Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence

Junkets

Introduction

  1. In the casino world, the term ‘junket’ refers to a short-term gambling program arranged by a junket operator for one or more high-wealth players at a chosen casino, in conjunction with the relevant casino operator, on terms agreed between them.1
  2. The person or persons who arrange junkets are known variously as junket operators, junket promotors or JTOs. Many JTOs have an international presence and operate in particular jurisdictions through agents known as junket tour representatives (JTRs).2
  3. As Ms Bergin, SC noted:

    Junkets are a well-recognised part of the international casino landscape …3

    There is a strong relationship between VIP patrons from Mainland China and Junkets. In Australia … casino operators are heavily dependent on Junkets for the continued success of the VIP market segment of their revenues ...4

    [JTOs] identify VIP patrons and make arrangements for them to travel to gamble in particular casinos, often by offering enticements such as free travel and accommodation. In return, casino operators pay Junket operators commissions …5

  4. The relationship between a casino operator and a JTO is contractual. While a casino operator might contract with a JTO on any terms, in Australia, casino operators ordinarily agree to pay JTOs commission, based on the collective turnover of junket players during a particular junket.6 Turnover refers to the sum of money actually wagered by players in the casino.7
  5. The contractual arrangements between a casino operator and a JTO typically require the JTO to deposit a minimum level of ‘front money’ in order to operate a junket program at a casino.8 That front money is then exchanged for junket-specific chips, known as ‘dead’ or ‘rolling’ chips, which are provided to the JTO for distribution to players for use during the junket.9
  6. Junket players cannot acquire dead or rolling chips directly from the casino operator and the chips cannot be redeemed for money. Winnings are paid in ‘live chips’, which can be redeemed for cash at the casino or given to the JTO in exchange for more dead chips for further junket gaming. This allows the JTO to track junket players’ turnover.10
  7. A casino operator has no contractual relationship with individual junket players. It has no particular visibility as to: (a) their identities; (b) what money, if any, they have each contributed to the collective pool of front money used to acquire dead chips; or (c) the source or the ultimate ownership of that money.11 A casino operator is not privy to the arrangements between a JTO and junket players in any given junket. It is possible that:
    • junket players may have been sourced by ‘sub-junkets’ who identify and recruit suitable players for a junket program, typically in exchange for a commission from a JTO
    • a JTO is funded by financiers
    • a JTO might itself advance credit to junket players
    • a JTO might source deposits from investors to advance as credit to junket players, with investors then receiving a dividend in return.12
  8. Casino operators do not ordinarily know who stands behind or is associated with any given JTO, particularly where that JTO operates through a JTR.13 This lack of transparency around junket operations, players’ identities, and the source, ultimate ownership and distribution of junket funds provides opportunities for criminal exploitation and, in particular, money laundering.14
  9. In December 2020, AUSTRAC released a report, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment, dealing with the junkets sector (AUSTRAC Junkets Report).15 AUSTRAC observed that players may prefer to participate in junkets, rather than play as individuals, for any number of reasons. These include that:
    • ‘junkets are often organised as holiday entertainment for tourists, and can involve complimentary transport, accommodation, food and beverages provided by the casino’ (known as complimentaries)
    • JTOs can organise tours to casinos across the world, and the players need only deal with one entity
    • junket players are generally accompanied by a JTO or JTR who ‘may be able to see to their needs in a manner beyond that which could be facilitated by the casino’
    • ‘JTOs often offer financial incentives to players, such as a portion of the commission the casino pays the JTO’
    • ‘JTOs often offer credit to players’
    • the JTO or JTR is ‘responsible for conducting all financial transactions with the casino, enabling players to focus on their gambling activity’.16
  10. In addition, in the case of premium or junket players who do not ordinarily reside in Australia, the Casino Control Act provides an exemption to the general prohibition of casinos offering credit to patrons.17
  11. Australian casino operators may similarly be attracted to junkets for several reasons:
    • The casino operator’s primary customer is the JTO and it is logistically easier to administer financial arrangements with one party rather than with several.18
    • JTOs are often foreign nationals who have greater capacity to identify and attract players from foreign jurisdictions to Australia (noting that the vast majority of VIP patrons come from mainland China).19
    • The JTO business model relies on repeat access to the same casinos, meaning that JTOs are more likely to repay any credit advanced to them personally (for the benefit of junket players) by a casino operator.20
  12. From the State’s perspective, junkets attract international tourists to Australia, generating both direct gaming revenue and associated taxes and indirect tourism revenue and employment. To remain competitive in a global junket market and thereby attract players from interstate and foreign jurisdictions, casinos have negotiated with state and territory governments to levy a lower rate of gaming tax than that which would otherwise apply.21

How does a junket work?

  1. The following describes how a junket ordinarily comes into existence and its typical features.
  2. First, a casino operator conducts due diligence and credit checks on a potential JTO, and assuming it is satisfied with the results, enters into a written contract with the JTO.22
  3. The JTO identifies prospective players, who are generally residents of a foreign country. Individual junket players enter into separate agreements with the JTO to either provide money up front, or alternatively enter into a private funding arrangement, which may include borrowing from the JTO. The casino is not privy to this financial arrangement.23
  4. Once the JTO has identified a sufficient number of players, the JTO and the casino enter into an agreement for that specific junket program. The agreement outlines whether the JTO will provide front money from its casino account, or whether the casino will provide a line of credit to the JTO. The agreement also ordinarily sets out:
    • the sum of front money, and therefore the expected turnover
    • the commission payable to the JTO (which is usually based on that expected turnover)
    • the terms of any credit provided
    • whether the casino will provide any ‘complimentaries’.24
  5. Players arrive at the casino and their identity is verified by casino staff. The casino provides the JTO or their representative with specialised chips, which are distributed by the JTO to players and only used for junkets. These chips cannot be used on the main gaming floor and must be returned to the casino for settlement of the junket account. The JTO is responsible for settling the account and all other financial transactions with the casino.25
  6. Players gamble with the junket-specific chips for the duration of the junket. Players may leave the program before it ends, settling privately with the JTO. New junket players can be added to the junket while it is progressing. Players can acquire more junket-specific chips by agreement with the JTO.26
  7. At the end of the program, players return the chips that have been won or not played to the JTO. The casino calculates turnover to determine whether the junket has won or lost, the casino tax payable, the commission payable to the JTO and any liability the JTO may have to the casino (for example, if a line of credit was advanced to the JTO by the casino operator).27
  8. The casino operator pays out winnings and commission in accordance with instructions from the JTO. The JTO may instruct that all winnings be paid to it, so that it can distribute those winnings among junket players in the relevant proportions. Payment will often occur offshore. In some circumstances, the JTO may instruct the casino operator to distribute the funds directly to the players, or to third parties. If the junket loses, the JTO is liable to pay the amount of the loss to the casino operator.28

