbers and to avoid ‘any overt sales and marketing activity’.117 No other changes were made to the day-to-day activities of China-based staff.
  40. On 20 October 2015, Mr Chen reported to Mr O’Connor that the team in China had ‘definitely heightened concerns’.118
  41. WilmerHale provided advice in October 2015, following the broadcast of the CCTV Program.119 WilmerHale advised that in the current environment, Crown marketing should not expressly promote the casino business and should not refer patrons to money changers.120
  42. Throughout 2016, Mr Chen continued to encourage his China-based staff to increase sales and performance, including on the first day of the arrests (13 October 2016).121
  43. On 26 June 2016, Mr Chen wrote to Mr Felstead advocating for a favourable performance review and noting that he had ‘taken on the risks of being prosecuted in China’.122
  44. On 13 and 14 October 2016, the raids and arrests of the 19 employees occurred. Sixteen were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.123
Conclusions of the Bergin Inquiry
  1. The Bergin Inquiry reached the following conclusions.
  2. The allegation that Crown knew its staff were breaching Chinese gambling laws was not established in view of the legal advice that Crown had obtained.124 The Bergin Inquiry did not consider whether Crown had breached other laws by operating in an office in China without a business licence.
  3. The allegation that Crown exposed its staff to the risk of detention in China was established. The Bergin Report noted that Crown kept pushing its China-based staff to make greater sales in the face of the questioning of its employees by Chinese authorities, the arrests of South Korean casino employees and the targeted crackdown on foreign casinos targeting and luring Chinese citizens to gamble overseas.125
  4. The allegation that Crown disregarded the welfare of its employees and pushed them to make greater sales was established.126
  5. The allegation that, as the Chinese police were closing in, Crown directed its China-based staff to keep promoting gambling but ‘under the radar’ was established.127
  6. The allegation that Crown instructed its China-based staff to falsely claim they were not working in China but in other locations was not established. This was because Mr Chen did not go ahead with the WilmerHale suggestion to that effect.128
  7. The allegation that Crown’s operations in China cast doubt over its corporate governance practices was established.129

Money laundering

Background

  1. Money laundering is the process of legitimising proceeds of crime. Casinos are particularly vulnerable to being used for money laundering.130 In part this is because of the large volumes of cash with which they deal.131 There are various mechanisms by which money may be laundered through a casino.132 One difficulty for casinos is that there is often little observable basis for distinguishing between those patrons laundering funds and other patrons.133
  2. Between 27 July 2019 and mid-August 2019, numerous newspaper articles alleged that money laundering had occurred through the Southbank and Riverbank bank accounts.134
  3. Separate allegations about money laundering at the Melbourne Casino were made in the media around that same time, including in a 60 Minutes program titled ‘Crown Unmasked’ that aired on 28 July 2019.135
  4. In an ASX announcement on 31 July 2019, the Crown board sought to defend Crown against the allegations that it facilitated money laundering in its casinos and that it turned a blind eye to this activity.136 Among other things, the board stated that Crown took its regulatory obligations very seriously, proactively complied with those obligations, and had in place a comprehensive anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) program.137
  5. Most relevantly, on 5 and 6 August 2019, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age published an article titled ‘Crown’s Firms Used to Launder Drug Funds’.138 The article alleged:

    Drug traffickers have used two private companies that were set up by Crown Resorts with Crown executives as directors to bank suspected proceeds of crime, federal investigations have alleged.

    Investigators traced money from a number of suspected or convicted drug traffickers and money launderers flowing into the bank accounts of the two companies, Southbank Investments Pty Ltd and Riverbank Investments Pty Ltd, between 2012 and 2016, according to former officials.

    One source said that federal police believed the two Crown companies were used by criminal entities because they believed that the money they deposited into them would not be closely scrutinised.139

  6. The Bergin Report directed its consideration of money laundering to the veracity of the media allegations that Crown: (a) facilitated money laundering or turned a blind eye to such activity in the Southbank and Riverbank accounts; and (b) facilitated money laundering or turned a blind eye to such activity in the Melbourne Casino.140