Junkets at Crown Melbourne

  1. In the recent past, junkets were an important—and highly profitable—part of Crown Melbourne’s business.
  2. Between July 2015 and June 2020, Crown Melbourne made well over $1 billion in junket revenue. In the 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 financial years, junkets generated revenue of approximately $445 million, $200 million, $430 million and $310 million respectively.29 In the 2020 financial year, in which revenue was reduced due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions into Australia and the mandated closing of the Melbourne Casino during periods of lockdown,30 Crown Melbourne’s junket revenue stood at just over $170 million.31
  3. The sum of money wagered during junkets over the period 2015 to 2020 was significant. For example, an internal risk assessment of a JTO with whom Crown Melbourne partnered revealed that, between July 2014 and November 2018, the turnover of junkets associated with that JTO alone was more than $20 billion.32
  4. Following the media revelations in mid-2019 concerning Crown Resorts’ relationships with JTOs that had links to organised crime, and the subsequent Bergin Inquiry,33 Crown’s position on junkets changed drastically. The evolution of Crown’s position is set out below, together with a timeline of related regulatory action taken by the VCGLR.34
  5. In August 2020, the Crown Resorts board resolved to suspend its relationship with JTOs so that it could review those relationships in light of matters raised by evidence before the Bergin Inquiry and more generally.35
  6. On 25 September 2020, at a time when international travel into Australia was severely limited due to COVID-19 restrictions, the Crown Resorts board decided to extend that suspension to 30 June 2021 so that it could properly assess the situation. It engaged Berkeley Research Group (BRG) to help it assess its relationships with JTOs.36
  7. On 2 October 2020, the VCGLR served a ‘show cause’ notice on Crown Melbourne under section 20(2) of the Casino Control Act.37 The notice alleged that Crown Melbourne had breached section 121(4) of the Casino Control Act by not dealing with particular JTOs and JTRs in accordance with its approved junket internal control statement (ICS). The notice foreshadowed disciplinary action in respect of that alleged breach and gave Crown Melbourne an opportunity to be heard before any action was taken.
  8. The VCGLR alleged that Crown Melbourne had breached clause 2.5.1 of its ICS by continuing to deal with particular JTOs, agents and junket players. Clause 2.5.1 required Crown Melbourne to ensure that it had robust processes in place to consider the ongoing probity of its registered junket operators, junket players and premium players. The question for the VCGLR was not only whether Crown Melbourne had in place robust probity processes, but whether those processes were followed in the relevant instances.38
  9. On 30 October 2020, Crown Melbourne made written submissions in response to the show cause notice.39 Crown Melbourne’s written (and later oral) submissions were to the effect that its probity processes for assessing junkets were robust, based on applicable standards and Crown Melbourne’s risk appetite at the time.40
  10. On 17 November 2020:
    • The VCGLR amended the show cause notice to add a further alleged breach.41
    • Crown Resorts announced a decision to permanently cease dealing with international junket operators, until any such operator had been licensed or authorised by all regulators in the jurisdictions in which it operated.42
  11. On 12 December 2020, Crown Melbourne made further written submissions in respect of the show cause notice.43
  12. On 21 January 2021, there was a hearing about the matters the subject of the VCGLR’s show cause notice at which Crown Melbourne made oral submissions.44
  13. On 1 February 2021, the Bergin Report was delivered. Chapter 3.4 considered the veracity of media allegations that Crown Resorts or its subsidiaries had partnered with seven junket operators with links to organised crime.45 The Bergin Report recommended that the Casino Control Act 1992 (NSW) be amended to prohibit casino operators in New South Wales from dealing with junket operators.46
  14. On 27 April 2021, the VCGLR handed down its decision in respect of its show cause notice, finding that Crown Melbourne had breached the Casino Control Act in the manner alleged. The VCGLR determined to impose the maximum possible fine of $1 million in respect of that breach. It also issued a letter of censure to Crown Melbourne, directing it, among other things, not to recommence junket operations at the Melbourne Casino until it applies to and receives permission from the VCGLR to do so.47
  15. On 13 May 2021, ILGA issued a media release in which it noted it had reached an agreement with Crown Resorts not to run any international junket operations.48 That media release was in different terms to a media release issued the same day by Crown Resorts, and referred to an earlier Crown Resorts announcement about Crown ceasing to deal with all junket operators.49
  16. Between 16 and 19 May 2021, Solicitors Assisting this Commission exchanged correspondence with the solicitors acting for Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne about those companies’ intentions with respect to junkets at the Melbourne Casino. This exchange culminated in a letter dated 19 May 2021, in which Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne confirmed that both had ceased dealings with international junket operators and JTOs and did not intend to deal with either in the future. The companies noted that the only remaining engagement Crown had with junket operators concerned the termination of junket agreements, the collection of outstanding debts and the return of funds and other property belonging to select operators.50
  17. In its closing submissions, Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne reiterated that neither had any intention of recommencing junket operations.51
  18. Of course, intentions can change.

The risks involved in junkets

  1. There are a number of characteristics of the junket sector that make it particularly susceptible to criminal exploitation. According to the FATF, a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog:

    A vulnerability of junket programmes is that they involve the movement of large amounts of money across borders and through multiple casinos by third parties. Junket participants generally rely on the junket operators to move their funds to and from the casino. This creates layers of obscurity around the source and ownership of the money and the identities of the players.52

  2. The vulnerabilities of junkets to organised crime are set out in detail in Chapter 1.5 of the Bergin Report and need not be repeated at length here.53 The risks largely arise because:
    • arrangements between JTOs, junket players and any third parties with whom JTOs might be affiliated are opaque. Funds are often transferred from abroad to a casino operator who deals only with a JTO or, one further step removed, their JTR. Such opacity around the source of junket funds and who ultimately owns those funds helps junket players and third parties avoid scrutiny and potentially facilitates money laundering54
    • JTOs may extend credit to junket players and therefore may need to enforce debts owed by those players. In circumstances where many junket players come from mainland China, where it is illegal to collect gambling debts, violence and other extra-judicial means of debt recovery may be utilised. This increases the chances of JTOs becoming associated with, if not infiltrated or run by, organised criminals.55
  3. There is a long history of links between junkets and organised crime. During the 1990s, triad turf wars in Macau were fuelled by conflict over who controlled VIP gaming rooms.56 The affiliation between Macau junket operations and organised crime is notorious.57 So too are the money laundering risks associated with junkets.58
  4. AUSTRAC has recognised that casino-based tourism generally is potentially susceptible to money laundering. Common risks it has identified include:
    • people carrying large amounts of cash into or out of countries
    • junket operators moving large sums electronically between casinos or to other jurisdictions
    • layers of obscurity around the source and ownership of money on junket tours.59
  5. In its AUSTRAC Junkets Report, AUSTRAC assessed the junket sector as being at a ‘high’ level of risk of money laundering and/or terrorism financing, on a ‘low-medium-high’ risk scale.60 AUSTRAC identified that the vulnerabilities of junkets to organised crime fall into five broad categories: (a) customers;61 (b) products and services;62 (c) delivery channels;63 (d) exposure to foreign jurisdictions;64 and (e) level of implementation of risk mitigation strategies.65
  6. Crown Melbourne’s former Group Manager for AML, Mr Nick Stokes, expressed broad agreement with AUSTRAC’s assessment of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with junkets.66
  7. The risk that junkets might be exploited for money laundering purposes has materialised at Crown Melbourne. An experienced Victoria Police officer in the Organised Crime Intelligence Unit of Victoria Police gave evidence that money laundering through junkets at the Melbourne Casino was ‘rife’. The officer stated that ‘money that we [Victoria Police] highly suspected was illicit … [was] flooding into junket accounts on a daily basis’. The officer said that the problem was not new but had been ‘happening constantly’ since at least 2007.67
  8. The first two of the AUSTRAC risk categories—customers, and products and services—should be explained in more detail.

Customers

  1. Junket players are inherently higher-risk customers for casino operators. The manner in which junkets operate, and the use of cash within junket programs, increases anonymity for junket players. The primary customer of the casino operator is the JTO, or its JTR. The relationship between the casino and junket players is indirect.
  2. The fact that the funds in junket accounts are pooled makes it more difficult for a casino operator, law enforcement and casino regulators to link transactions made by the JTO to specific junket players. In addition, transaction reports submitted by a casino operator to AUSTRAC and other regulatory bodies about transactions that trigger reporting requirements have limited use because the transactions are likely to be reported under the name of the JTO or JTR rather than the name of any individual player whose actions have triggered the reporting requirement.
  3. The vast majority of junket players in Australia are foreign nationals. AUSTRAC found that 95 per cent of junket players in Australia between 1 April 2018 and 31 March 2019 were foreign residents.68 Having a customer base composed of predominantly foreign residents can increase the junket sector’s attractiveness and exposure to transnational serious and organised crime, simply due to its geographical reach. In addition, such a customer base can mean that the source and destination of funds, and information about customers’ criminal and financial activity, are difficult to identify as they are located in foreign jurisdictions.
  4. As the level of gaming transactions during junkets is relatively high, there is also a higher risk that junkets will be exploited for money laundering.69
  5. Further, AUSTRAC has found that some junkets have been infiltrated by criminals, including members of crime groups operating in Asia, and people involved in transnational money laundering schemes.70
  6. Finally, AUSTRAC has reported that junket accounts are also used by persons who do not have any direct association with a JTO or junket. It identified 193 SMRs recording that a third party was depositing money into a junket account. Some of these were ‘indirect’ cash deposits that third parties may have made into their own casino account, then transferred to a junket account, even though they were not participating in the junket. Casino staff also reported observing third parties giving cash to a JTO or their representative, who made the deposit into the junket account.71
  7. The level of transacting on junket accounts by persons not identified as players on the junket indicates that junket accounts are vulnerable to use for purposes other than junket activity.