The Southbank and Riverbank accounts

Southbank: incorporation and activity
  1. Southbank was incorporated on 1 August 1996.141 It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Crown Melbourne.142
  2. As at 1 January 2021, the directors of Southbank were Mr Felstead, who was appointed on 8 November 2013, and Mr Barton, who was appointed on 30 June 2017.143 Its secretaries were Mr Joshua Preston, who was appointed on 12 August 2014, and Ms Mary Manos, who was appointed on 30 June 2017.144
  3. Previous directors of Southbank included Mr Alexander, between 22 March 2017 and 24 January 2020, and Mr Craigie, between 9 January 2002 and 22 March 2017.145
  4. The Bergin Report does not record why Southbank was incorporated, why it was named ‘Southbank Investments Pty Ltd’ or what activities, besides operating a bank account, it undertook. The Bergin Report does, however, refer to internal legal advice provided some time after December 2016 that suggested that Southbank did not carry on business and simply operated a bank account to receive casino patrons’ funds.146
  5. In late 2001, the regulator advised Crown Melbourne that it had no objection in principle to its proposal that international patrons be permitted to make deposits to Crown Melbourne through the Southbank account in order to afford those patrons ‘privacy’, subject to certain conditions. One condition was that the regulator be provided with quarterly reports of the details of deposits into the account. This, however, occurred only for a relatively short period. Thereafter, the regulator received quarterly reports only of the total assets and liabilities of Southbank. The regulator therefore lacked visibility of the actual deposits made into the account.147
  6. The Bergin Report does not identify from whom, or why, patrons were said to require privacy; but presumably the patrons did not wish for their own banking records to reveal deposits into a Crown casino bank account.
  7. In December 2016, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) queried whether Southbank should be enrolled as a ‘reporting entity’, within the meaning of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act), in its own right. Internal legal advice obtained by Crown suggested that because the Southbank account had ‘no other function than the mere conduit for the receipt’ of casino patrons’ funds, Southbank was not providing a ‘designed service’ under the AML/CTF Act (and was therefore not itself a reporting entity).148
  8. Subsequently, Crown sought external legal advice as to whether Southbank and Riverbank were reporting entities because they were providing a designated remittance service.149 The Bergin Report does not record what advice was received or whether any action was taken in response.
Riverbank: incorporation and activity
  1. Riverbank was incorporated on 15 May 2003 and is a subsidiary of Burswood Limited, which operates Crown Perth.150
  2. As at the time of the Bergin Report, the directors of Riverbank were Mr Felstead, who was appointed on 26 March 2007, and Mr Barton, who was appointed on 12 August 2014.151 Its secretaries were Mr Preston and Ms Manos, who were both appointed on 30 June 2017.152
  3. Previous directors of Riverbank included Mr Alexander, between 22 March 2017 and 24 January 2020, and Mr Craigie, between 29 October 2008 and 22 March 2017.153
  4. As with Southbank, the Bergin Report does not explain why Riverbank was incorporated, why it was named ‘Riverbank Investments Pty Ltd’ or what activities, besides operating a bank account, it undertook. The Bergin Report does, however, indicate that the purpose of Riverbank was ‘also to afford its international patrons privacy’, and records that patrons of Crown Perth made deposits through the Riverbank account.154
Operation of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts
  1. Initially, both Southbank and Riverbank held bank accounts with HSBC. In 2013, following a strategic review of the gaming sector, HSBC decided to discontinue its relationship with Southbank and Riverbank.155
  2. Southbank then opened an account with CBA and Riverbank opened an account with ANZ.156
  3. Crown circulated the details of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts to its patrons. It advised its patrons that when making a deposit, the depositor should reference the Crown identification number of the patron to whom the deposit should be credited. This was so that the patron’s deposit account could be credited accordingly.157 If no patron identification number was referenced at the time of deposit, the patron had to provide it to the casino, via the Cage or VIP International, with evidence of the deposit to enable Crown to credit their patron deposit account.158 The evidence could take the form of a receipt from the bank or from internet banking, or a phone screenshot showing the nature of transfer that had occurred.159
  4. When funds accumulated in the Southbank and Riverbank accounts, they would be ‘swept’ into Crown bank accounts at regular intervals.160 Hundreds of millions of dollars flowed through the Southbank and Riverbank accounts annually.161
  5. Despite Crown directing patrons that the Southbank and Riverbank accounts would not accept transfers from companies, when such transfers were made, they were in fact accepted. Southbank and Riverbank also accepted anonymous deposits made using the ‘QuickCash’ method.162
The aggregation problem
  1. Cage staff at Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth entered details of deposits made by patrons into the Southbank and Riverbank accounts into a database known as ‘SYCO’.
  2. SYCO is an electronic customer relationship management system used by Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth. It records information about patrons and details of deposits credited to their patron deposit accounts.163
  3. Certain Cage staff at both casinos aggregated numerous deposits (made to the credit of a single patron deposit account) into a single SYCO entry recording only the sum total of the deposits, rather than recording each individual deposit separately. Other staff recorded both the aggregate value of deposits to a single account and the individual deposits that constituted the aggregate amount.164 In the main, Cage staff favoured the former practice.165 By aggregating individual deposits, important information that could be seen in the Southbank and Riverbank bank statements was lost in the process of data entry into the SYCO system.166 There was no indication on the face of relevant SYCO entries that the amount being credited to the relevant patron deposit account was comprised of two or more smaller amounts. This is what is termed the ‘aggregation’ problem.
  4. SYCO played an important role in the AML transaction monitoring program in place at Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth. Members of the AML Teams at Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth accessed and reviewed SYCO for the purpose of identifying suspicious transactionsor patterns of transactions at their respective casinos. In particular, the AML Teams extracted reports from SYCO to review deposits for AML purposes.167
  5. The aggregation of multiple deposits to the credit of a single patron deposit account into a single SYCO entry by Cage staff meant that AML staff were unable to identify the fact of aggregation, or the number and nature of deposits that constituted the aggregated amount. AML staff were denied a complete picture of what was occurring in the underlying bank accounts.168
  6. Further, there were indications that money laundering was, or was likely to be, occurring through the Southbank and Riverbank accounts from at least January 2014.169
  7. These are summarised below.
Red flag: ANZ and the Riverbank account
  1. On 31 January 2014, approximately six months after the Riverbank account was opened, ANZ raised concerns with Crown by email to Mr Travis Costin, Group Treasury and Finance Manager, about multiple cash deposits that were indicative of ‘structuring’ in the account. By internal email to Mr Barton that same day, Mr Costin expressed the incorrect belief that the accounts could not receive cash deposits.170
  2. On the same day, Mr Costin responded to ANZ requesting further details of the transactions in question. ANZ provided those details and posed a series of questions to Mr Costin about the Riverbank account. The questions related to the purpose of the account, why the account was being used as a conduit account, the reason for establishing a separate legal entity to conduct ‘this activity’, why the entity included ‘Investments’ in its company name, whether ‘other “investment” accounts under the Crown group’ were being utilised in a similar fashion, and what, if any, monitoring of the Riverbank account was taking place.171 The questions indicated that ANZ had serious concerns about the operation of the Riverbank account.
  3. In an internal email from Mr Costin to Mr Barton on 31 January 2014, Mr Costin stated that he was ‘not 100% sure what we should/shouldn’t mention around the use of company names’.172 Mr Barton recommended that Mr Costin speak with Mr Birch of ANZ.173
  4. On 3 February 2014, a meeting took place at the office of Crown Melbourne between Mr Costin and Mr Birch about the suspect transactions in the Riverbank account. At the meeting, Mr Costin sought to ‘get ANZ comfortable’ with the accounts, and noted in a subsequent email to Mr Theiler that one outstanding question from the meeting ‘was why the money changer deposits multiple amounts under $10k at different branches’.174 The ‘obvious answer’ was that the deposits were indicative of money laundering, explaining why they had been queried by ANZ in the first instance.175
  5. There was no evidence that Crown provided any written response to the questions from ANZ.176 Nor was there any evidence of the following:
    • That Mr Costin, Mr Barton or anyone else at Crown or its subsidiaries elevated ANZ’s concerns or queries to any Crown Risk Management Committee (RMC)177 or the boards of Crown, Crown Perth or Riverbank.178
    • That any person at Crown took steps to review the balance of the transactions in the bank statements for the Riverbank account in light of ANZ’s concerns. A review would have revealed that those statements up to January 2014 were ‘riddled with examples’ of structuring. From 31 January 2014 until the accounts were shut for good in late 2019,179 an additional 61 cash deposits indicative of structuring appeared in the accounts.180
  6. On 27 March 2014, a further meeting took place between representatives of ANZ and Crown relating to issues of money laundering. Those present included Mr Neilson (then General Counsel of Crown), Ms Tegoni (then Legal Officer and AML Compliance Officer for Crown Melbourne), Mr Preston (then Legal Officer and AML Compliance Officer for Crown Perth), Mr Barton and Mr Costin. That meeting and the fact that it related to issues of money laundering was not brought to the attention of the Crown RMC, the Crown board, the Crown Perth board or the Riverbank board.181
  7. On 31 March 2014, ANZ sent an email to Mr Costin raising the practice of aggregation in the context of reporting to AUSTRAC.182 The practice of aggregation was neither reviewed nor stopped after this email.
  8. On 31 March 2014, Mr Barton retained consultancy firm Promontory to undertake a review of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing (AML/CTF) programs at Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth. Crown commissioned this review to give ANZ comfort in circumstances where transactions indicative of money laundering had been identified in the Riverbank account. Promontory was not, however, alerted to the existence of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts; nor about the issues that ANZ had identified in those accounts.183
  9. On 29 April 2014, Mr Barton and Mr Costin again met with ANZ. At that meeting ANZ informed Crown that the Riverbank account would be closed in July 2014.184 In response, Mr Barton directed Mr Costin to tell patrons of Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth ‘to stop making multiple in branch cash deposits below the [reporting] threshold’.185 That same day, Mr Costin emailed numerous Crown staff noting that the closure of the Riverbank account had been expected. He requested that customers be advised that multiple in-branch cash deposits under the $10,000 reporting threshold (set under the AML/CTF Act) would not be accepted in the new CBA accounts, as ‘we don’t want this process to occur again with CBA in six months time … due to the suspect transactions’.186
  10. On 29 September 2014, Promontory delivered its report to Mr Barton. The report noted that Promontory had reviewed the manual (as opposed to automated) transaction monitoring undertaken by Crown and, without conducting any testing, was able to infer that Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth had implemented the manual control in a manner consistent with their AML/CTF programs.187 The Promontory report did not address the Southbank or Riverbank accounts, nor the issues ANZ had identified with those accounts. The report did, however, observe that the procedures and documentation for the cash transactions report monitor’s (CTRM) review of bank statements was deficient and depended largely on the monitor’s experience with AML/CTF issues and familiarity with the business of Crown Melbourne.188
  11. Mr Barton subsequently provided the Promontory report to Mr Birch at ANZ. On 5 March 2015, Mr Birch responded to Mr Barton with commentary on the Promontory analysis, suggesting improvements that Crown might make to its AML/CTF Program in the areas of know-your-customer (KYC), junkets due diligence, enhanced due diligence, and transaction monitoring. It is not clear from the Bergin Report whether that commentary was passed on to Crown AML Teams. On 6 March 2015, Mr Barton replied to Mr Birch stating that his commentary ‘seems to largely be a comparison with ANZ’s processes’ and enquiring ‘[a]re there any specific area that should be addressed from this comparison?’189
  12. Despite ANZ closing the Riverbank account in July 2014, the delivery of the Promontory report on 29 September 2014 recording deficiencies in Crown processes for reviewing bank statements, and Mr Birch’s commentary of 5 March 2015, no changes were made to the operation or monitoring of the Southbank or Riverbank accounts at this time.190
Red flag: ASB Bank and the Southbank (New Zealand) account