Products and services

  1. The activities and services provided by JTOs, and gambling activities generally, provide several opportunities for money laundering. According to AUSTRAC:
    • Money deposited with a casino and then withdrawn with minimal gaming activity ‘will appear to have a legitimate origin, even though very little money was actually risked’. Additionally, any losses sustained can give the incorrect appearance that the customer is engaging in genuine gaming activity.
    • As it is possible to win large amounts following a relatively small outlay, it is difficult for banks at which gamblers’ accounts are held to identify suspicious deposits, or to determine whether income derives from its claimed income source (for example, gambling winnings).
    • Money involved in gambling activities is highly moveable and can be transferred between fiat currency and gaming chips, or transferred to another player, another casino or a domestic or foreign bank.72
  2. In Australia, gambling winnings are not taxable, so funds ‘run through’ a casino can be readily justified as winnings and go untaxed.73

Use of cash

  1. Cash is particularly vulnerable to being laundered because it is anonymous, untraceable and easy to exchange. AUSTRAC has assessed that the high incidence of large cash transactions in the junket sector increases its vulnerability to money laundering and in particular, to the comingling of illicit and legitimate funds.74
  2. Cash for use during junkets can often be deposited directly into bank accounts of casino operators. These transactions are reported to AUSTRAC by the bank rather than the casino. Casinos accepting cash deposits for customer accounts through banks are susceptible to the money laundering method known as cuckoo smurfing and is another way of facilitating the domestic transactions required for offsetting.75

Use of gaming accounts

  1. Casinos can provide ‘gaming accounts’ to JTOs or patrons, operating similarly to an account with a financial institution. Gaming accounts allow account holders to deposit and withdraw funds using chips, cash, personal and bank cheques, intra-casino transfers and domestic electronic transfers.76
  2. AUSTRAC considers junket accounts at casinos to be highly vulnerable to the storage and movement of potentially illicit funds.77 The ‘parking’ of illicit money puts distance between the act or acts that generated the illicit funds and the ultimate recipient(s) of those funds, making it harder to trace the flow of money.

The regulation of junkets

The previous position

  1. The history of gambling regulation in Victoria is set out at length in Chapter 2. There it is explained that Mr Connor, QC’s original view that junkets be dealt with under the Casino Control Act was not adopted. Rather it was left to regulation, and the regulator.
  2. By 2003, with the introduction of the Gambling Regulation Act, the regulator’s oversight of junkets and premium players was replaced with a requirement that the casino operator’s ICSs include ‘procedures for the promotion and conduct of junkets or premium player arrangements’.78
  3. The rationale behind this change is unclear. As noted in Chapter 2, the second reading speech for the Gambling Regulation Bill recorded only:

    In other reforms, probity requirements for junket operators will now be the responsibility of the casino operator, but overseen by the [regulator] through its supervision of the casino’s internal controls and procedures.79

  4. Section 121(1) of the Casino Control Act prohibits a casino operator from conducting casino operations otherwise than in accordance with a written system of internal controls and procedures approved by the VCGLR. Section 122(1) provides that such a system must include details of the matters prescribed in that section. The Gambling Regulation Act introduced a new sub-section 122(1)(w) in the Casino Control Act, which requires the internal controls to include details of ‘procedures for the promotion and conduct of junkets or premium player arrangements’.
  5. Accordingly, at present, the establishment and conduct of junkets at Crown Melbourne is regulated only by its ICS on junket and premium player programs.80 The previous iteration of that ICS required Crown Melbourne to ensure that it has in place robust processes to consider the ongoing probity of junket operators, junket players and premium players.81 The current iteration of the ICS, introduced in December 2020, is in different terms, but also requires Crown Melbourne to consider probity matters.82
  6. Under this regime, the obligation to ensure the probity of JTOs and others involved in junkets with whom Crown Melbourne deals lies squarely with Crown Melbourne.
  7. The VCGLR has only indirect control over junkets at Crown Melbourne. Its role is limited to approving or not approving a proposed ICS regarding Crown Melbourne’s junket operations.
  8. Insofar as the ICS calls for the exercise of discretion or judgement, it is for Crown Melbourne alone to exercise that discretion or judgement. Whether and how Crown Melbourne follows its controls in practice is, to a large degree, a matter for it. The Casino Control Act does not presently grapple with the prospect that Crown Melbourne—as a private enterprise without the investigatory and other powers of a law enforcement body—might not be in a position to adequately ‘vet’ proposed JTOs or JTRs and their close associates. Nor may it be able to investigate the accuracy or appreciate the broader significance of rumours and reports of JTO or JTR links to organised crime or criminal activity.

Is the current regulation effective?

  1. In considering whether the current regulation is effective, it is necessary, first, to understand the circumstances that led to Crown Resorts’ and Crown Melbourne’s decision to cease partnering with JTOs. Those circumstances are, in large part, detailed in the Bergin Report and summarised in Chapter 3.83
  2. There had been media allegations that Crown had partnered with several JTOs that had links to organised crime.84 The Bergin Inquiry found that information in the public domain supported the media allegations in that at least some of the junket operators with whom Crown had dealings had links to organised crime.85 It did not find that Crown was wilfully blind or recklessly indifferent to those links. Rather, it found:
    • Crown had numerous structures in place to deal with junket operators. Those structures were adjusted from time to time and, from mid-July 2017, there were annual reviews into existing operators. Those reviews were, however, most often conducted solely by Crown’s Credit Control Team and rarely escalated to a review panel86
    • Crown gave consideration to publicly available information in respect of the named junket operators, although it reached what the Bergin Inquiry considered to be unjustified conclusions87
    • Crown had flawed structures for reviewing particular junket operators88
    • in some instances, decisions to continue dealing with particular operators ‘may have been infected with error or failed to take into account appropriate matters’.89
  3. During the Bergin Inquiry, Crown Resorts commissioned three independent consultants to review various aspects of its junket arrangements:
    • In August 2019, it commissioned FTI Consulting (FTI) to review its policies and procedures for conducting due diligence research into existing and new JTOs and premium players. The scope of engagement included FTI reviewing sources of information, research methodologies and third party research platforms utilised by Crown in its internal due diligence process to assess the effectiveness and defensibility of its process. FTI delivered a draft report on 10 September 2019.90 It was the first review of Crown Resorts’ junket due diligence process.91
    • In April 2020, it commissioned Deloitte to review Crown Resorts’ decision-making processes related to JTOs and persons of interest. Deloitte’s scope of work included identifying opportunities for Crown to enhance its due diligence and decision-making frameworks. Deloitte delivered its report on 26 August 2020.92
    • In July 2020, it commissioned BRG to undertake a discrete due diligence investigation into specified JTOs and JTRs. BRG delivered its report on 12 September 2020.93
  4. Having received those reports, Crown Resorts made a series of concessions to the Bergin Inquiry about its junket due diligence processes.94 It accepted that due diligence carried out on some junket operators did not identify all necessary information, or otherwise result in information that was identified being analysed in a way that accurately assessed risk.95 It also accepted that there was a need for greater input from its Compliance and AML Teams in the due diligence process, noting that letting people on the operational side of the business have the final say on vetting junket operators could cause tension.96
  5. Notwithstanding those concessions, which were plainly open to be made, the evidence examined by this Commission demonstrates that Crown’s problems with junkets went beyond a lack of information and lack of input from relevant compliance units. For example, Crown Resorts’ conduct after receiving the draft FTI report is troubling and demonstrates both a reluctance to improve its internal processes and a failing in its risk management procedures and processes.
  6. The draft FTI report did not conclude that Crown’s junket probity processes were defensible or robust. Rather, it made 29 recommendations, relating to 16 aspects of its probity processes, about how Crown could improve its due diligence into existing and new JTOs and premium players.97 In particular, it recommended that: (a) due diligence be conducted not only on JTOs but also on junket tour agents; (b) the outcome of all due diligence decisions by management be documented; and (c) Crown ‘[build] the capability’ of its staff undertaking due diligence research,98 implying that Crown’s capacity at that time was insufficient.
  7. As Ms Anne Siegers, the Chief Risk Officer of Crown Resorts, accepted in the course of her evidence, the draft FTI report revealed significant gaps in Crown’s due diligence processes as they existed in September 2019.99 Insofar as the report identified that Crown Melbourne’s probity processes regarding junkets were not ‘robust’, as required by its then current junkets ICS, Ms Siegers conceded that some kind of response from Crown Melbourne was required.100
  8. Despite this, it appears that:
    • the draft FTI report was not circulated to relevant stakeholders and never tabled at a Crown Melbourne RMC meeting101
    • no request was ever made to FTI to finalise its draft report
    • no changes were made to Crown Melbourne’s ICS on junkets and premium players in response to the 29 recommendations contained in the draft FTI report102
    • junket operations continued unchanged.
  9. One possible explanation for the inaction of Crown Resorts and Crown Melbourne is that the FTI report was commissioned solely with a view to assisting Crown Resorts defend the robustness of its junket probity processes before the Bergin Inquiry, rather than to genuinely assist it identify deficiencies in and improve those processes (or otherwise with that dual purpose). When it became apparent that, if finalised, the draft FTI report could not be deployed in the manner intended, it appears to have been shelved.
  10. Whatever the reason Crown Resorts failed to act on the draft FTI report, it was not the conduct expected of a suitable associate of a licensee. Due to the operational dependence of Crown Melbourne on Crown Resorts, and the intimate interconnection of the affairs of Crown Melbourne and Crown Resorts, the failure to act on the draft FTI report reflects also on the suitability of Crown Melbourne. That failure to act is not the conduct expected of a suitable licensee.
  11. As had been observed, in April 2020, Crown Resorts engaged Deloitte to review its decision making processes related to JTOs and persons of interest. The scope of Deloitte’s engagement was different to and narrower than the scope of FTI’s engagement, although there was a degree of overlap. Deloitte’s scope of work included identifying opportunities for Crown to enhance its due diligence and decision making frameworks. Both the FTI draft report and the Deloitte report were completed by Dr Murray Lawson, who had moved from FTI to Deloitte after FTI delivered its draft report and before Deloitte received instructions to prepare a separate report. This only came to light after Dr Lawson gave evidence to the Commission and was not explained.103
  12. In August 2020 Deloitte delivered its report. It contained 27 recommendations.104
  13. The report noted that probity assessments were primarily managed by the Crown Credit Team and made several recommendations about involving Crown’s AML, Compliance, and Security and Surveillance Teams in the due diligence process.105 In his evidence to the Commission, Dr Lawson agreed that a lack of documentation of ‘reasoning and rationales’ was a theme of the Deloitte report.106 He also said that Crown Melbourne had avoided costly due diligence searches into JTOs even though junket operations contributed millions of dollars of revenue each year.107
  14. The Deloitte report repeated many of the same observations, and made similar recommendations, as the draft FTI report of the previous year.108 For instance, one recommendation made by Deloitte was that ‘[t]hose staff members in the Credit team who are responsible for conducting due diligence [be] provided with formal training in open-source research and information collection’, and that ‘internal training documents [be] supplemented to include guidance on carrying out searches and due diligence checks …’.109 The draft FTI report had similarly recommended that ‘[s]taff members conducting DD [due diligence] … be provided with formal training and support in Information Collection, Due Diligence …’ and that ‘[s]taff members conducting DD … develop a comprehensive research manual that contains guidance on search strategies, information sources, and how best [to] utilise the available resources’.110
  15. Another example is the recommendation by Deloitte that Crown obtain details of authorised junket agents as part of the initial information provided to it by new JTOs. The draft FTI report had similarly recommended that Crown’s Marketing Team ‘obtain details of all authorised agents from [JTOs] as part of the initial onboarding procedure’.111 There are many other examples.
  16. In its closing submissions, Crown itself acknowledged the ‘similar[ities]’ between the observations and recommendations in both reports.112 That recommendations needed to be repeated across the two reports makes plain that Crown Resorts did not take the deficiencies in its junket due diligence processes sufficiently seriously.
  17. In September 2020, shortly after the completion of the Deloitte report, BRG delivered its report. BRG’s work involved it making a series of inquiries to verify the probity or otherwise of particular individuals and entities that had entered into junket arrangements with Crown Melbourne. BRG had discussions with industry sources, and with regulatory and other contacts in regions relevant to the persons being investigated. The BRG report confirmed that several JTOs were suspected to be involved in illegal activity. Despite this, Crown Resorts entered into arrangements with those JTOs, presumably because the illegal activity was unproven.113 That is, substantive rumours of criminal conduct or criminal association were not a deterrent.
  18. Of particular relevance to the question of regulation, it should be noted that there was nothing groundbreaking in BRG’s methods of investigation. BRG did not discover a new way of conducting due diligence. Crown could have engaged BRG or a similar organisation to investigate probity concerns surrounding persons with dubious reputations when those concerns first arose, and otherwise well prior to mid-2020. Crown could also have carried out more thorough investigations itself. It did neither.114
  19. Whatever the reason for Crown’s inaction, it is not the conduct expected of a suitable licensee, or a suitable associate of a licensee.
  20. It is apparent from the foregoing that Crown continued to deal with persons with links to organised crime before it suspended junket operations at least partly because of inadequacies in its junket due diligence processes and the implementation of those processes.
  21. However, even with best practice processes, difficulties would have remained.
  22. Crown Resorts directors and former directors themselves gave evidence to the Bergin Inquiry about the complexities of dealing with JTOs.115 Crown Resorts’ then Chief Executive Officer of Australian Resorts, Mr Barry Felstead, gave evidence to the effect that Crown did not always have access to all information it would require to make an informed decision about whether to deal with particular JTOs or JTRs.116 He advocated for a nationwide junket licensing regime in which licensing would be done by ‘an independent party’.117
  23. In its closing submissions to the Bergin Inquiry, Crown Resorts reflected on this difficulty. It said:

    … Crown accepts that there have been shortcomings in its junket due diligence processes. Crown also accepts that, in their most recent form, those processes do not eliminate all risks associated with junkets. One reason that is so is because a casino operator can never have full information, and usually will have significantly less information than that which is available to regulators and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, there is a question whether Crown or other casino operators should continue to deal with junkets in future absent licensing, approval or sanction of junkets by regulators.118

  24. There is no doubt that the ability of casino operators to ensure they do not deal with junkets or junket operators engaging in or facilitating criminal behaviour is limited by the opaque nature of many junket operators. As a private enterprise, Crown Melbourne has limited powers to see through that opacity itself. One might read Crown Resorts’ and Crown Melbourne’s stated intention not to deal with international junket operators and JTOs in future as an implied admission of that fact and the untenable nature of the associated risks.
  25. In circumstances where: (a) as the Bergin Inquiry concluded, Crown partnered with numerous junket operators with links to organised crime; (b) there were system and process failures in the way Crown carried out probity checks and periodic assessments of junket operators—unidentified by the regulator prior to the media revelations and events of the Bergin Inquiry; and (c) there are limitations inherent in any private enterprise’s ability to assess probity, particularly of persons outside the jurisdiction, it cannot be suggested that the current regulatory framework is effective. It is not.

An effective regulatory approach

  1. There are four possible approaches to regulating junkets:
    • Maintain the current regulatory regime in the hopes that Crown Melbourne will implement better procedures for assessing the probity of JTOs and others in the junket sector, with a commitment to probity over profit.
    • Revert to the regulatory model in place prior to 2003: this model would shift the burden of establishing the probity of JTOs and JTRs to the VCGLR, assisted by the Chief Commissioner of Police.
    • Implement a similar but stricter regulatory model, such as that in place in Singapore.
    • In recognition of the significant risks inherent in junket operations, as acknowledged in the AUSTRAC Junkets Report and by Crown’s Group Manager for AML, ban junkets altogether.
  2. The regulatory regime in Singapore bears brief description.
  3. Casino operators in Singapore are governed by the Casino Control Act 2006 (Singapore).119 The Casino Regulatory Authority (CRA) is the regulator responsible for administering that Act. Section 110A of the Act requires JTOs, referred to in the Act as ‘International Marketing Agents’ (IMAs), and persons employed by IMAs as their representatives or agents, to be licensed by the CRA. Severe penalties, including imprisonment, apply to contraventions of section 110A.
  4. Part II of the Casino Control (Casino Marketing Arrangements) Regulations 2013 (Singapore) governs IMA licence applications.120 Among other things, regulation 7 requires all applications for a licence to be accompanied by: (a) documentary evidence from a casino operator of its intention to enter into an ‘international market arrangement’ with the IMA applicant; and (b) an endorsement from that casino operator stating that, having regard to the suitability of the applicant, the casino operator is satisfied that entering into such an agreement with the applicant will not affect the credibility, integrity or stability of its casino operations. The application must be accompanied by a due diligence report on the applicant.
  5. Regulation 13 sets out the matters to which the CRA shall have regard in considering any application for an IMA licence. These include:
    • the financial soundness and stability of the applicant
    • any information that the applicant is not of good repute, having regard to character, honesty and integrity
    • the nature of the ownership, trust or corporate structure of the applicant, where applicable
    • whether the applicant or its associates have business associations with persons not of good repute or with undesirable or unsatisfactory financial resources
    • the applicant and its associates’ track record of compliance with legal and regulatory regimes in Singapore and elsewhere.
  6. The CRA may require the applicant to consent to having their photograph, fingerprints and palm prints taken and sent to the Commissioner of Police, who may inquire into and report on such matters as the CRA requests.121
  7. As with the previous regime in place in Victoria, licences are valid only for the period specified by the regulator, and cannot exceed three years.122
  8. Once licensed, an IMA is subject to a variety of duties and must still comply with requests for information from the CRA.123 The IMA must keep extensive records of every casino marketing arrangement that it organises, promotes or conducts, including player details and other prescribed matters.
  9. At present, there are no IMAs licensed under the Singaporean regime.124
  10. Of the four potential options outlined above, the first option—maintenance of the current regime—can quickly be discounted. It does nothing to address the inherent limitations on a casino operator’s ability to accurately and thoroughly assess the probity or otherwise of third parties, particularly where those parties are based in foreign jurisdictions.
  11. The first option also pays insufficient regard to the fact that:
    • as recently as late last year, Crown’s own experts examined Crown’s junket probity processes and found them substandard
    • Crown’s conduct regarding junkets to date has shown that it cannot, at least yet, be left to its own devices in managing the risks associated with junkets
    • a casino operator will always have a financial self-interest in partnering with profitable JTOs and JTRs, even in the face of doubts about their probity.
  12. The second and third options—reverting to the regulatory model in place before 2013 or implementing a model similar to that in place in Singapore respectively—are not dissimilar, though both have disadvantages. The second option would likely result in a not insignificant cost to the State, for the primary benefit of a private enterprise. If that course were to be adopted, a mechanism might be introduced where the casino operator bears those costs or some portion of those costs, given that the relevant regulatory work would effectively be undertaken on its behalf.
  13. The Singaporean regime is more developed than the model previously contained in the Casino Control Act and related regulations. It appears to represent a superior model for junket licensing. One difficulty for a Victorian—as opposed to a Federal—regulator may be gaining access to relevant information from foreign jurisdictions about foreign nationals and associated entities. This much was acknowledged by the VCGLR, which, in its closing submissions observed:

    ...

    1. Any regulatory licensing regime will face difficulties in assessing, verifying and ensuring the probity of junket entities given they are commonly foreign entities, require the provision of intelligence and evidence from Commonwealth and overseas agencies, and require adequate resourcing to thoroughly investigate.
    2. Doing so may be seen to transfer the obligation of a casino operator, who should, as a suitable person, ensure that the entities they do business with, including junkets, are themselves suitable, to the regulator ...125
  14. In circumstances where players who might otherwise participate in junkets can instead enter into premium player arrangements with casino operators directly, the fourth option can be justified by the findings of the AUSTRAC Junkets Report and the inherent and demonstrated risks associated with junkets.

Recommendation 8: Regulation of junkets

It is recommended that the Casino Control Act be amended to prohibit a casino operator from dealing with junket tour operators.

Endnotes

1 The Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 3 defines ‘junket’ to mean ‘an arrangement whereby a person or group of people is introduced to a casino operator by a junket organiser or promoter who receives a commission based on the turnover of play in the casino attributable to persons introduced by the organiser or promoter or otherwise calculated by reference to such play’.

2 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 68 [27].

3 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 16 [22].

4 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 19 [40]; see also 24 [63].

5 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 16 [22].

6 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 16 [22].

7 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 15 [16].

8 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 17 [24].

9 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 15–16 [16]–[17].

10 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 15 [16].

11 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 67–8 [21]–[24].

12 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 67–8 [23]–[25].

13 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 67 [22]–[23].

14 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 67 [21].

15 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020).

16 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8.

17 Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) s 68(8).

18 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8.

19 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8; Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 14 [9].

20 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8.

21 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 7.

22 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8.

23 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 8.

24 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 9.

25 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 9.

26 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 9.

27 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 9.

28 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 9.

29 Exhibit RC0455 Junket Operators and Premium Players revenue spreadsheet, n.d.; Adrian Finanzio, Penny Neskovcin, Meg O’Sullivan and Geoffrey Kozminsky, Counsel Assisting Submissions, Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence (14 July 2021) 196 [2.4].

30 Indeed, in its closing submissions to the Bergin Inquiry, Crown Resorts and Crown Sydney Gaming Pty Ltd observed that ‘it has in practice been impossible since March 2020 for junkets to operate at Crown Melbourne or Crown Perth’: Exhibit RC1560 Crown Resorts, Closing submission to Bergin Inquiry, n.d., 64 [216].

31 Exhibit RC0455 Junket Operators and Premium Players revenue spreadsheet, n.d.

32 Exhibit RC0463 Letter from DLA Piper to Solicitors Assisting, 31 May 2021, Annexure i, 152 [454]; Exhibit RC1561 Crown Melbourne ML/TF Risk Assessment Review, n.d.

33 See, eg, Exhibit RC1554 Article: How ‘Mr Chinatown’ Delivered the Whales, 29 July 2019; Exhibit RC1555 Article: How Australia’s Casino Got Tied Up With Criminals, 29 July 2019; Exhibit RC1556 Article: Casinos Face Probe into Organised Crime Links, 1 August 2019.

34 For a detailed timeline of the regulatory action, see Chapter 10.

35 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [17].

36 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [17]; Crown Resorts, ‘ILGA Inquiry—Evidence’ (ASX Media Release, 25 September 2020).

37 Exhibit RC1523 Letter from Ross Kennedy to Barry Felstead, 2 October 2020.

38 Exhibit RC0292 VCGLR Confidential Reasons for Decision, 27 April 2021, 10 [33]–[36].

39 Exhibit RC0366 VCGLR Transcript of proceedings in the matter of Crown Melbourne, 21 January 2021, 2.

40 Exhibit RC0292 VCGLR Confidential Reasons for Decision, 27 April 2021, 11 [41].

41 Exhibit RC0366 VCGLR Transcript of proceedings in the matter of Crown Melbourne, 21 January 2021, 2.

42 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 302 [19]; Crown Resorts, ‘Future Junket Relationships—Update’ (ASX Media Release, 17 November 2020).