  1. In addition to its CBA Australian dollar account, Southbank held an account in New Zealand with ASB Bank, a subsidiary of CBA.191
  2. On 10 July 2018, Ms Tama Tauira, a Transaction Relationship Manager from ASB, requested to speak with Mr Costin to ask him ‘urgent’ due diligence questions regarding the operation of the ASB Southbank account. On 11 July 2018, at Mr Costin’s request, Ms Tauira put those questions in writing, enquiring whether the ASB account:
    • was subject to governance and oversight by the Crown board or senior management
    • was covered by the Crown AML Program or a Crown internal AML audit
    • was covered by periodic audits undertaken by the casino’s regulator
    • was regulated by any regulator in New Zealand.192
  3. Ms Tauira also asked Mr Costin to confirm whether: (a) there was transaction monitoring in place to detect unusual activity in the Southbank ASB account; and (b) there were processes and procedures in place to identify cash deposits and confirm the source of cash deposits in the account. Ms Tauira requested Mr Costin to provide documentation to support the answers to each of the questions she had posed.193
  4. Later that day, Mr Costin forwarded Ms Tauira’s queries to Ms Louise Lane, then Group General Manager of AML. Despite Ms Tauira noting the queries to be urgent, no response was provided to ASB until three months later, on 2 October 2018. Mr Costin’s response was drafted by Ms Lane.194
  5. The response to ASB was misleading:
    • There was no evidence to support the suggestion made by Mr Costin that Crown made ‘source of funds’ enquiries in respect of cash deposits into the Southbank account.195
    • Contrary to Mr Costin’s indication that the Southbank ASB bank account was subject to oversight by Crown’s board or senior management, the majority of the Crown board knew nothing about the Southbank and Riverbank accounts, let alone provided oversight of the Southbank ASB bank account.196
    • As Southbank was not enrolled as a reporting entity with AUSTRAC, the ASB account was not ‘covered by’ the Crown Melbourne AML/CTF Program or any AML audit, contrary to Mr Costin’s assertion.197
    • Mr Costin’s response implied that the ASB account was audited by the VCGLR, which was untrue.198
    • Mr Costin’s response that transaction monitoring was in place was true to an extent. At that time, however, Crown had been made aware by ANZ and Promontory that its transaction monitoring processes had deficiencies, and that its processes and procedures for identifying cash deposits into the Southbank and Riverbank accounts suffered from the aggregation problem described above.199
  6. On 2 November 2018, Ms Tauira raised urgent queries with Mr Costin regarding $15 million in payments made over the preceding two years by a particular patron. She considered that the patron’s activities required investigation and sought particular information from Mr Costin. After internal discussion, Crown did not provide the information requested.200
  7. On 23 November 2018, Ms Tauira queried whether Southbank was an AML/CTF reporting entity. Mr Costin replied that it was not, and indicated that the reporting entity was Crown Melbourne, the holding company of Southbank and the operator of the gaming facility.201
  8. On 22 January 2019, ASB notified Crown that it was closing the Southbank account for reasons that included the information that Crown had provided to ASB.202
  9. Mr Xavier Walsh (then COO of Crown Melbourne), Mr Preston and Ms Lane were all informed of the ASB decision. The same day that ASB notified Crown of its decision to close the Southbank account, Mr Walsh emailed Mr Costin asking ‘[a]re we able to set up an account with a different bank?’ Mr Costin replied, copying Mr Preston and Ms Lane, that that would be unlikely, that ANZ had already shut down the Southbank accounts in Australia due to AML concerns, and that Chinese, European and American banks ‘won’t go anywhere [near] patron accounts’, leaving only Westpac or Bank of New Zealand as banking options.203
  10. Neither the closure of the ASB Southbank account, nor the perceived difficulty in finding an alternative bank, were escalated to Crown’s RMC, the Crown board or the Crown Melbourne board.204
  11. The closure of the ASB Southbank account (against the backdrop of the earlier closure by ANZ of the ANZ Riverbank account in light of AML concerns) did not lead to:
    • any review of the wisdom of permitting Southbank and Riverbank to continue to operate conduit accounts
    • any detailed review of either the account statements for those entities or of Crown’s AML processes more generally
    • the implementation of any additional controls to prevent the Southbank and Riverbank accounts from being (or continuing to be) exploited for money-laundering purposes.205
Red flag: CBA and the Southbank account
  1. Overlapping with the period during which the ASB developments occurred, there were also developments with CBA regarding the Southbank and Riverbank accounts.
  2. On 10 December 2018, CBA raised written queries about money laundering with Crown regarding the operation of the Southbank accounts. In particular, CBA queried whether Southbank was covered by the existing Crown-wide AML Program as a ‘Designated Business Group’ and what measures Southbank undertook to identify and verify the identity of individuals from whom it was accepting funds. CBA also queried what measures Southbank had in place to identify and prevent the receipt of illegitimate funds, and what remedial actions Crown had taken in respect of the VCGLR finding regarding junket arrangements.206
  3. On 11 December 2018, Mr Costin emailed Ms Lane to note that the ‘ASB queries have finally reached CBA’. On 20 December 2018, Crown responded to the CBA queries.207
  4. In February 2019, Ms Lane met with the CBA account management team to discuss Crown’s AML controls. The fact of this meeting and CBA’s concerns were not notified to the Crown RMC or the boards of Crown, Crown Melbourne or Crown Perth.208
  5. In July and August 2019, there was media reporting about money laundering at the Melbourne Casino, which the Crown Resorts board denied through an ASX announcement on 31 July 2019.
  6. On 5 and 6 August 2019, the article exposing allegations of money laundering through the Southbank and Riverbank accounts was published in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age respectively.209
  7. On 14 August 2019, ILGA issued the Terms of Reference for the Bergin Inquiry.210
  8. On 27 August 2019, there was a meeting between Crown and CBA. The meeting was attended by Ms Lane, Mr Costin, Mr Alan McGregor and Mr Barton, on behalf of Crown. At the meeting, CBA indicated that the issues identified in the newspaper article raised red flags, and that an investigation of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts had identified information that CBA could not share with Crown, thereby telegraphing to Crown CBA’s concerns that the accounts had been used for money laundering.211
  9. On 4 October 2019, there was a further meeting between Crown and CBA, attended by Mr Costin and Mr Barton. At that meeting, CBA notified Mr Costin and Mr Barton of the impending closure by CBA of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts.212
  10. In December 2019, the decision by CBA to close those accounts was brought to the attention of the Crown RMCs and the boards of Crown, Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth.213
Red flag: Ms Lane’s Review
  1. Immediately after the publication of the article in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age on 5 August 2019, Ms Lane began conducting a review of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts.214
  2. On 6 August 2019, Ms Lane requested the bank statements for the Southbank account. Between 6 and 20 August 2019, Ms Lane conducted a manual review of the statements, cross-checking suspicious activity with SYCO entries and establishing whether Crown entities had submitted ‘suspicious matter reports’ (SMRs) appropriately.215
  3. By 20 August 2019, Ms Lane had formed the view that the review process was highly labour intensive and that she would need either additional internal support to complete the task, or that it would need to be done externally. On 20 August 2019, she spoke to Mr Neil Jeans, the Principal of Initialism (a specialist AML consultancy), about obtaining external forensic assistance to review the Southbank and Riverbank accounts. Mr Jeans advised that they might obtain that assistance from Grant Thornton (a business advisory consultancy). That same day, Mr Jeans introduced Ms Lane to Ms Katherine Shamai of Grant Thornton.216
  4. By email on 21 August 2019, Ms Lane informed Mr Preston that she wished to engage Grant Thornton to assist in her bank account review. She also indicated that if Crown preferred that the ‘incredibly time consuming’ task be completed internally, additional hands would be required. At that time, Mr Preston was a designated AML Compliance Officer for Crown.217
  5. Ultimately, Crown did not engage Grant Thornton to provide forensic support. Crown obtained advice from law firm MinterEllison that there was a real risk that any such review would not be the subject of legal professional privilege (and thus a risk it would not be immune from production in a legal proceeding). Mr Preston then formed the view that it was not necessary to conduct a comprehensive review of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts. He understood that the Crown transaction monitoring program covered those accounts.218 Mr Preston provided incorrect advice to the Crown board that the Southbank and Riverbank accounts were dealt with in the same manner as all other Crown accounts, and that they were covered by the Crown AML policy.219
  6. Crown’s response to the media allegations demonstrated not only a failure to understand the AML landscape and legislative requirements, but also a total lack of commitment to rectifying obvious problems identified in the 5 and 6 August newspaper article.220
  7. Ms Lane took no further steps in relation to the matter and left her employment at Crown in early October 2019 (following a period of leave between 31 August and 22 September 2019).221
  8. Crown did not promptly inform the Bergin Inquiry that Ms Lane had (to Mr Preston’s knowledge) commenced a review of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts following publication of the article in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age on 5 August 2019. That only came to light on and from 17 November 2020, due in part to the fact that relevant documents relating to these matters, previously not produced by Crown, were newly available.222
  9. In September 2020, the AML, Compliance and Credit Teams within Crown Melbourne and Crown Perth commenced an internal investigation into the aggregation problem.223
  10. In November 2020, reports by Grant Thornton comprising forensic data analysis of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts, and a report by Initialism reviewing those accounts for indications of money laundering, were provided to the Bergin Inquiry.224 The Grant Thornton and Initialism reports identified seven types of transactions indicative of money laundering on those accounts.225 These included numerous instances of structuring in the manner identified by ANZ in January 2014.226 The activity continued in the Southbank and Riverbank CBA accounts following closure of the ANZ account in 2014. The activity appeared in the Southbank CBA account from November 2013 to April 2019, and in a new Riverbank CBA account from May 2014 to July 2017.227
  11. Although Crown’s banking instructions required patrons who wished to make deposits into the Southbank or Riverbank accounts to do so from a personal account (that is, not from a company, business or trust bank account), these instructions were regularly ignored by patrons and not enforced by Crown. The bank statements of Southbank and Riverbank included hundreds of transfers from companies and money remitters.228 The collective value of those transfers was at least in the tens of millions of dollars.229
Findings in respect of the Southbank and Riverbank accounts
  1. The Bergin Inquiry found there was ‘no doubt’ that the processes adopted by Crown enabled or facilitated money laundering through the Southbank and Riverbank accounts.230 By contrast, the Bergin Inquiry found that the veracity of the media allegations that Crown turned a blind eye to money laundering through those accounts, was not established.231 Instead, the Bergin Inquiry’s findings were equally damning. They were that:
    • Crown knew that money laundering was probably occurring, starting from when ANZ notified Crown in 2014 of its concerns about the indications of money laundering in the Riverbank account.232
    • Crown’s facilitation of money laundering continued for years, from at least 2014 until the accounts were closed in October 2019, notwithstanding that Crown was alerted by a number of banks to the real prospect of money laundering in the accounts.233
    • Crown displayed a cavalier attitude in relation to queries about money laundering later raised by ASB and CBA.234
    • Crown failed to ensure that the operation of its casinos was protected from criminal exploitation.235
    • Decisions made by Crown were infected by extraordinarily poor judgement.236
    • The aggregation problem compromised the ability of the AML Team to do its work properly.237
    • Crown’s failure to react urgently and comprehensively to public allegations of money laundering through its subsidiaries exposed a present, very deep corporate cultural problem.238
    • The lack of understanding of the AML landscape and legislation displayed by the Crown directors constituted a very significant deficiency in the corporate character of Crown.239
Crown concessions
  1. Crown ultimately accepted that there was aggregation of certain transactions in entries in its SYCO system.240 It also accepted that this aggregation compromised the ability of its AML Team to identify examples of structuring in the Southbank and Riverbank accounts.241
  2. From 18 November 2020, Crown conceded, on the basis of the Initialism report, that it was more probable than not that money laundering occurred in the Southbank and Riverbank accounts as a result of ‘cuckoo smurfing’.242
  3. Crown Chairman at the time, Ms Helen Coonan, conceded that the conduct of Crown had enabled money laundering to occur.243

Money laundering at the Melbourne Casino

  1. The media allegations against Crown were not limited to facilitating and turning a blind eye to money laundering in its Southbank and Riverbank accounts. The media also alleged that Crown facilitated money laundering or turned a blind eye to such activity at the Melbourne Casino.244
  2. CCTV footage provided to the Bergin Inquiry depicted three separate incidents at the Suncity junket cash desk (within the Melbourne Casino):
    • In May 2017, a man placed a blue cooler bag on the Suncity desk, unzipped the bag, unpacked many bundles of $50 notes wrapped in elastic bands and placed them in stacks on the cash desk.245
    • In December 2017, a man removed multiple bundles of cash, amounting to many hundreds of thousands of dollars, from a black cardboard shopping bag. The cashier then put the money through a cash-counting machine and provided the man with plaques, a form of chips.246
    • In December 2017, a man placed chips on the Suncity desk. The Suncity cashier then exchanged the chips for cash.247
  3. In respect of the three incidents, there was no evidence of Suncity personnel checking the source of the cash, or confirming the identity of the person providing the cash.248
  4. CCTV still photographs from January and February 2018 depicted further similar scenarios at the Suncity desk, including bundles of cash wrapped in elastic bands being removed from a suitcase in front of the desk.249
  5. In March 2018, the Crown Melbourne International VIP Team received an internal report that large amounts of cash were being stored at the Suncity desk. Following that report, Crown reviewed and changed the Suncity room cash arrangements to limit the amount of cash that could be held in that room to $100,000.250 At the time that limit came into force, on 20 April 2018, $5.6 million in cash was removed from the Suncity room under supervision of Crown staff and deposited into a Suncity patron deposit account.251
  6. On 19 December 2018, a backpack containing $250,000 was taken from behind a curtain in the Suncity room to two men waiting in a car outside the casino. The two men were subsequently arrested.252
Findings
  1. The Bergin Inquiry found that money taken from the suitcase and shopping bags was, more probably than not, money that was to be laundered. It found that money was laundered through the Suncity VIP room at the Melbourne Casino and conditions were not imposed until 2018 to prevent very large cash transactions from occurring.253 It concluded that the media allegations that Crown facilitated money laundering through Crown Melbourne were established.254
  2. It also concluded that, by reason of the belated actions Crown took with respect to cash in the Suncity room, it did not turn a blind eye to money laundering through the Melbourne Casino.255

Junkets and organised crime

Background

  1. Junkets are a well-recognised part of the international casino landscape. An important development in many casinos around the world in the early 2000s was the emergence of the VIP segment of the casino market.256 This is now a global market, with casinos around the world competing for VIP patrons,and the ‘vast majority’ of VIP patrons come from mainland China.257 The Bergin Report explained:

    There is a strong relationship between VIP patrons from Mainland China and Junkets. In Australia … casino operators are heavily dependent on Junkets for the continued success of the VIP market segment of their revenues.258

    …

    Junkets identify VIP patrons and make arrangements for them to travel to gamble in particular casinos, often by offering enticements such as free travel and accommodation. In return, casino operators pay Junket operators commissions which in some jurisdictions such as Macau and Australia are based upon the Junket participant’s turnover during any particular Junket program … Junkets may also advance credit to Junket participants and enforce debts incurred by those participants.259

    …

    In Australia, the casino operator enters into contractual arrangements with the Junket operators, sometimes referred to as ‘junket promoters’, rather than with the individual Junket participants. If the casino operator extends credit to the Junket operator, it looks to the Junket operator to pay the debt. It is a matter for the Junket operator how the debt is received from the Junket participant.260

  2. The involvement of organised crime groups in the junket industry has been widely reported for many years.261 By reason of their credit-providing and debt-enforcing functions, junkets are particularly vulnerable to infiltration by those involved in organised crime. Criminal behaviour associated with junkets includes unlawful debt collection practices and money laundering.262
  3. It is illegal to enforce gambling debts in China.263 This has led to the use of extra-judicial means of debt collection, such as threats of violence, to encourage debtors to repay money.264
  4. There are also strict limits on the amount of money that individuals can carry or otherwise transfer out of China.265 Junkets have been implicated in the laundering of money out of China.266 The potential link between junkets and money laundering, and the vulnerability of junkets to money laundering, is well recognised. In Australia, this vulnerability has been acknowledged by AUSTRAC and the VCGLR.267
  5. The ability of casino operators to ensure that they do not deal with junkets or junket operators engaging in, or facilitating, such behaviour is limited by the opaque nature of many junket operators. At the Bergin Inquiry, the then directors of Crown gave evidence about the difficulties they perceived in dealing with junket operators.268
  6. The practice of Crown was to deal only with individuals as junket operators, rather than corporations. Crown had two types of arrangements with junket operators: one was to pay the operator a negotiated rate with a slight discount to theoretical takings; and the other was a revenue-sharing arrangement, with the total revenue generated from the junket split as agreed between the junket operator and the casino.269
  7. Crown entered into contracts with individual junket operators to formalise these arrangements.270

Media allegations and Crown’s response

  1. Among the various media allegations made in July and August 2019 were allegations that Crown had partnered with junket operators with links to drug traffickers, money launderers, human traffickers and organised crime groups.271 In particular, it was alleged that:
    • Crown partnered with seven named junket operators with links to organised crime groups
    • Crown failed to conduct appropriate due diligence into the junket operators with whom it entered into agreements, such that it was either wilfully blind or recklessly indifferent to the links these junket operators had to organised crime groups.272
  2. In an ASX announcement on 31 July 2019, the Crown board sought to rebut the suggestion that Crown partnered with junket operators with links to organised crime.273 The directors of Crown claimed that:
    • junkets were an established and accepted part of the operations of international casinos
    • Crown dealt with junkets in essentially the same way as other international casinos
    • Australian regulators reviewed junket operators and their dealings with licensed casinos
    • Crown itself had a robust process for vetting junket operators and undertook regular reviews of those operators in light of new or additional information.274