43 Exhibit RC0366 VCGLR Transcript of proceedings in the matter of Crown Melbourne, 21 January 2021, 2.

44 Exhibit RC0366 VCGLR Transcript of proceedings in the matter of Crown Melbourne, 21 January 2021.

45 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 298 [2]; Exhibit RC0970 Bergin Report Volume 2, 1 February 2021, 692 [15(c)]. A summary of the Bergin Report’s findings regarding junkets is set out in Chapter 3 of this Report.

46 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, v [11].

47 Exhibit RC0292 VCGLR Confidential Reasons for Decision, 27 April 2021, 2.

48 ILGA, ‘Bergin Report Update Regarding Crown’s Barangaroo Casino’ (Media Release, 13 May 2021) 1.

49 Crown Resorts, ‘NSW ILGA Announcement in Relation to Crown Sydney’ (ASX Media Release, 13 May 2021).

50 Exhibit RC0461 Letter from Allens Linklaters to Solicitors Assisting, 19 May 2021.

51 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 154 [E.4].

52 FATF, Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector (Report, March 2009) 48 [153].

53 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63–8.

54 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 4.

55 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [3]–[4].

56 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 63 [1].

57 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 64 [5]–[6].

58 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 64 [7].

59 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 64–5 [9].

60 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 3.

61 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 25.

62 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 31.

63 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 35.

64 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 37.

65 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 41.

66 Transcript of Nicholas Stokes, 20 May 2021, 364.

67 Transcript of A Police Officer, 18 June 2021, 2079–80.

68 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 4, 10, 28.

69 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 28.

70 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 29.

71 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 31.

72 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 31. Fiat currency is currency that is designated and accepted as legal tender within a country; ie coin or paper money.

73 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 31.

74 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 32.

75 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 34.

76 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 34.

77 AUSTRAC, Junket Tour Operations in Australia: Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment (Report, 11 December 2020) 34.

78 Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) s 12.1.2, sch 5 item 115(b); Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic) ss 121(1), 122(1)(w).

79 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 2 December 2003, 1989 (Justin Madden).

80 See, eg, Exhibit RC0969 Crown Melbourne Junket and Premium Player Programs ICS version 10, 24 December 2015; Exhibit RC1276 Crown Melbourne Junket and Premium Player Programs ICS version 11, December 2020.

81 Exhibit RC0969 Crown Melbourne Junket and Premium Player Programs ICS version 10, 24 December 2015, cl 2.5.1.

82 Exhibit RC1276 Crown Melbourne Junket and Premium Player Programs ICS version 11, December 2020.

83 See generally Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, Chapter 3.4.

84 See Chapter 3.

85 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 313 [100], 314 [107].

86 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [126], 319 [133].

87 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 320 [136].

88 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 320 [139].

89 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [133].

90 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019.

91 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, 6–8.

92 Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i.

93 Exhibit RC0453 BRG Investigative Report regarding Chau Cheok Wa et al, 12 September 2020.

94 See Chapter 3.

95 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 319 [129(d)].

96 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 318 [127]–[128].

97 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, Annexure 5.

98 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, 7.

99 Transcript of Anne Siegers, 10 June 2021, 2021.

100 Transcript of Anne Siegers, 10 June 2021, 2030.

101 See, eg, Transcript of Anne Siegers, 10 June 2021, 2013, 2015, 2021–2; Transcript of Jane Halton, 7 July 2021, 3576.

102 Adrian Finanzio, Penny Neskovcin, Meg O’Sullivan and Geoffrey Kozminsky, Counsel Assisting Submissions, Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence (14 July 2021) 232–3 [6.8]–[6.10].

103 Adrian Finanzio, Penny Neskovcin, Meg O’Sullivan and Geoffrey Kozminsky, Counsel Assisting Submissions, Royal Commission into the Casino Operator and Licence (14 July 2021) 203 [6.12].

104 Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i, Appendix G.

105 See, eg, recommendation 18 in Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i, Appendix G.

106 Transcript of Murray Lawson, 20 May 2021, 302.

107 Transcript of Murray Lawson, 20 May 2021, 307.

108 Cf Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, Annexure 5 and Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i, Appendix G.

109 Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i, Appendix G, recommendation 4.

110 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, Annexure 5.

111 Exhibit RC0192 FTI Consulting Review of Due Diligence Procedures for Operators and Premium Players Crown Resorts draft report, 10 September 2019, Annexure 5 (Agents) and Exhibit RC0354 Third Statement of Xavier Walsh, 3 May 2021, Annexure i, Appendix G, recommendation 7.

112 Responsive submission Crown Melbourne Limited and Crown Resorts Limited, 2 August 2021, 165 [E.38].

113 Transcript of Xavier Walsh, 5 July 2021, 3305–6.

114 Transcript of Xavier Walsh, 5 July 2021, 3305–6.

115 Exhibit RC0445 Bergin Report Volume 1, 1 February 2021, 301 [18].

116 Bergin Inquiry Transcript (Felstead), 19 August 2020, 1328–34.

117 Bergin Inquiry Transcript (Felstead), 19 August 2020, 1334.

118 Exhibit RC1560 Crown Resorts closing submission to the Bergin Inquiry, n.d., 64 [215].

119 Casino Control Act (Singapore, cap 33A, 2007 rev ed).

120 See also Casino Control Act (Singapore, cap 33A, 2007 rev ed) s 110B.

121 Casino Control (Casino Marketing Arrangements) Regulations 2013 (Singapore) rr 10(2)(c), 10(2)(d), 10(3).

122 Casino Control (Casino Marketing Arrangements) Regulations 2013 (Singapore) r 17.

123 Casino Control (Casino Marketing Arrangements) Regulations 2013 (Singapore) pt III, particularly r 24.

124 ‘Licenses & Approvals’, CRA (Web Page, 1 March 2021) < www.cra.gov.sg/licenses-approvals/licenses/External Link international-market-agents>.

125 Responsive submission VCGLR, 2 August 2021, 56–7 [165(c)]–[165(d)].

Reviewed 25 October 2021