Evidence before the Bergin Inquiry

  1. The following topics were common ground at the Bergin Inquiry:
    • In numerous instances, Crown had information that included claims and allegations that some of the seven junket operators named in the media allegations had links to organised crime groups. After receiving that information, Crown continued its relationships with those operators.275
    • Those at Crown in a position to determine whether it should commence or continue a relationship with a particular junket operator did not have any clear guidance as to the proper approach they should take to publicly available reputational information and allegations about junket operators. There was no set ‘bar of tolerance’ against which decision makers could test information and allegations.276
    • The senior people at Crown who had responsibilities for Crown’s junket operators included:
      • Mr Felstead, then the CEO of Australian Resorts and the Head of the VIP business unit
      • Mr Preston, then the Chief Legal Officer responsible for reviewing relationships between Crown and its junket operators
      • Mr Johnston, then a non-executive director of Crown, who was involved in the Crown review of junket operations after the China arrests in October 2016.277
    • Following its review of its operations following the China arrests in October 2016, Crown ceased its relationship with all China-based junket operators, with perhaps one exception.278
    • In about 2017, Mr Felstead, Mr Preston and Mr Johnston formed a ‘review panel’ to review any particular junket operator ‘escalated’ to the panel for consideration. On escalation, the panel was to consider whether Crown should continue its relationship with that operator, or whether the risk rating of the operator should be adjusted.279
    • From July 2017, Mr Felstead, Mr Preston and Mr Johnston made the final decision whether to approve a new junket operator. No prospective operator would be approved unless each of them granted approval. The rationale for determining whether or not an operator would be approved was undocumented.280
    • Also from July 2017, Crown commenced reviewing its relationships with existing junket operators on an annual basis. Most often, those reviews were conducted solely by the Credit Control Team and escalated to the review panel if it determined that material new information or a material change in an operator’s profile warranted such an escalation.281
    • In April 2020, Crown commissioned Deloitte to undertake a review of its junket program.282
    • On 26 August 2020, Deloitte submitted its report. The report advised that a number of improvements were required in respect of Crown’s junket operations, including better definition of risk and probity, gathering more robust information and data, and ensuring a clearer pathway for decision making.283
    • One shortcoming the Deloitte report identified was the lack of a defined ‘escalation point’ to the review panel, and ambiguity as to triggers for further investigations. Only on five occasions did an annual review result in escalation to the review panel.284
    • In August 2020, the Crown board determined to suspend its junket operations. The suspension was put in place pending a review of problems identified in the course of the Bergin Inquiry, and of Crown’s future relationships with junket operators in general.285
    • Also in August 2020, Crown retained the consultancy Berkeley Research Group to assist in assessing its relationships with junket operators and to undertake a due diligence investigation into various junket operators and representatives.286
    • In September 2020, when its casinos were shut due to COVID-19 restrictions, the Crown board decided to extend the suspension of junket operations until 30 June 2021 so it could conduct a proper assessment of the situation.287
    • On 17 November 2020, Crown announced that it would permanently cease dealing with international junket operators unless those operators are licensed or otherwise authorised by regulators in the jurisdictions in which they operate.288
The evolution of the Crown junket due diligence processes
  1. The Crown due diligence processes changed over time.289 The first change occurred in October 2014, following the broadcast of a Four Corners program ‘High Rollers High Risk’ in September 2014. The second change occurred in November 2016, following the China arrests. The third change occurred in mid-2017, following a broad review of VIP International conducted in the aftermath of the China arrests.290
  2. Prior to September 2014, the Crown due diligence processes were very limited.291 Decisions regarding approval of prospective junket operators were not subject to any sign-off at the senior executive level. Instead, Mr O’Connor had ultimate decision-making responsibility.292
  3. Prospective junket operators submitted applications to in-market sales team members at Crown. Those team members were responsible for collecting identification documents and sending applications to VIP International, which would then assess the applicant’s bona fides. VIP International verified whether the applicant was a junket operator established in other jurisdictions and whether the applicant had a legitimate request to operate a junket with Crown. VIP International also sought evidence of the applicant’s ability to perform the expected function of a junket operator. Once VIP International was satisfied of these matters, it provided the application to the Crown Compliance Team. This team did no more than prepare a form licence document and undertake a further background check against the ‘World-Check’ database. This check focused more on the creditworthiness of the prospective junket operator than the probity of the applicant.293
  4. To Mr O’Connor, a ‘critical’ part of the probity assessment was that the prospective junket operator was able to secure a visa to come to Australia. He reasoned that border control authorities in Australia had access to a lot more robust information and intelligence than Crown. Accordingly, if a junket operator could pass the border authorities’ test (the test involved character suitability) and obtain a visa, that gave him confidence that probity was as it ought to be.294
  5. After the Four Corners program, Crown reviewed the allegations made in that broadcast. A compliance probity review was commissioned by Mr O’Connor and undertaken by Ms Michelle Fielding, Group General Manager, Compliance at Crown Melbourne, and her team. Ms Fielding’s team reported to Ms Tegoni, then Legal Officer and AML Compliance Officer at Crown Melbourne.295 Mr O’Connor claimed that Crown thereafter made improvements to the due diligence procedure, including extra due diligence checking against some other databases. Mr O’Connor was unable to identify any other improvements to the due diligence procedure. In fact, due diligence checks often remained limited to World-Check searches.296
  6. In the immediate aftermath of the China arrests, Crown reviewed certain aspects of its VIP International business and made changes to its due diligence process for junket operators. The review was undertaken by the Crown ‘VIP Committee’. The VIP Committee comprised Mr Felstead, Mr Johnston, Mr Neilson, Ms Tegoni, Mr Theiler and, on occasion, Mr Craigie and Mr Preston. As part of the review, Crown decided to cease dealing with junket operators based in China.297 Minutes from VIP Committee meetings indicate that:
    • obtaining third party due diligence reports remained the exception, rather than the rule
    • Crown did not keep records of junket due diligence reports
    • only a small portion of junket operators with whom Crown dealt had been confirmed as holding DICJ junket licences (issued by the gambling regulator in Macau).298
  7. From mid-2017, the position changed. A prospective junket operator was required to complete a ‘New Junket Operator Application’ and provide a range of information and documentation to Crown. The Credit Control Team then undertook a due diligence procedure on the junket operator. This procedure included obtaining credit and due diligence reports from third party providers, and focused on junket operator creditworthiness and probity. If the credit control team decided to recommend that an applicant be approved, it prepared a due diligence profile for the applicant for review by the review panel comprising Mr Felstead, Mr Preston and Mr Johnston. They made the final decision as to whether a prospective junket operator would be approved. The basis for their approval was not documented.299
Crown concessions
  1. Crown initially adopted the same defensive approach to the junket allegations as was apparent in its ASX announcement. Ultimately, however, it made the following concessions to the Bergin Inquiry:
    • Ms Coonan conceded that, while it might be apt to describe the Crown junket due diligence processes as ‘extensive’, they were not ‘robust’. She indicated that one of the deficiencies in the assessment process was that it did not cast the net widely enough to capture people associated with junkets.300
    • Other directors accepted that the junket due diligence and review processes had deficiencies, were not sufficiently robust or could be improved.301
    • Crown required more clearly defined escalation points and triggers for further investigation as part of its annual junket operator reviews.302
    • There were shortcomings in the junket due diligence processes. Even in their most recent formulation, those processes did not eliminate all risks associated with junkets, including because a casino operator can never have full information about probity.303
    • The scope of junket due diligence processes had been too narrowly focused on the junket operator.304
    • Due diligence carried out on some junket operators either did not identify all necessary information, or was not analysed sufficiently to accurately assess risk.305
    • There was a need for greater input from the Crown Compliance and AML Teams in the due diligence assessments for junkets. Tension could exist in letting people on the operational side of the business have the final say on vetting junket operators.306
Findings
  1. The Bergin Inquiry concluded that there was information in the public domain to support the media allegations that at least some of the junket operators with whom Crown had dealings had links to organised crime groups, and that those allegations were established.307 It did not find that Crown was wilfully blind or recklessly indifferent to those links.308 Rather, it found that:
    • Crown had numerous structures in place to deal with junket operators. Those structures were adjusted from time to time and, from mid-July 2017, there were annual reviews into existing operators.309
    • Crown gave consideration to publicly available information in respect of the seven named junket operators, although it reached what the Bergin Inquiry considered to be unjustified conclusions.310
    • Crown had flawed structures for reviewing particular junket operators.311
    • In some instances, decisions to continue dealing with particular junket operators were ‘infected with error or failed to take into account appropriate matters’.312

Conclusions

  1. Putting to one side the findings ultimately made by the Bergin Inquiry, some conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing narrative.
  2. In respect of the China arrests, those involved in managing the VIP International business favoured the aggressive pursuit of profit over the safety and welfare of China-based staff. In particular:
    • They conducted business in China from the Guangzhou office without any business licence or authorisation, in known disregard of the law, from May 2012 (at the latest) until October 2016.
    • They ignored concerns raised by Mr Albouy that the clandestine Guangzhou office was unsuitable and posed many risks.313
    • They declined to apply for a business licence, authorisation or registration despite the Crackdown Announcement on 6 February 2015, with a view to keeping Crown’s China-based activities ‘under the radar’ and out of sight of Chinese authorities.
    • They relied on a positive interpretation of Article 303 (albeit with the benefit of legal advice) in circumstances where:
      • The Chinese Government had announced a crackdown on foreign casinos soliciting Chinese citizens to gamble abroad.
      • China-based staff were fearful about the legitimacy of their activities (and at least in one instance lied, to the knowledge of Crown senior management, to Chinese authorities about the nature of those activities).
      • After the Crackdown Announcement, VIP International executives decided to defer travel to China for a period.
      • Two China-based employees had been questioned by authorities, after tip-offs, about their activities in China and gambling.
      • They supplied a letter to Chinese authorities confirming the employment of a questioned China-based employee, in which they did not disclose that Crown operated casinos in Australia or the nature of the employee’s work in organising gambling tours in Melbourne and Perth.
      • South Korean casino employees organising for Chinese citizens to visit South Korean casinos had been arrested in China.
    • They ignored the possibility that the risk was not necessarily that Crown employees were committing offences under Article 303 (as the Chinese authorities ultimately alleged), but that the employees were subject, at the very least, to the risk of arrest and detention.
    • They otherwise failed to adequately heed various red flags and warnings about the risk of arrest and limit their activities in China accordingly.
    • They did not sufficiently appreciate the risks of operating in China, or they ignored those risks.
  3. The following conclusions may be drawn in respect of money laundering:
    • Crown was aware that money was likely being laundered through its Southbank and Riverbank accounts from as early as 2014. Despite this, it did not investigate the position or otherwise take steps to prevent money laundering (except by directing patrons to stop structuring) until some time after the media allegations about Southbank and Riverbank and the establishment of the Bergin Inquiry. This was despite:
      • ANZ closing the Riverbank account in July 2014 in light of AML concerns
      • ASB closing the Southbank New Zealand dollar account in January 2019 in light of AML concerns
      • CBA closing the Southbank Australian dollar account in around October 2019 in light of AML concerns.
    • Crown was not motivated to identify and report, nor meaningfully mitigate against, the risk of money laundering through its Southbank and Riverbank accounts.
    • Red flags indicating serious money laundering concerns were ignored, and not appropriately escalated to board or RMC levels. Crown’s corporate governance failed in respect of its AML activities.
  4. The following conclusions may be drawn in respect of junkets:
    • Crown’s processes for vetting its junket partners were ill-defined and inadequate.
    • Crown did not take sufficient, or sufficiently quick, steps to terminate its relationships with junket operators alleged to have links to organised crime.
    • Crown favoured profits generated by junkets over conducting robust due diligence on its junket partners.
  5. The following conclusions may be drawn in respect of governance and culture:
    • Crown had a culture that prioritised profit above compliance with its legal obligations.
    • Crown had inadequate corporate governance processes and failed to appropriately respond to known risks or, otherwise, properly investigate those risks.
    • Crown officers are likely to have breached duties imposed by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by exposing Crown and/or its subsidiaries to the risk of prosecution and civil litigation.

The Packer influence

Background

  1. What follows is a summary of evidence presented to the Bergin Inquiry in connection with Mr Packer and CPH.
  2. Mr Packer was responsible for much of the success of the Crown enterprise.314
  3. Mr Packer served as the Executive Chairman of Crown from late 2007 until 13 August 2015.315 He remained on the board as a director at that time, until 21 December 2015.316 He was again appointed as a director on 3 August 2017.317
  4. On 21 March 2018, Mr Packer resigned from the board, citing personal reasons. He also resigned as a director of various other entities within the CPH group of companies.318
  5. Mr Packer still retains ultimate control of CPH, the largest shareholder in Crown Resorts.319

The nature of the Packer influence

  1. The size of the CPH holding of Crown, coupled with the ubiquitous and powerful influence of Mr Packer, led to the creation of a team of loyal directors and senior managers. Those directors and managers were committed and steadfast in their devotion to assisting Mr Packer achieve his business pursuits.320 Mr Packer retained significant control over Crown affairs, even after his resignation as Chairman of the board and as a director.
  2. The Bergin Report states:

    The extent and nature of Mr Packer’s power whilst at the helm of the Crown Board and in continuing to manoeuvre it remotely after his departure from the Board assisted not only by his loyal team of corporate operatives but also by the information sharing arrangements that had been fastened onto the corporate structure has been the subject of investigation as a matter incidental to the question of the suitability of Crown and the Licensee.321

  3. To understand the extent of Mr Packer’s influence over Crown requires some analysis of evidence before the Bergin Inquiry—in particular, in relation to the following directors and senior managers: Mr Johnston, Mr Jalland, Mr Alexander, Mr Andrew Demetriou, Mr Harold Mitchell, Mr Barton, Mr Felstead, Mr Ratnam and Mr Benjamin Brazil.

Michael Johnston
  1. Mr Johnston was one of the three CPH nominees on the Crown board from 6 July 2007 and was a non-executive director of Crown until resigning from his positions at CPH and Crown on 10 February 2021.322 He was the Finance Director of the CPH group of companies from 2004. In 2013, Mr Packer invited Mr Johnston to participate in the Crown VIP working group. Mr Johnston then provided Mr Packer with updates on issues in relation to the VIP business.323
  2. At different times, Mr Johnston owed obligations to Crown as a director of Crown; to CPH as a director of CPH; to CPH Crown Holdings as its sole director, and/or to Crown as a CPH executive providing services. These obligations resulted in the potential for serious conflicts of interest, which were discussed during the Bergin Inquiry.324
  3. Following Mr Packer’s resignation as a director of Crown and CPH, Mr Johnston wrote to the Crown CEO, Mr Barton, on 23 August 2018 in relation to the Services Agreement between Crown and CPH. This agreement was a formal arrangement for the provision of certain services by CPH to Crown. Mr Johnston suggested an amendment to the Services Agreement to allow Crown to continue to provide confidential information to Mr Packer.325 The Crown Remuneration Committee resolved that a ‘Controlling Shareholder Protocol’ (Protocol) would be the preferred mechanism to enable the sharing of confidential information with Mr Packer. Mr Johnston executed the Protocol on behalf of CPH on 31 October 2018.326
  4. The Protocol required careful consideration of certain requirements before confidential information was shared by Crown with CPH or Mr Packer. It was Mr Johnston’s practice to give information to Mr Packer in relation to the VIP working group and to brief Mr Packer in relation to the VIP business.327
  5. The Bergin Inquiry concluded that many of the risk management problems and corporate governance issues encountered by Crown were worsened by Mr Johnston’s conflicting roles.328
  6. Mr Packer expected Mr Johnston to inform him of any important issues regarding Crown, particularly in relation to the VIP International business. Mr Johnston showed complete loyalty to Mr Packer.329
Guy Jalland
  1. Mr Jalland was a director of CPH and was appointed to the Crown board in June 2018. He was also the Managing Director of CPH in June 2018.330 Mr Jalland resigned from his positions at Crown and CPH on 10 February 2021.331
  2. Mr Jalland executed the Protocol for the purposes of sharing confidential information with Mr Packer.332
  3. Mr Jalland was one of Mr Packer’s three key advisors within CPH.333
John Alexander
  1. Mr Alexander was appointed as a director of Crown Resorts Ltd on 6 July 2007 and remained as a director until 22 October 2020. He was the Executive Deputy Chairman at the commencement of 2015. Mr Alexander was the Executive Chairman as well as the CEO of Crown from 1 February 2017 to 24 January 2020. He was a director of Crown Sydney from 22 March 2017 to 24 January 2020.334
  2. Mr Alexander’s first loyalty has been to Mr Packer for many years. When Mr Packer made suggestions about the business, Mr Alexander had ‘cause to listen’.335
  3. Mr Alexander executed the Protocol on behalf of Crown.336
  4. Mr Alexander used the Protocol to provide Mr Packer with high-level information on a regular basis, including information in relation to proposed initiatives and details of discussions at board meetings.337
  5. Email evidence before the Bergin Inquiry indicated that Mr Alexander had received instructions from Mr Packer regarding cost-cutting measures that Crown should take.338
  6. Mr Packer was asked about the cost-cutting measures that were the subject of the emails:

    Q: So Mr Alexander was raising with you a significant question of whether he should proceed with cost-cutting measures including staff and salaries, and he also referred to short-term incentives; do you see that?

    A: Yes.

    Q: And this was a significant management decision which Mr Alexander was raising?

    A: I would say Mr Alexander was proposing.

    Q: Yes. And, in your email, you were telling him that he had your blessing to do that, to implement those cost-cutting measures; correct?

    A: I agreed with his proposal. Yes.

    Q: Yes. And you expected Mr Alexander to act on what you said and implement those cost-cutting measures, didn’t you?

    A: I expected Mr Alexander to act on what he said and what I agreed with—

    Q: You expected—

    A: —and implement those cost-cutting measures.

    Q: Yes. You were giving him your blessing to implement cost-cutting measures, he having sought it; correct?

    A: Correct.339

  7. This exchange, and the broader email correspondence between Mr Alexander and Mr Packer, shows that Mr Packer was heavily involved in decision making on important issues at Crown, despite holding no position at Crown after March 2018.
  8. Not only did Mr Packer influence Mr Alexander, but Mr Alexander also provided confidential information to Mr Packer about board meetings and ‘in camera’ sessions of the board.340
Andrew Demetriou
  1. Mr Demetriou was appointed as an independent non-executive director of the Crown board in January 2015.341
  2. Mr Demetriou was appointed Chairman of Crown Melbourne on 30 January 2020. He resigned on 12 February 2021.342
  3. Mr Demetriou’s relationship with the Packer family resulted from a meeting between Mr Demetriou and Mr Kerry Packer (Mr James Packer’s father) before Mr Kerry Packer’s death. Mr Demetriou was then introduced to Mr James Packer, who approached him directly with a request to join the Crown board in 2012 (which Mr Demetriou refused) and again in January 2015.343
  4. Mr Demetriou regularly shared confidential Crown information with Mr Packer, including providing summaries of Crown board meetings.344
  5. The extent of Mr Demetriou’s dedication to Mr Packer is illustrated in an email sent from Mr Demetriou to Mr Packer in April 2019, in which Mr Demetriou said: ‘As previously said, I remain committed to serving the best interests of Crown and, most importantly, you.’345
  6. When questioned how his relationship with Mr Packer—and the above statement—were consistent with his obligations as an independent director, Mr Demetriou distanced himself from the statement, and indicated that the best interests of Crown were first and foremost. When pressed, however, Mr Demetriou conceded that a reasonable bystander would question whether he was truly independent based on his statement to Mr Packer.346
  7. Other evidence before the Bergin Inquiry confirmed that Mr Packer sought to influence Mr Demetriou in Mr Demetriou’s role as a director of Crown.347
Harold Mitchell
  1. Mr Mitchell is a long-term friend of the Packer family. He was appointed as an independent non-executive director of Crown on 10 February 2011.348 He resigned on 22 February 2021.
  2. There was no direct evidence before the Bergin Inquiry in relation to Mr James Packer’s influence over Mr Mitchell. There was, however, evidence of a large loan provided by Mr Kerry Packer to Mr Mitchell. Mr Mitchell denied that he had been influenced in his decision making.349
Kenneth Barton
  1. Mr Barton was the CFO of Crown from March 2010 until his appointment as CEO on 24 January 2020. He was a director of Crown Melbourne from 17 October 2013, a director of Riverbank from 12 August 2014, and a director of Southbank from 30 June 2017. Mr Barton was also a director of Crown. He resigned from all of these positions on 15 February 2021.350
  2. Mr Barton provided financial reports to Mr Packer on an almost daily basis under the Protocol.351 Mr Barton acknowledged that, after Mr Packer’s resignation from Crown and CPH, Mr Packer gave him instructions regarding the information he required.352
  3. Mr Packer conceded that, in November 2018, he instructed Mr Barton to prepare specific information and reports for him.353
  4. Mr Packer also conceded that there were numerous other occasions on which he instructed Mr Barton to do as he expected.354
  5. Mr Barton acknowledged that he provided confidential information to Mr Packer in order to ‘maintain a strong and open relationship with CPH and to get the benefits that we get from CPH and James’ involvement in the business’.355
Barry Felstead
  1. Mr Felstead was CEO of Crown Perth from March 2007 until August 2013, when he was appointed CEO of Australian Resorts at Crown. At the same time he had responsibility for VIP International. He was appointed director of Crown Melbourne in November 2013. He had a standing invitation to attend Crown board meetings, in addition to receiving all board papers. Mr Felstead resigned from all Crown positions at the end of 2020.356
  2. Mr Packer told the Bergin Inquiry that he expected Mr Felstead would inform him of any important issues in relation to VIP International, and that Mr Felstead had shown complete loyalty to him for many years.357
  3. Mr Felstead engaged in regular correspondence with Mr Packer following Mr Packer’s resignation from Crown and CPH director positions.358
Ishan Kunaratnam (known as Mr Ratnam)
  1. Mr Ratnam was a long-term friend of the Packer family and was appointed as Special Advisor to the Chairman by Mr Packer in October 2014 in order to conduct dealings with VIP customers on Mr Packer’s behalf and to provide important information to Mr Packer. Mr Ratnam also held various executive roles in VIP International.359
  2. Mr Ratnam’s primary role was to interact with VIP International clients and to provide information to Mr Packer.360 The evidence before the Bergin Inquiry confirmed that Mr Packer had significant influence over Mr Ratnam when he was performing his duties as an officer of Crown.361
Benjamin Brazil
  1. Mr Brazil was a Crown director from 2009 to 2017. Mr Brazil was a personal friend of Mr Packer and this friendship led to Mr Brazil joining the Crown board.362
  2. Mr Brazil was questioned about his relationship with Mr Packer, and about a series of emails in which he appeared to be assisting Mr Packer. Mr Brazil denied that he acted other than in the interests of Crown.363

Mr Packer’s use of his influence

  1. Mr Packer exercised varying levels of influence over the operations of Crown both while holding positions at Crown and CPH, and after he relinquished those positions.
  2. For the most part, Mr Packer used his influence over these directors and executives to elicit from them important information confidential to Crown. Mr Packer also used his influence to exercise control over Crown business operations to suit his own interests, even after his resignation from Crown and CPH.
  3. Mr Packer was asked by Ms Bergin, SC about his desire to influence directors and senior management:

    Q: It would appear from what I have read thus far that there is an element, or there was an element at the time that you were Chairman, of a desire to please you. You understand that, don’t you?

    A: Possibly, Madam Commissioner. Possibly.

    Q: Is it a mere possibility, Mr Packer?

    A: If you look at our financial budgets and forecasts, they never please me because we always missed them, and that was probably right towards the top of my list of important things, so I don’t think it would be fair to say that I was always being pleased by people.

    Q: It’s the other way around though; it was their desire to please you, do you not think?

    A: I don’t know, Madam Commissioner. I mean, I always asked for conservative budgets … Whether that was people trying to please me or whether that was people trying to justify the capex [capital expenditure] that we had committed to the business …

    Q: So they weren’t giving you the bad news in relation to the budgets?

    A: Well, the budgets—the actuals never hit the budgets.364

  4. The extent of Mr Packer’s influence is demonstrated in a line of questions from counsel assisting the Bergin Inquiry relating to email correspondence between Mr Packer and Mr Barton in 2018:

    Q: You expected Mr Barton to do what you had asked and prepare for you a conservative financial year forecast, didn’t you?

    A: Well, that was Mr Barton’s job.

    Q: Yes. But you were asking him to prepare something for you that you could bank; correct?

    A: Those are the words in the email, Mr Bell, so yes.

    Q: Yes. And you expected Mr Barton to do that, didn’t you?

    A: Yes.365

    The topic was taken up by Ms Bergin, SC:

    Q: But his [Mr Barton’s] job wasn’t to tell you things. His job was to work for Crown.

    A: No, his job Madam Commissioner, there was a budgeting process that was done at this time every year and so I was curious—I was curious about that. I—

    Q: I understand you were curious, but his job was as CFO of Crown, was it not?

    A: Yes, Madam Commissioner.366

  5. An email of 1 March 2019 from Mr Packer to Mr Barton further evidences Mr Packer’s influence. Mr Packer wrote: ‘Ken I think all of you have had your heads in the sand this year. We never meet our plans and I’m sick of it. Make sure for your own sake that we achieve the FY 20 [the 2020 financial year] plan.’367
  6. The following day, Mr Packer wrote to Mr Barton, copying Mr Alexander and Mr Felstead, and stated: ‘Sorry Ken I meant everyone.’368
  7. Mr Packer was questioned about his use of the words ‘for your own sake’. Mr Packer agreed that he was frustrated and that he was making his expectations abundantly clear.369
  8. The Bergin Inquiry considered other correspondence between Mr Packer and Crown directors. The correspondence showed not only that Mr Packer had influenced the Crown directors in the execution of their duties, but that he knew he had this influence.370
  9. The Bergin Report recorded that Mr Alexander was reporting to Mr Packer. Mr Barton was reporting to Mr Packer. Mr Felstead was reporting to Mr Packer. Mr Johnston was reporting to Mr Packer. Mr Packer did not report to anyone.371
  10. The Bergin Report’s ultimate conclusion was that the influence of Mr Packer, and his ability to remotely manoeuvre Crown’s operations notwithstanding his absence from the Crown board, had ‘disastrous consequences’ for Crown.372

CPH undertakings post Bergin Inquiry

  1. In April 2021, CPH reached agreement with ILGA that CPH could retain its 37 per cent shareholding in Crown on certain terms. The purpose of the agreement was to reduce Mr Packer’s influence over Crown.373
  2. Under the agreement, CPH undertook that it would not:
    • enter into any information-sharing arrangements with Crown
    • initiate any discussions with Crown, other than through public forums, about Crown businesses or operations
    • seek to have its executive or nominee appointed to the Crown board, or requisition a meeting of Crown shareholders to seek the appointment of any person as a director of Crown, before October 2024
    • seek any amendment to the Crown constitution that would affect the management or operation of Crown businesses.374
  3. Similar undertakings have been offered to the VCGLR.375

Endnotes

1 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021; Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021.

2 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 101 [3], [7], 105 [25]. See also Western Australia, Western Australian Government Gazette, No 45, 12 March 2021, 1079, 1081. The Bergin Report records that ‘Burswood Ltd’ is the Crown entity that holds a licence to operate, and operates, the Crown casino in Perth (cf 106 [31] where the Bergin Report records that ‘Burswood Nominees Pty Ltd’ is the licensee). It appears, however, from the Terms of Reference appointing a Royal Commission to inquire into and report on the affairs of ‘Crown Casino Perth’ in Western Australia, that the Crown entity licensed to operate the Crown casino in Perth is ‘Burswood Nominees Ltd in its capacity as trustee of the Burswood Property Trust’ and not Burswood Ltd, which is the holding company of Burswood Nominees Ltd.

3 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 680 [10], 692 [16]. ‘Close associate’ is defined in s 3 of the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) by reference to s 5 of the Gaming and Liquor Administration Act 2007 (NSW).

4 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 692 [14]–[15].

5 The Bergin Inquiry’s Terms of Reference were subsequently amended to reflect the fact that, on 29 April 2020, Melco sold its shares in Crown Resorts and ceased to have a relevant interest or voting power in Crown Resorts: Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 8 [24]–[25]; Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 691 [11]–[12], 692 [16(d)].

6 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, ii.

7 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 204–38.

8 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 239–97.

9 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 298–321.

10 Exhibit RC0148 Letter from Ray Finkelstein to Crown Melbourne Directors, 10 March 2021.

11 Exhibit RC1268 Letter from Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne to Ray Finkelstein, 17 March 2021.

12 Exhibit RC0148 Letter from Ray Finkelstein to the Crown Melbourne Directors, 10 March 2021; Exhibit RC1268 Letter from Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne to Ray Finkelstein, 17 March 2021.

13 Exhibit RC1268 Letter from Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne to Ray Finkelstein, 17 March 2021, 3 [6].

14 Exhibit RC1268 Letter from Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne to Ray Finkelstein, 17 March 2021, 3 [7].

15 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 2 [1].

16 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 2 [4].

17 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 2 [5].

18 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 3 [6].

19 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 3 [7]–[8].

20 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 4: see Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) s 35(3).

21 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 4–5 [8]–[9].

22 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 5 [9].

23 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 2 [3].

24 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 7 [14].

25 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [79], 285 [238].

26 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 241 [13], [14].

27 Exhibit RC0445 Inquiry Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 241–2 [14]–[18].

28 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 243 [22].

29 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 243 [23].

30 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 243 [24].

31 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 243 [26].

32 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 243 [27].

33 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [22], 244 [28].

34 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 242 [15].

35 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 251 [73].

36 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 251 [74].

37 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [77].

38 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [78].

39 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [82].

40 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [79], 285 [238].

41 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [80].

42 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 269 [162].

43 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 252 [76].

44 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 253 [86].

45 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 291 [271]–[272].

46 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 255 [102(a)].

47 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 291 [273].

48 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 239–40 [5].

49 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 240 [6].

50 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 240 [6]–[7].

51 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 253 [87].

52 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 253 [88].

53 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 253 [89].

54 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 253–4 [89], [92].

55 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [92].

56 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [90]–[91].

57 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [92].

58 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [93].

59 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [94].

60 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [95], 277 [202], 284 [233].

61 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [95].

62 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 255 [98].

63 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 255–6 [102].

64 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 256 [103]–[104].

65 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 256–7 [106].

66 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 257 [107].

67 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 257 [109].

68 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 257 [110].

69 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 258 [112]–[116].

70 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 258–9 [117]–[119].

71 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 259 [119].

72 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 263 [138].

73 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 264 [140].

74 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 259 [120]–[121].

75 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 265 [143].

76 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 265 [143].

77 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 265 [146].

78 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 265 [146].

79 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 265–6 [147].

80 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 266 [149].

81 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 266–7 [151]–[153].

82 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 267–8 [156]–[159], 270 [170].

83 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 268 [160].

84 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 268 [161].

85 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 271 [172].

86 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 271 [173].

87 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 271 [175]–[176].

88 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 271 [174].

89 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 260 [122]–[124].

90 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 260–1 [124].

91 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 273 [184], 296 [310].

92 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 261 [125]–[126].

93 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 274 [186], 275 [190], 277 [199].

94 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 274 [186], 276 [193].

95 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 275 [188], [190].

96 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 275–6 [190]–[193].

97 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 276 [195].

98 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 276 [195]–[196] (cf 287 [246]).

99 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 277 [201].

100 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 130 [22].

101 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 278 [207].

102 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 279 [210].

103 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 279–80 [211]–[212].

104 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 282–3 [223], [224].

105 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283 [225]–[226].

106 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 261 [127]–[128].

107 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283 [227]–[228], 286 [242].

108 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 284 [232], 286 [242].

109 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283 [230], 286 [240].

110 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 286 [241].

111 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283 [229], 284 [232].

112 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283–4 [230]–[238].

113 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 283–4 [230]–[238].

114 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 286 [244].

115 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 285 [238].

116 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 262 [130].

117 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 288 [252], [254].

118 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 289 [258].

119 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 262 [129].

120 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 262–3 [130]–[135].

121 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 290 [264], [266], 291 [269], [270].

122 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 291 [267].

123 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 291 [271]–[273].

124 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 293 [280]–[283].

125 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 293–4 [285]–[287], 294 [290].

126 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 294–5 [291]–[299].

127 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 295–6 [301]–[308].

128 Exhibit RC0445 Inquiry Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 296–7 [309]–[311].

129 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 297 [312]–[314].

130 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 45 [1]–[2].

131 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 46 [9].

132 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 46 [8].

133 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 47 [10].

134 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 101[6]-[7], 197 [12].

135 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 197 [11], 205 [5]–[6].

136 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 205 [7], 206 [9]–[10].

137 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 205–6 [8], [10].

138 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 204 [2].

139 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 204 [2]–[3].

140 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 206 [11].

141 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 101 [6], 207 [14].

142 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 101 [3], [6].

143 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207 [16].

144 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207 [15].

145 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207 [16].

146 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 215–16 [62].

147 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207 [17].

148 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 215 [61].

149 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 216 [63].

150 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 101 [7], 207 [18].

151 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207 [19].

152 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [20].

153 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 207–8 [19].

154 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [21].

155 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [22].

156 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [23].

157 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [25].

158 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [26].

159 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [26].

160 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [27].

161 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 208 [24].

162 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 220 [87].

163 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209 [28]–[29].

164 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209 [31].

165 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [168].

166 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209 [33].

167 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209 [30], [32].

168 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209 [33].

169 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 210 [39]–[40].

170 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 210 [39]–[40].

171 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 210–11 [41]–[42].

172 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 211 [43].

173 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 211 [45].

174 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212 [46]–[47].

175 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212 [47].

176 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212 [45].

177 As to which, see Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 133 [2]–[3], 134 [9].

178 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212 [45].

179 As to which, see Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [91], [92].

180 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212 [48].

181 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 212–13 [49]–[50].

182 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 209–10 [34]–[37].

183 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [51], [55].

184 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [51].

185 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [52].

186 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [52].

187 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [55].

188 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 213 [56].

189 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 214–15 [57]–[59].

190 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 215 [60].

191 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 216 [65].

192 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 216 [66], [67].

193 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 216 [66], [67].

194 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 216–17 [68]–[69].

195 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 217 [70].

196 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 217 [71].

197 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 217 [72].

198 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 218 [73].

199 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 218 [74]–[75].

200 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 218 [76].

201 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 218–19 [77]–[78].

202 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 219 [79].

203 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 219 [81]–[82].

204 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 219 [80].

205 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 219 [83]–[84].

206 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 220 [86].

207 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 220 [85]–[86].

208 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [88].

209 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [89].

210 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 203 [36].

211 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [90].

212 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [91].

213 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 221 [92].

214 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 222 [95].

215 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 223 [97].

216 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 223 [98]–[99].

217 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 202 [32], 223 [100].

218 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 224 [101]–[105].

219 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 202–3 [32].

220 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 547 [31].

221 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 225 [109].

222 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 225 [110]–[113].

223 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 225 [114].

224 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 227 [125].

225 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 228–9 [130].

226 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 229 [132].

227 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 229 [133].

228 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 231 [144]–[150].

229 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 231 [148]–[149].

230 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 232 [153].

231 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 232 [153], 234 [166].

232 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 232 [158].

233 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 544 [12].

234 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 232 [159].

235 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 549 [43].

236 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [166].

237 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [166], [168].

238 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 552 [52].

239 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 552 [54].

240 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 226 [116].

241 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 226 [116].

242 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 227–8 [126].

243 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 232 [152].

244 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 206 [11], 234 [171]–[173].

245 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 235 [177].

246 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [175].

247 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [176].

248 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 235 [178].

249 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 235–6 [179]–[181].

250 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 236 [183]–[184].

251 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 236–7 [185]–[186].

252 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 237 [191].

253 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 544 [12].

254 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 234 [172], 237 [194]–[195].

255 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 238 [191].

256 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 14 [5].

257 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 14 [5], [9]–[10].

258 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 19 [40]; see also 24 [63].

259 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 16 [22].

260 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 16–17 [23].

261 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 66 [18].

262 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [1], [3].

263 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [4], 66 [17].

264 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [4].

265 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [3].

266 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [3].

267 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 64–5 [7]–[10].

268 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [18]; Bergin Inquiry Transcript (Packer), 8 October 2020, 3696–7; Bergin Inquiry Transcript (Johnston), 29 September 2020, 3157; Bergin Inquiry Transcript (Mitchell), 9 October 2020, 3853–4.

269 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 304 [32], [33].

270 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 304 [34].

271 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 198 [14], 298 [1].

272 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 298 [2]–[3].

273 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 240 [6], 300 [8].

274 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 298 [4], 300 [6]–[9].

275 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302 [23], 304 [35], 305 [38].

276 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302–3 [25].

277 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 303 [27]–[28].

278 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302 [23]. In November 2016, Crown terminated its relationship with over 100 junket operators in mainland China: 320 [135].

279 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 303 [28].

280 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [125].

281 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [126].

282 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [130].

283 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [130].

284 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [126].

285 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [17].

286 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [17], 309 [64].

287 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [17].

288 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302 [19]; Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 539 [28].

289 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 315 [110].

290 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 315 [110].

291 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 316 [115].

292 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 316 [113].

293 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 315–16 [111]–[112].

294 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 316 [114].

295 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 289 [262], 316 [116]. As to Ms Tegoni’s position, see 212 [49].

296 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 316 [117].

297 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 317 [118]–[119].

298 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 17 [25], 317 [120]–[122]. The Macau regulator, the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, is commonly referred to as the DICJ (Direcção de Inspecção e Coordinenanação de Jogos).

299 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 317–18 [123]–[125].

300 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302 [24], 319 [129(c)].

301 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [129(c)].

302 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [126].

303 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [129(a)].

304 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [129(b)].

305 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [129(d)].

306 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [127]–[128].

307 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 313 [100], 314 [107].

308 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 321 [142].

309 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [126], 319 [133].

310 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 320 [136].

311 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 320 [139].

312 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [133].

313 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 254 [90]–[91].

314 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 145 [1], [4].

315 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 146 [10], 149 [28].

316 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 152 [46].

317 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 160 [79].

318 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 146 [7], 160 [77]–[79], [81]–[82].

319 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 102 [12].

320 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 145 [5], 146 [8], 148 [17]–[22]; Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 558 [90].

321 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 146 [8].

322 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 403 [1]–[2]; Crown Resorts, ‘Resignation of Directors’ (ASX Media Release, 10 February 2021).

323 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 404 [8].

324 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 433 [121].

325 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 161 [85].

326 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 161 [88], 162 [93].

327 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 404 [11].

328 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 446 [164].

329 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [17].

330 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 476 [62]–[64].

331 Crown Resorts, ‘Resignation of Directors’ (ASX Media Release, 10 February 2021).

332 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 162 [93].

333 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 244 [35].

334 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 494 [3].

335 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [18].

336 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 162 [93].

337 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 166 [105].

338 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 167 [113].

339 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 170 [124].

340 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 179 [168].

341 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 447 [1].

342 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 447 [2]; Crown Resorts, ‘Resignation of Director—Andrew Demetriou’ (ASX Media Release, 12 February 2021).

343 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 447–8 [7].

344 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 461 [63].

345 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 461 [64].

346 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 461–2 [65].

347 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 175 [149]–[151].

348 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 482 [94].

349 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 485–6 [111].

350 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 366 [3]–[8]; Crown Resorts, ‘Senior Executive Changes’ (ASX Media Release, 15 February 2021).

351 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 371 [33].

352 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 502 [45].

353 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 167 [116].

354 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 167 [116], 168 [119].

355 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 370 [29].

356 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 519 [3]–[5].

357 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 247 [47].

358 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 529 [24].

359 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [22].

360 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [22].

361 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 148 [22].

362 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 505 [57]–[59].

363 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 508 [75].

364 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 146–7 [11].

365 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 167 [116].

366 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 168 [119].

367 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 173 [137].

368 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 174 [142].

369 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 174 [143].

370 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 150–1 [34]–[45].

371 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 182 [187]–[188].

372 Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 570 [19].

373 Exhibit RC0437 Statement of Helen Coonan, 28 April 2021, Annexure i.

374 Exhibit RC0437 Statement of Helen Coonan, 28 April 2021, Annexure i.

375 Exhibit RC1409 Letter from Ashurst to DLA Piper, 26 July 2021.

Reviewed 25 October 2021

Volume 1